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


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DISQUISITIONS

RELATING TO

MATTER AND SPIRIT.

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Cipriani del. Bartolozzi Sculp.

I have laid the foundation & another build-
-eth thereon: But let every man take heed
how he buildeth thereon. 1 Cor. 3. 10.

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DISQUISITIONS

RELATING TO

MATTER AND SPIRIT.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

The History of the Philosophical Doctrine concerning the Origin of the Soul, and the Nature of Matter; with its Influence on Christianity, especially with Respect to the Doctrine of the Pre-existence of Christ.

By JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL.D. F.R.S.

Si quelqu'un demontreroit jamais, qu *l'âme eſt materielle*, loin de s'en alarmer, il faudroit admirer la puiſſance, qui auroit donné a la matiere la capacité de penſer.

BONNETT. *Palingeneſie.* Vol. I, p. 50.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON, No. 72, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD, 1777.

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TO THE

REV. WILLIAM GRAHAM.

DEAR SIR,

I TAKE the liberty to dedicate to you a work, written with greater freedom than any that I have hitherto offered to the Public. An enemy of bigotry, and a diſtinguiſhed champion for freedom of thinking, in very trying ſituations, as you have long been, I am ſatisfied you will not be diſpleaſed with any effort of the ſpirit with which you have ever been animated, and which you have done ſo much to inſpire.

Educated, as you know I was, in the very ſtraiteſt principles of *reputed orthodoxy*, and zealous as I once was

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for every tenet of the ſyſtem, it was, in a great meaſure, by your example and encouragement, at my entrance on theological inquiries, that I adventured to think for myſelf on ſubjects of the greateſt importance; and that I have been able, in the courſe of a ſlow and laborious inveſtigation, to free myſelf from many vulgar prejudices, and to reject many groſs corruptions, as I now deem them, of that religion which is the beſt gift of God to man, and to attain to the degree of conviction and ſatisfaction of mind which I now enjoy. Every obligation of this important kind I hope I ſhall always remember with peculiar pleaſure and gratitude.

After a ſufficiently tempeſtuous life, you are now enjoying yourſelf in a *tranquill retirement*, and ſeeing others contend with the ſtorm, the fury

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fury of which you have borne, and which you have, in ſome meaſure, broken, and rendered leſs hazardous to thoſe who come after you. My time of withdrawing from this buſy ſcene is not yet come; but while I feel myſelf animated with your *love of truth*, I ſhall enjoy an enviable compoſure even in the midſt of the tempeſt; and I ſhall endeavour to relieve the ſeverity of theſe more ſerious purſuits, with thoſe of *philoſophy*, as you have done with thoſe of *claſſical literature*.

Whatever you may think of ſome parts of my *reaſoning* in the principal work, now preſented to you, I am confident you will approve of the main *object* of it, and eſpecially the *Sequel*. You have long been an aſſertor of the *proper unitarian doctrine*, and cannot be diſpleaſed with my en-

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deavouring to trace to their ſource in heathen antiquity, thoſe capital corruptions of chriſtianity—the *Athanaſian* and *Arian* opinions.

The proper *unity of God*, the maker and governor of the world, and the proper *humanity of Chriſt*, you juſtly conſider as reſpectively eſſential to natural and revealed religion; and conſequently entertain a reaſonable ſuſpicion and dread of any opinions that infringe upon them; and the more venerable thoſe opinions have become on account of their *antiquity*, or the *numbers*, or worldly *power*, by which they are ſupported, ſo much the more do they excite your indignation and zeal.

I rejoice with you, on account of ſuch a prevalence of free inquiry, and good ſenſe in matters of religion, in the preſent age, as cannot fail, in the

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end, to overturn the *antichriſtian ſyſtems* that have been permitted by divine providence to prevail ſo long in the chriſtian world, and conſequently (though probably in a remote period) the *antichriſtian tyrannies* that have ſupported them.

I am,

with the greateſt eſteem,

Dear Sir,

your affectionate friend,

and chriſtian brother

J. PRIESTLEY.

Calne,
July, 1777.

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THE PREFACE.

IT may appear ſomething extraordinary, but it is ſtrictly true, that but a very few years ago, I was ſo far from having any thoughts of writing on the ſubject of this publication, that I had not even adopted the opinion contended for in it. Like the generality of chriſtians in the preſent age, I had always taken it for granted, that man had a ſoul diſtinct from his body, though with many modern divines, I ſuppoſed it to be incapable of exerting any of its faculties, independently upon the body; and I believed this ſoul to be a ſubſtance ſo intirely diſtinct from matter, as to have no property in common with it. Of this ſeveral traces may be found in my *Inſtitutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*, and probably in ſome of my other writings.

Not but that I very well remember that many doubts occurred to me on the ſubject of the intimate union of two ſubſtances ſo intirely

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heterogeneous as the ſoul and the body were repreſented to be. And even when I firſt entered upon metaphyſical inquiries, I thought that either the *material*, or *immaterial* part of the univerſal ſyſtem was ſuperfluous. But not giving any very particular attention to a ſubject on which I could get no light, I relapſed into the general hypotheſis of *two intirely diſtinct and independent principles in man*, connected in ſome unknown and incomprehenſible manner; and I acquieſced in it as well as I could.

Father Boſcovich and Mr. Michell's new theory concerning matter, of which I gave an account in my *Hiſtory of Diſcoveries relating to Viſion* &c. was calculated, as will be ſeen, to throw the greateſt light on the conſtituent principles of human nature; but it was a conſiderable time before I could bring myſelf really to receive a doctrine ſo new, though ſo ſtrictly philoſophical; and beſides I had nothing of a metaphyſical nature in contemplation at that time.

It was upon reſuming ſome of my metaphyſical ſpeculations, to which (like moſt other perſons of a ſtudious turn) I had been exceedly attached in the early period of my literary life,

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life (when I publiſhed my *Examination of the Principles of Common Senſe*, as maintained by Dr. Beattie, &c. and when I republiſhed Dr. *Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind*) that I firſt entertained a ſerious doubt of the truth of the vulgar hypotheſis; and writing, as I always do, with great frankneſs, I freely expreſſed that doubt, exactly as it then ſtood in my mind; and I think it is hardly poſſible to expreſs any thing with more heſitation and diffidence. The paragraph I allude to is the following:

"I am rather inclined to think, though the "ſubject is beyond our comprehenſion at pre- "ſent, that man does not conſiſt of *two princi-* "*ples* ſo eſſentially different from one another "as *matter* and *ſpirit*, which are always deſcrib- "ed as having no one common property, by "means of which they can affect, or act upon, "each other; the one occupying ſpace, and the "other not only not occupying the leaſt imagi- "nable portion of ſpace, but incapable of bear- "ing any relation to it; inſomuch that, proper- "ly ſpeaking, my mind is no more in my bo- "dy, than it is in the moon. I rather think that "the whole man is of ſome *uniform compoſition*; "and that the property of *perception*, as well "as the other powers that are termed *mental*,

"is

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" is the result (whether necessary, or not) of " such an organical structure as that of the " brain: consequently, that the whole man " becomes extinct at death, and that we have " no hope of surviving the grave, but what is " derived from the scheme of revelation.

I little imagined that such a paragraph as this could have given the alarm that I presently found it had done. My *doubts* were instantly converted into a *full persuasion*, and the cry against me as an *unbeliever*, and a *favourer of atheism*, was exceedingly general and loud; and was echoed from quarters where more candour and better discernment might have been expected. With what *intention* this was done, is best known to the authors of such gross defamation. I shall proceed to relate the *consequences* of it, for which they are, in some measure, answerable.

This odium, which I had thus unexpectedly drawn upon myself, served to engage my more particular attention to the subject of it; and this at length terminated in a full conviction, that the doubt I had expressed was well founded. Continuing to reflect upon the subject, I became satisfied that, if we suffer ourselves to be guided in our inquiries by the universally

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verſally acknowledged *rules of philoſophizing*, we ſhall find ourſelves intirely unauthorized to admit any thing in man beſides that *body* which is the object of our ſenſes; and my own obſervations, and my collection of opinions on the ſubject, preſently ſwelled to the bulk that is now before the Public.

Theſe obſervations I now lay before the reader, whatever be his diſpoſition of mind with reſpect to myſelf, or my ſubject, with the ſame openneſs and ſimplicity with which I firſt propoſed my ſimple doubt; and, judging from what has paſſed, I may imagine that, if the *ſimple doubt* occaſioned ſo great an alarm and outcry, the unreſerved avowal of my *intire conviction* on the ſubject will cauſe a much greater alarm. And yet in this apprehenſion I may poſſibly be miſtaken; and as, on the former occaſion, the offence was taken when I was leaſt aware of it, the popular clamour may have ſpent itſelf, and may begin to ſubſide, on the very occaſion on which I imagined it would be inflamed to the utmoſt.

Men of reaſon and religion may attend to the arguments that I have produced, from *reaſon* and the *ſcriptures*, in ſupport of my hypotheſis, and may be ſatisfied that my opinion is neither

neither irrational in itſelf, nor deſtitute of countenance in the ſacred writings, and therefore certainly not *dangerous*; and the favour of *the few* may ſilence the clamour of *the many*.

On the other hand, the tide of popular prejudice may riſe ſtill higher, and though I have ſpent the greateſt part of my life in the ſtudy and defence of chriſtianity, the ſuſpicion of my being an unbeliever, and an underminer of all religion, may be confirmed; and, like Mr. Hobbes, I may for generations lie under the imputation of abſolute atheiſm.

Be this as it may; I feel a great *preſent eaſe* in the idea of publiſhing my thoughts with the moſt unreſerved freedom on this important ſubject; and I am not without hopes that, though many well meaning chriſtians may, for ſome time, rank me with unbelievers, ſome unbelievers, of a philoſophical turn of mind, may, on this very account, be prevailed upon to attend to the ſubject; and finding the true ſyſtem of revelation to be quite another thing than they had imagined it to be, and infinitely more *conſonant to the real appearances of nature*, may think it worth their while to conſider it in various *other lights*, and attend to the *evidence* that myſelf and others have produced

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in favour of it, and ſo, from being infidels, in conſequence of not underſtanding what chriſtianity really is, and not ſufficiently examining the evidence of it, which is generally the caſe, they may become rational chriſtians.

A very few converts of this kind would, in my eſtimation, compenſate for a great deal of odium among profeſſed chriſtians. Their indignation would do neither themſelves, nor me, much harm; whereas the conviction of the *reaſonableneſs* and *truth* of chriſtianity, in a few really thinking and intelligent unbelievers, might do the greateſt good; and even contribute to put a ſtop, ſooner than otherwiſe would be done, to the infidelity of the philoſophical part of the world.

To effect this, in any tolerable degree, would be an object indeed; and the man who ſhould in any meaſure ſucceed in it, could not be ſaid to have lived, to have written, or to have been calumniated in vain. I am fully ſatisfied that it will be to no purpoſe to expect the converſion of philoſophical unbelievers to that ſyſtem of opinions which now generally paſſes for chriſtianity, and eſpecially that which is *eſtabliſhed* in the different countries of Europe under that name. Becauſe concluſions contrary

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to all *natural appearances*, will never be admitted by them to be true.

So very free and undiſguiſed an attack upon an opinion almoſt univerſally deemed to be of the utmoſt importance to all religion, natural or revealed, may be expected to rouſe the zeal of many friends to the prevailing ſyſtem, and produce *defences* of it. This is what I *expect*, and what I *wiſh*; and as I am prepared for it, I will take this opportunity of acquainting my readers with the rule I have laid down to myſelf on ſimilar occaſions, and to which I propoſe to adhere in this.

I by no means think it right to reſolve, with Mr. Hume, to take no notice of any antagoniſt whatever. I might as well refuſe to make any reply to a perſon who ſhould addreſs himſelf to me in converſation, after I had thought proper to direct my diſcourſe to him: for in printed publications we, in fact, addreſs all the world. A *pertinent*, and eſpecially a *decent*, reply, requires, I think, a reſpectful notice, though a very *abſurd* and *impertinent* one may juſtly, as in converſation, be treated with neglect. The Public, in whoſe preſence every thing paſſes, will judge for themſelves, whether a man refuſes to make a reply becauſe

he

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he is not able to make a good one, or becauſe he has ſome ſufficient reaſon for not doing it. It muſt, however, be acknowledged, that even the general and public opinion *may* be ſo unreaſonable, that a writer may be juſtified in paying no attention to it, and in appealing to the more mature judgment of poſterity.

It is, I preſume, ſufficiently evident from the ſtrain of my publications, that *general applauſe* has not been my object. I know that they are rather calculated to narrow the circle of my friends, though I hope they will leave me enow for any valuable purpoſe in life. I ſhall not, therefore, feel myſelf diſpoſed to take notice of *every* attack upon this treatiſe, and eſpecially ſuch as may be *anonymous*. But if the principles advanced in it be controverted by any perſon whoſe name, as a metaphyſician, or divine, is *generally reſpected*, I do aſſure him that I will take more or leſs notice of him; either acknowledging any miſtakes I may be convinced I have fallen into, or endeavouring to convince him of his. Even a very *able*, or *very plauſible*, anonymous antagoniſt ſhall not be neglected. For, as in the controverſy which I began with the Scotch writers, I really wiſh to have the ſubject freely and fully canvaſſed.

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There are ſubjects on which, after a reaſonable attention to them, a man may be authorized to *make up his mind*, ſo as to be juſtified in refuſing even to loſe his time in reading what may be addreſſed to him on it; becauſe he may have ſufficient ground to preſume it cannot contain any thing materially new to him. This is what moſt proteſtants will avow with reſpect to the popiſh doctrine of *tranſubſtantiation*, and I avow it with reſpect to the doctrine of the *trinity*, and various other articles of Calviniſtic theology. I have at this time by me ſeveral tracts, particularly *Letters* addreſſed to me, on thoſe ſubjects, and which have been much applauded, which I have not looked into, and which I profeſs I never intend to look into. But this is not the caſe with reſpect to the ſubject of this treatiſe. I will carefully read, for ſome time at leaſt, whatever ſhall be addreſſed to me, or the Public, on the ſubject, provided the writers take care that their publications be tranſmitted, or properly announced, to me.

I do not, as many perſons would, except againſt all anſwers that may be written in a manner not perfectly conſiſtent with the laws of *decorum*, or thoſe in which I may think myſelf

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ſelf treated with too much *aſperity*, or *ridicule*. I would have every man write as he actually *feels* at the time. There are few controverſial writers, who, when the warmth of debate is over, may not ſee ſomething of this kind to blame themſelves for; but thoſe who are acquainted with human nature, will make allowance for ſuch *human imperfections*, and attend to the *merits of the caſe*; and it may be depended upon, that the real *weight of argument* is the thing that will decide in the end, when every thing of a *perſonal nature*, in the courſe of the controverſy, will be forgotten.

If I were diſpoſed, as I am not, to plead for *mercy*, I would alledge the extreme unpopularity of my ſide of the queſtion; and ſay that, a man who writes with the full tide of popular opinion in his favour, has no occaſion for any *indirect method* of bearing down his antagoniſt. The man whoſe opinions are unpopular ſtands in the moſt need of the arts of addreſs, and in him they would be moſt excuſable. But, notwithſtanding this, I ſhall truſt my very unpopular argument to its native ſtrength, or weakneſs, without any artificial ſupport whatever.

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As I have extended this preface thus far, I ſhall extend it a little farther, in order to anſwer an objection that may be made to religion, natural or revealed, from the very great *differences of opinion* among the profeſſors of it, on ſuch ſubjects as are here diſcuſſed, and from the *animoſity* with which we may happen to debate about them. Now this does not at all ariſe from the *nature of the ſubject*, any farther than its greater importance neceſſarily, and juſtly, makes it more intereſting, but from the *nature of man*, the ſame principles operating in a ſimilar manner on ſimilar occaſions.

Men do not differ more, or diſpute with more warmth, on ſubjects of *religion*, or *metaphyſics*, than they do on thoſe of civil *government*, *philology* or even *philoſophy*, which, one would imagine, *a priori*, muſt always be the calmeſt thing in the world, and could never occaſion an angry debate. But by giving much *attention* to any thing, we may *intereſt* ourſelves in any thing, and wherever that is the caſe, an intemperate warmth is the inevitable conſequence. Beſides, it is not in human nature not to feel one's ſelf more or leſs intereſted in the ſupport of an opinion which we have once advanced as *our own*. And whenever any

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any thing *perſonal* mixes in a debate (and it is barely poſſible that it ſhould not do ſo) it is, in fact, a regard for *our reputation* and *character* that is the *ſtimulus*, and nothing neceſſarily belonging to the *ſubject*.

But the circumſtance that chiefly intereſts the paſſions, and inflames the animoſity of thoſe who diſpute on the ſubject of religion, is the *worldly emolument* annexed to the profeſſion of particular tenets, in the civil eſtabliſhments of chriſtianity. Did the civil magiſtrate ſhew no preference to one mode of religion more than to another, and was there no other motive concealed under the maſk of *zeal for religion*, there would be no great reaſon to complain of its intemperance.

Few perſons are, from their ſituation and experience, better qualified to ſpeak on this ſubject than myſelf, few perſons having been engaged in a greater variety of purſuits, or in a ſcene of more *various controverſy*; and I ſee no reaſon whatever for accuſing *religion*, more than any thing elſe, of exciting jealouſy, hatred, or any other immediate cauſe of animoſity and angry debate.

Many of my friends are frequently expreſſing their wiſhes, that I had nothing to do with

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theology, or *metaphyſics*, flattering me with the proſpect of a conſiderable degree of unenvied reputation as a *philoſopher*. But the moſt rancorous oppoſition, and the moſt unprovoked abuſe that I have met with, has been from perſons who never knew any thing of me but in the character of a philoſopher. And, though I will venture to ſay, that it is not poſſible to write with more frankneſs than I have always done; deſcribing, in the moſt natural manner, the very progreſs of my thoughts with reſpect to every diſcovery of conſequence, and, upon all occaſions giving rather too much, than too little, to any perſon who has favoured me with the leaſt aſſiſtance, as all my philoſophical writings evidence, I have been treated as a notorious *plagiary**. There are even many perſons, not deſtitute of name and character themſelves, who cannot bear to hear me ſpoken of, as having any pretenſions to philoſophy, without a ſneer; and who think my publications on the ſubject a diſgrace to philoſophy, and to my country.

Can, I, then, have a more ungracious reception among *divines*, *metaphyſicians*, or *philo-*

* See my Pamphlet intitled *Philoſophical Empiriciſm*.

logiſts,

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logiſts? In ſhort, having no better treatment to expect in any walk of literature, I ſhall, without diſtinction, apply myſelf to any purſuit to which my attention ſhall be more particularly drawn. I have friends, and I have enemies, in every claſs of men to whom I have been introduced. All the former I ſhall be happy to oblige in their turn, but I cannot be with any of them always. The latter I neither abſolutely deſpiſe, nor greatly dread. Thoſe of them who are diſpoſed to be civil to me ſhall meet with civility from me in return, and as to thoſe of them who are otherwiſe diſpoſed, I ſhall behave to them as I may happen to be affected at the time.

But, mindful of the motto which I have choſen for my coat of arms, *Ars longa, vita brevis*, I ſhall devote as much of my time as poſſible to the *purſuit of truth*, and as little as I can help to the mere *defence of it*, or of *myſelf*. The former is a noble and ſublime exerciſe of the mind, exalting the ſoul, and improving the temper; whereas in the latter, though conducted with the greateſt caution, there is a riſk of debaſing the mind, hurting the temper, and ſacrificing our peace. For, controverſy is, at beſt, a ſtate of war.

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THE hiſtorical account of the ſyſtem of heatheniſm concerning the pre-exiſtence of ſouls in general, and of the pre-exiſtence of the ſoul of Chriſt in particular, which was derived from it, I had once thought of reſerving for my *Hiſtorical View of the Corruptions of Chriſtianity*, which will be the laſt part of my *Inſtitutes of Natural and Revealed Religion.* But as it was actually compoſed during my inveſtigation of this ſubject, as it roſe out of it, and is ſtrictly connected with it, I have thought proper to ſubjoin it, by way of *Sequel.*

Both the parts of this work, taken together, will ſhew, in a ſtriking light, the very extenſive miſchief that has been done to revealed religion by the introduction of this part of the ſyſtem of heatheniſm, concerning the ſoul. And when the proper extent of this *foreign ſyſtem* is ſeen, it may be hoped, that many perſons who have rejected a part of it, will ſee equal reaſon to reject the whole. And, for my own part, I am ſatisfied that it is only by purging away the whole of this *corrupt*

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leaven, that we can recover the priſtine ſimplicity and purity of our moſt excellent and truly rational, though much abuſed, religion.

Athanaſianiſm, I think, will ſufficiently appear to have been merely Oriental philoſophy in its origin, and afterwards to have become more abſurd than the original tenets of that philoſophy; and Arianiſm is only the ſame philoſophy altered, free indeed from the palpable *contradictions* of Athanaſianiſm, but it is, in other reſpects, no leſs remote from the proper ſcheme of chriſtianity. I ſhall think myſelf happy if, by this or any other of my writings, I be able to throw the leaſt new light upon a ſubject which has ſo near a relation to the fundamental principles of the chriſtian ſyſtem.

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A CATALOGUE OF

Some of the BOOKS that are quoted in this Treatiſe.

AS there are different editions of ſeveral of the books that I have quoted in this treatiſe, it will be proper to ſubjoin a liſt of the copies that I have made uſe of. It will alſo be proper to give more at length the titles of ſome books that I have frequently referred to very conciſely, having ſometimes mentioned nothing more than the name of the writer.

This has been more eſpecially the caſe with Beauſobre and Dupin, to both of whom, and eſpecially the former, I am much indebted for my hiſtorical account of the opinions of the ancients. And I would obſerve in this place, that when I might, with no great trouble, have given thoſe opinions from the original authors themſelves, I have often choſen to give them

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them as represented by such writers as these. Because as these things have been very differently represented, I was confident that the opinion of these writers would be more respected than my own, their learning and exactness being universally acknowledged; and their views in writing being different from mine, they cannot be suspected of partiality to my hypothesis.

FOLIO.

Tertulliani Opera, per Rigaltium. Paris 1675.
Divi Gregorii Papæ Opera. Paris 1551.
Justini Martyris Apologia, cum Notis Thirlbii. London 1722.
Arnobius Adversus Gentes, per Elmenhorstium. Hamb. 1610.
Dupin's History of Ecclesiastical Writers. London 1696.
Joannis Damasceni Opera, per J. Billium. Paris 1619.
Plutarchi Opera, per Xylandrum. Franckfort 1620.
Anselmi Opera, per Picardum. Col. Agrip. 1612.
Bernardi Opera, per Picardum. Paris 1609.
Athanasii Opera, Gr. Lat. 2 *vols.* Paris 1627.

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Th. Aquinatis Summa. Paris 1631.

QUARTO.

Cudworth's Intellectual Syſtem.
Hiſtoire Critique de Manichée, et du Manicheiſme, per M. de Beauſobre, 2 *vols.* Amſterd. 1734.
Caſſiodori Opera. Geneva 1637.

OCTAVO.

Leland on the Advantage and Neceſſity of the Chriſtian Revelation, 2 *vols.* 1768.
Petri Lombardi Sententiæ. Moguntiæ. 1632.
An Hiſtorical View of the Controverſy concerning an intermediate State, and the ſeparate Exiſtence of the Soul, 2d *edition.* 1772.
Wollaſton's Relig. of Nature, 7th *edit.* 1750.
Warburton's Divine Legation, 4 *vols.* 4th *edition*, 1754.

DUODECIMO.

Moſheimii Diſſertationes ad Hiſtoriam Eccleſiaſticam pertinentes. Altonaviæ 1733.

Bax-

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Baxter's Matho, 2 *vols.* 3d *edition.* 1765.
L'Hiſtoire de la Religion des Juifs, per Mr. Baſnage, 6 *vols.* Rotterdam 1707.
Les Voyages de Cyrus, avec un diſcours ſur la Mythologie, par Mr. Ramſay. London 1757.
Th. Stanleii Hiſtoiria Philoſophiæ Orientalis, per J. Clericum. Amſterdam 1690.
Hiſtoire Naturelle de l'ame, Traduite de l'Anglois de Mr. Charp. A la Haye. 1745.

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THE INTRODUCTION.

LEST any perſon ſhould haſtily miſapprehend the *nature*, or *importance*, of the queſtions diſcuſſed in this treatiſe, or the manner in which I have decided for myſelf with reſpect to them, I ſhall here ſtate the ſeveral ſubjects of inquiry as conciſely, and with as much diſtinctneſs, as I can, and alſo inform the reader what my opinions concerning them really are.

It has generally been ſuppoſed that there are *two diſtinct kinds of ſubſtance* in human nature, and they have been diſtinguiſhed by the terms *matter* and *ſpirit*, or *mind*. The former of theſe has been ſaid to be poſſeſſed of the property of *extenſion* viz. of length, breadth, and thickneſs, and alſo of *ſolidity* or *impenetrability*, and conſequently of a *vis inertiæ*; but it is ſaid to be naturally deſtitute of all other powers whatever. The latter has of late been defined to be a ſubſtance intirely *deſtitute of all extenſion*, or *relation to ſpace*, ſo as to have no property in common with matter; and therefore to be properly *immaterial*, but to be poſſeſſed of the powers of *perception*, *intelligence*, and *ſelf-motion*.

Matter

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Matter is that kind of ſubſtance of which our *bodies* are compoſed, whereas the principle of perception and thought belonging to us is ſaid to reſide in a *ſpirit*, or immaterial principle, intimately united to the body; while higher orders of intelligent beings, and eſpecially the Divine Being, are ſaid to be purely immaterial.

It is maintained in this treatiſe, that neither *matter* nor *ſpirit* (meaning by the latter the ſubject of ſenſe and thought) correſpond to the definitions above mentioned. For that matter is not that *inert* ſubſtance that it has been ſuppoſed to be; that *powers of attraction* or *repulſion* are neceſſary to its very being, and that no part of it appears to be *impenetrable* to other parts. I therefore, define it to be a ſubſtance poſſeſſed of the property of *extenſion*, and of *powers of attraction or repulſion*. And ſince it has never yet been aſſerted that the powers of *ſenſation* and *thought* are incompatible with theſe (*ſolidity*, or *impenetrability*, and conſequently a *vis inertiæ*, only, having been thought to be repugnant to them) I therefore maintain that we have no reaſon to ſuppoſe that there are in man two ſubſtances ſo diſtinct from each other, as have been repreſented.

It is, likewiſe maintained in this treatiſe that the notion of two ſubſtances that have no *common property*, and yet are capable of *intimate connection* and *mutual action* is both abſurd and *modern*; a ſubſtance without extenſion or relation to place being unknown both in the ſcriptures, and to all antiquity; the human mind for

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for example, having till lately been thought to have a proper *preſence in the body*, and a *proper motion* together with it; and the Divine Mind having always been repreſented as being, truly and properly, *omnipreſent*.

It is maintained, however, in the SEQUEL of this treatiſe, that ſuch a diſtinction as the ancient philoſophers *did* make between *matter* and *ſpirit*, though it was by no means ſuch a diſtinction as was defined above (which does not admit of their having any common property) but a diſtinction which made the Supreme Mind the author of all good, and *matter* the ſource of all evil, that all inferior intelligences are *emanations from the Supreme Mind*, or made out of its ſubſtance, and that matter was reduced to its preſent form not by the Supreme Mind itſelf, but by *another intelligence*, a peculiar emanation from it, has been the real ſource of the greateſt corruptions of true religion in all ages, many of which remain to the very day; that this *ſyſtem of philoſophy* and the *true ſyſtem of revelation* have always been diametrically oppoſite, and hoſtile to each other; and that the latter can never be firmly eſtabliſhed but upon the ruins of the former.

To promote this firm eſtabliſhment of the ſyſtem of *pure Revelation*, in oppoſition to that of a vain and abſurd *philoſophy*, here ſhewn to be ſo, is the true object of this work; in the peruſal of which I beg the candour and patient attention of the judicious and philoſophical reader.

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ERRATA.

Preface, page xi, line 14, for *upon*, read *of*.
p. xxxi, *Cudworth* should be among the Folios.

Page 3, line 2, from the bottom, for *a ball*, read *the ball*.
34, 21, for *have to*, read *to have*.
47, 9, from the top, for *its* read *his*.
50, 18, for *a most*, read *most*.
75, 4, for *properties*, read *property*.
142, 15, for *Heb.* read *Hab.* (for *Habakkuk*)
164, 11, for *mean*, read *meant*.
166, 17, for *requires*, read *implies*.
182, 12, for *was*, read *it was*.
189, 18, for *with*, read *without*.
195, 2, from the bottom, for *Galis*, read *Gale's*.
228, 27, for *Innocent*, read *John*.
254, 7, from the top, for *pre-existed?* read *pre-existed*.
263, 4, from the bottom, for *restolution*, read *restoration*.
267, 3, for *of Mr.* read *by Mr.*
268, 2, from the top, for *was*, read *were*.
279, 14, for *ing*, read *making*.
312, 17, for *impossible*, read *possible*.
319, 6, for *have*, read *have observed*.

N. B. This whole quotation should have been inserted at the end of the section.

336, line the last, for *Beausobre*, &c. read (*Beausobre*, *vol.* ii. p. 245) and *Pythagoras*
337, 2, from the bottom, for *came*, read *come*.

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Explanation of the FRONTISPIECE.

THE idea is taken from 1 *Cor.* iii. 12, where different perſons are repreſented as having built with different materials, on the ſolid foundation of chriſtianity, as laid by Chriſt and the apoſtles; and that what was built with wood, and other baſe materials, would be conſumed by fire, while the reſt would ſtand. Our Saviour, who revealed the future ſtate of his church to the apoſtle John, is repreſented as ſhewing him this circumſtance relating to it. The application of this ſcene to the object of this work, is ſufficiently obvious.

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SECTION I.

Of the Nature and eſſential Properties of MATTER.

I AM ſorry to have occaſion to begin theſe diſquiſitions on the nature of *matter and ſpirit*, with deſiring my reader to recur to the univerſally received *rules of philoſophizing*, ſuch as are laid down by Sir Iſaac Newton at the beginning of his third book of *Principia*. But though we have followed theſe rules pretty cloſely in other philoſophical reſearches, it appears to me that we have, without any reaſon in the world, intirely deſerted them in this. We have ſuffered ourſelves to be guided by them in our inquiries into the cauſes of *particular appearances* in nature, but have formed our notions, with reſpect to the moſt *general* and *comprehenſive principles* of human knowledge, without the leaſt regard, nay in direct contradiction, to them. And I am willing to hope, that when this is plainly pointed out, the inconſiſtency of our conduct in theſe caſes cannot fail to ſtrike us, and be the means of inducing the philoſophical part of the world to tread back their ſteps, and ſet out again on the ſame maxims which they

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have actually followed in their progreſs. For my own part, I profeſs an uniform and rigorous adherence to them; but then I muſt require that my own reaſoning be tried by this, and by no other teſt.

The firſt of theſe rules, as laid down by Sir Iſaac Newton, is that we are to *admit no more cauſes of things than are ſufficient to explain appearances*; and the ſecond is that, *to the ſame effects we muſt, as far as poſſible, aſſign the ſame cauſes.*

So long as we follow theſe maxims, we may be confident that we walk on ſure ground; but the moment we depart from them, we wander in the regions of mere *fancy*, and are only entertaining ourſelves and others with our own crude imaginations and conceits. By theſe plain rules, then, let us purſue our inquiries concerning the nature and connection of what have been called *material* and *thinking* ſubſtances; concerning both which very great miſconceptions ſeem to have very generally prevailed. And in the firſt place, let us attend to what metaphyſicians and philoſophers have advanced concerning *matter*, with reſpect to which (I mean its *fundamental properties*, and what may be abſolutely affirmed or denied concerning them) there are very few who have ſo much as expreſſed the leaſt doubt or uncertainty.

It is aſſerted, and generally taken for granted, that matter is neceſſarily a *ſolid*, or *impenetrable* ſubſtance, and naturally, or of itſelf,

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ſelf, deſtitute of all *powers* whatever, as thoſe of *attraction* or *repulſion*, &c. or, as it is commonly expreſſed, that matter is poſſeſſed of a certain *vis inertiæ*, and is wholly indifferent to a ſtate of reſt or motion, but as it is acted upon by a foreign power.

That the vulgar ſhould have formed theſe opinions, and acquieſce in them, I do not wonder; becauſe there are *common appearances* enow which muſt neceſſarily lead them to form ſuch a judgment. I preſs my hand againſt the table on which I am writing, and finding that I cannot penetrate it, and that I cannot puſh my hand into the place which it occupies, without firſt puſhing it out of its place, I conclude that this table, and by analogy, *all matter is impenetrable to other matter.* Theſe firſt appearances are ſufficient for them to conclude, that matter is neceſſarily *ſolid*, and incapable of yielding to the impreſſion of other ſolid matter.

Again, I ſee a billiard table; and though I obſerve the balls upon it ever ſo long, I do not find any of them ever to change their places till they are puſhed againſt; but that when once they are put in motion, they continue in that *new ſtate* till they are ſtopped, either by ſome obſtacle, or their own friction, which is in fact the reſult of a ſeries of obſtacles. And therefore I conclude, that, had there been no obſtacle of any kind in the way, a ball would have continued in that ſtate of *motion* (as, without being impelled by a foreign

reign force, it would have continued in its former ſtate of *reſt*) for ever; having no power *within itſelf* to make any change in either of thoſe ſtates. I therefore conclude univerſally, that all matter, as ſuch, is entirely deſtitute of *power*, and whatever is true of larger bodies with reſpect to each other, muſt be equally true of the ſmalleſt component parts of the ſame body; and conſequently that all *attraction* or *repulſion* muſt be the effect of ſome *foreign power*, diſpoſing either larger bodies, or their ſmall component parts, to certain motions and tendencies, which otherwiſe they would not have had.

Such appearances as theſe, I imagine, have led to the concluſions above mentioned, concerning the fundamental properties of matter. But then they are no more than *ſuperficial appearances*, and therefore have led to ſuperficial and falſe judgements; judgements which the *real appearances* will not authorize. For, in fact, when the appearances above mentioned are conſidered in the new and juſt lights which late obſervations have thrown upon this part of philoſophy, they will oblige us, if we adhere to the rules of philoſophizing laid down above, to conclude that *reſiſtance*, on which alone our opinion concerning the ſolidity or impenetrability of matter is founded, is never occaſioned by *ſolid matter*, but by ſomething of a very different nature, viz. a *power of repulſion* always acting at a real, and in general an aſſignable diſtance from what we call the body

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body itself. It will also appear, from the most obvious considerations, that without a power of attraction, a *power* which has always been considered as something quite distinct from matter itself, there cannot be any such a thing as matter; consequently, that this *foreign property*, as it has been called, is in reality absolutely essential to its very *nature* and *being*. For when we suppose bodies to be divested of it, they come to be *nothing at all*.

These positions, though not absolutely new, will appear paradoxical to most persons, but I beg a candid hearing; and I appeal to the allowed rules of philosophizing above mentioned, being confident that they will sufficiently support my conclusions.

It will readily be allowed, that every body, as *solid* and *impenetrable*, must necessarily have some particular *form* or *shape*; but it is no less obvious, that no such *figured thing* can exist, unless the parts of which it consists have a *mutual attraction*, so as either to keep contiguous to, or preserve a certain distance from each other. This power of attraction, therefore, must be essential to the *actual existence* of all matter; since no substance can retain any *form* without it.

This argument equally affects the smallest atoms, as the largest bodies that are composed of them. An atom, by which I mean an ultimate component part of any gross body, is necessarily supposed to be perfectly solid,

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wholly impervious to any other atom; and it must also be round, or square, or of some other *determinate form.* But the parts of such a body (as this solid atom must be *divisible*, and therefore have parts) must be infinitely hard, and therefore must have powers of mutual attraction infinitely strong, or it could not hold together, that is, it could not exist as a *solid atom.* Take away the *power* therefore, and the solidity of the atom intirely disappears. In short, it is then no longer *matter*; being destitute of the fundamental properties of such a substance.

The reason why *solid extent* has been thought to be a complete definition of matter, is because it was imagined that we could separate from our idea of it every thing else belonging to it, and leave these two properties independent of the rest, and subsisting by themselves. But it was not considered, that, in consequence of taking away *attraction*, which is a *power*, *solidity* itself vanishes.

It will perhaps be said, that the particles of which any solid atom consists, may be conceived to be placed close together, without any mutual attraction between them. But then this atom will be intirely destitute of *compactness*, and hardness, which is requisite to its being *impenetrable.* Or if its parts be held together by some *foreign power*, it will still be true that *power* is necessary to its *solidity* and *essence*; since without it every particle would fall from each other, and be dispersed.

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perſed. And this being true of the ultimate particles, as well as of groſs bodies, the conſequence muſt be, that the whole ſubſtance will abſolutely vaniſh. For as the large bodies would be diſſolved without ſome principle of union, or ſome *power*, internal or external, ſo the parts of which they are compoſed would, in ſimilar circumſtances, be reſolved into ſmaller parts, and conſequently (the ſmalleſt parts being reſolved in the ſame manner) the whole ſubſtance muſt abſolutely diſappear, nothing at all being left for the imagination to fix upon.

It will be obſerved, that, in this diſquiſition, I by no means ſuppoſe that theſe powers, which I make to be eſſential to the being of matter, and without which it cannot exiſt as a material ſubſtance at all, are *ſelf-exiſtent* in it. All that my argument amounts to, is, that from whatever ſource theſe powers are derived, or by whatever being they are communicated, matter cannot exiſt without them; and if that ſuperior power, or being, withdraw its influence, the ſubſtance itſelf neceſſarily ceaſes to exiſt, or is annihilated. Whatever *ſolidity* any body has, it is poſſeſſed of only in conſequence of being endued with certain *powers*, and together with this *cauſe*, ſolidity, being no more than an *effect*, muſt ceaſe, if there be any foundation for the plaineſt and beſt eſtabliſhed rules of reaſoning in philoſophy.

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Though Mr. Locke conſidered ſolidity as conſtituting the eſſence of matter (ſee *Eſſay*, &c. vol. ii. p. 141, where he ſays, "that "ſubſtance that has the modification of ſo- "lidity is matter,") yet it is plain he had an idea of ſomething elſe, being in fact neceſſary to its coheſion. "If God," ſays he, Eſſay, vol. ii. p. 148, "cannot join things together "by connections inconceivable to us, we muſt "deny the conſiſtence, and being, even of "matter itſelf; ſince every particle of it "having ſome bulk, has its parts connected "by ways inconceivable by us."

Mr. Baxter, who, I believe, is conſidered as the ableſt defender of the ſtrict immaterial ſyſtem, acknowledges that *powers of reſiſtance and coheſion* are eſſential to matter, and abſolutely make it a ſolid ſubſtance. But aſſerting, as he does, that theſe powers are the immediate agency of the Deity himſelf, it neceſſarily follows that there is not in nature any ſuch thing as *matter*, diſtinct from *the Deity*, and *his operations*. A ſtrange opinion, but that in which Mr. Baxter's hypotheſis neceſſarily terminates; though, ſince he was not apprized of it, it ought not to be imputed to him.

"Reſiſtance," ſays Mr. Baxter, Eſſay, vol. ii. p. 345, "is fundamental in the nature of "matter, and this itſelf is the power of the "immaterial cauſe, indefinently impreſſed up- "on, and exerted in, every poſſible part of "matter. And ſince without this, theſe leaſt

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" parts could not cohere at all, or make a " ſolid, making reſiſtance, it appears that " the power of this cauſe thus inceſſantly put " forth, through all its poſſible parts, is that " which *conſtitutes* the ſolidity and reſiſtance " of matter.—Without this *foreign influence* to " effect coheſion, and ſolidity in it, we could " not conceive it to be at all a ſubſtance."

But it is certainly more agreeable to the rules of philoſophizing, to conſider all the *conſtant effects* of any ſubſtance as produced by powers properly *belonging to* that ſubſtance, whether they be neceſſarily inherent in it, or communicated to it; ſo that the action of the Deity in preſerving ſuch a ſubſtance in being, will be a different thing from the Deity himſelf, by his immediate agency, performing all that we aſcribe to that ſubſtance; which is in effect to annihilate the ſubſtance, and to make the Deity himſelf to *do*, and to *be* every thing.

The opinion that all the powers of matter are nothing but the immediate agency of the Deity, is not peculiar to Mr. Baxter, though it is that which chiefly diſtinguiſhes his writings. It was held by the famous Jordano Bruno, as his ſentiments are repreſented by the author of *Examen du Fataliſme*, " All the " motions," ſays he, " which ſtrike our ſenſes, " the reſiſtance which we find in matter, are " the effect of the immediate action of God. " The ſmalleſt parts of matter are united by " a force; and as there is no active force in

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" nature but that of God; this being is the " infinite force which unites all the parts of " matter, an immenſe ſpring which is in " continual action." Vol. i. p. 277. It is evident, however, that this philoſopher conſidered the ultimate particles of matter as ſomething different from any thing belonging to the Deity. But his principles, purſued to their proper extent, would have been the ſame with thoſe of Mr. Baxter.

SECT.

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SECTION II.

Of IMPENETRABILITY, *as aſcribed to Matter.*

AS philoſophers have given *too little* to matter, in diveſting it of all *powers*, without which I preſume it has been proved that no ſuch ſubſtance can exiſt, ſo it equally follows, from the plain rules of philoſophizing above laid down, that they have aſcribed *too much* to it, when they have advanced that *impenetrability* is one of its properties. Becauſe, if there be any truth in late diſcoveries in philoſophy, reſiſtance is in moſt caſes cauſed by ſomething of a quite different nature from any thing *material*, or *ſolid*, viz. by a *power of repulſion* acting at a diſtance from the body to which it has been ſuppoſed to belong, and in no caſe whatever can it be proved that reſiſtance is occaſioned by any thing elſe.

Now if *reſiſtance*, from which alone is derived the idea of impenetrability, is in moſt caſes certainly, cauſed by *powers*, and in no caſe certainly by any thing elſe, the rules of philoſophizing oblige us to ſuppoſe, that the cauſe of *all* reſiſtance is *repulſive power*, and in no caſe whatever the thing that we have hitherto improperly termed *ſolid*, or *impenetrable matter*.

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As all reſiſtance can differ only in degree, this circumſtance can only lead us to the ſuppoſition of a greater or leſs repulſive power, but never to the ſuppoſition of a cauſe of reſiſtance intirely different from ſuch a power. This would be exceedingly unphiloſophical. To judge in this manner, is to judge altogether *without*, nay really *contrary to evidence*.—But I come to the *facts* themſelves, which no philoſopher will pretend to controvert.

When I preſs my hand againſt the table, as was mentioned above, I naturally imagine that the obſtacle to its going through the table is the *ſolid matter* of which it conſiſts; but a variety of philoſophical conſiderations demonſtrate, that it generally requires a much greater power of preſſure than I can exert to bring my fingers into actual contact with the table. Philoſophers know that, notwithſtanding their ſeeming contact, they are actually kept at a real diſtance from each other, by *powers of repulſion* common to them both. Alſo, electrical appearances ſhew that a conſiderable weight is requiſite to bring into contact, even links of a chain hanging freely in the air; they being kept aſunder by a repulſive power belonging to a very ſmall ſurface, ſo that they do not actually touch, though they are ſupported by each other.

I have myſelf, as will be ſeen in the account of my electrical experiments, (ſee *Hiſtory of Electricity*, p. 702.) endeavoured to aſcertain

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certain the weight requiſite to bring a number of pieces of money, lying upon one another, into ſeeming contact, or ſo near to one another only as the particles that compoſe the ſame continued piece of metal, and I found it to be very conſiderable. Theſe, however, are ſuppoſed by philoſophers not to be in *actual contact*, but to be kept at certain diſtances from each other by powers of reſiſtance within the ſubſtance itſelf. That the component particles of the hardeſt bodies do not actually touch one another, is demonſtrable from their being brought nearer together by cold, and by their being removed farther from each other by heat. The power, ſufficient to overcome theſe internal forces of repulſion, by which the ultimate particles of bodies are prevented from coming into actual contact, is what no perſon can pretend to compute. The power, requiſite to break their coheſion, or to remove them from the ſphere of each other's attraction, may, in ſome meaſure, be eſtimated; but this affords no *data* for aſcertaining the force that would be neceſſary to bring them into actual contact, which may exceed the other almoſt infinitely.

Mr. Melville has ſhewn, from optical conſiderations, ſee *Hiſtory of Diſcoveries relating to Viſion*, &c. p. 454, that a drop of water rolls upon a cabbage leaf without ever coming into actual contact with it; and indeed all the phenomena of *light* are moſt remarkably unfa-

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favourable to the hypothesis of the solidity or impenetrability of matter.

When light is reflected back from a body on which it seems to strike, it was natural to suppose that this was occasioned by its impinging against the *solid parts* of the body; but it has been demonstrated by Sir Isaac Newton, that the rays of light are always reflected by a *power of repulsion*, acting at some distance from the body. Again, when part of a beam of light has overcome this power of repulsion, and has entered any transparent substance, it goes on in a right line, provided the medium be of an uniform density, without the least interruption and without a single particle being reflected, till it comes to the opposite side; having met with no solid particles in its way, not even in the densest transparent substances, as glass, crystal, or diamond; and when it is arrived at the opposite side, it is solely affected by the laws of attraction and repulsion. For with a certain angle of incidence, the greatest part, or the whole of it, will be drawn back into the solid body, without going on into the air, where it would seem that there would have been less obstruction to its passage.

Now these facts seem to prove, that such dense bodies as glass, crystal and diamonds, have no solid parts, or so very few, that the particles of light are never found to impinge upon them, or to be obstructed by them. And certainly till some portion of light can be shewn

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ſhewn to be reflected within the ſubſtance of a homogeneous tranſparent body, there can be no reaſon from *fact*, and *appearances*, to conclude that they have any ſuch ſolid parts; but, on the contrary, there muſt be all the reaſon in the world to believe, that no ſuch ſolid reſiſting particles exiſt. All the phenomena may be explained without them, and indeed cannot be explained with them.

Since then it is demonſtrable that no common preſſure is ſufficient to bring bodies even into *ſeeming contact*, or that near approach which the component parts of the ſame body make to each other (though theſe are by no means in *abſolute contact*, as the phenomena of heat and cold fully prove) but the reſiſtance to a nearer approach is in all caſes cauſed by *powers of repulſion*, there can be no ſufficient reaſon to aſcribe reſiſtance *in any caſe* to any thing beſides ſimilar *powers*. Nay, the eſtabliſhed rules of philoſophizing above recited, abſolutely require that we aſcribe *all reſiſtance* to ſuch powers; and conſequently the ſuppoſition of the *ſolidity* or *impenetrability* of matter, derived ſolely from the conſideration of the reſiſtance of the ſolid parts of bodies (which, excluſive of a *power* operating at a diſtance from them, cannot be proved to have any reſiſtance) appears to be deſtitute of all ſupport whatever. The hypotheſis was ſuggeſted by a mere fallacy, and therefore ought to be diſcarded now that the fallacy is diſcovered.

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It will be ſaid, that if matter be not a ſolid or impenetrable ſubſtance, *what is it?* I anſwer, with reſpect to this, as I ſhould with reſpect to any other ſubſtance, that it is poſſeſſed of ſuch properties, and ſuch only, as the actual well-examined *appearances* prove it to be poſſeſſed of. That it is poſſeſſed of powers of attraction and repulſion, and of ſeveral ſpheres of them, one within another, I know; becauſe appearances cannot be explained without ſuppoſing them; but that there is any thing in, or belonging to matter, capable of reſiſtance, beſides thoſe powers of repulſion, does not appear from any phenomena that we are yet acquainted with; and, therefore, as a philoſopher, I am not authorized to conclude that any ſuch a thing exiſts. On the contrary, I am obliged to deny that matter has ſuch a property.

If I be aſked how, upon this hypotheſis *matter* differs from *ſpirit*, if there be nothing in matter that is properly ſolid or impenetrable; I anſwer, that it no way concerns me, or true philoſophy, to maintain that there is any ſuch difference between them as has hitherto been ſuppoſed. On the contrary, I conſider the notion of the union and mutual influences of ſubſtances ſo eſſentially different from one another, as *material* and *immaterial* ſubſtances have been repreſented, as an opinion attended with difficulties infinitely embarraſſing, and indeed actually inſuperable,

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as may appear in the ſequel of theſe diſquiſitions.

The conſiderations ſuggeſted above tend to remove the *odium* which has hitherto lain upon matter, from its ſuppoſed neceſſary property of *ſolidity*, *inertneſs*, or *ſluggiſhneſs*; as from this circumſtance only the *baſeneſs* and *imperfection*, which have been aſcribed to it are derived. Since matter has, in fact, no properties but thoſe of *attraction and repulſion*, it ought to riſe in our eſteem, as making a nearer approach to the nature of ſpiritual and immaterial beings, as we have been taught to call thoſe which are oppoſed to groſs matter.

The principles of the Newtonian philoſophy were no ſooner known, than it was ſeen how few, in compariſon, of the phenomena of nature, were owing to *ſolid matter*, and how much to *powers*, which were only ſuppoſed to accompany and ſurround the ſolid parts of matter. It has been aſſerted, and the aſſertion has never been diſproved, that for any thing we know to the contrary, all the ſolid matter in the ſolar ſyſtem might be contained within a nut-ſhell, there is ſo great a proportion of *void ſpace* within the ſubſtance of the moſt ſolid bodies. Now when ſolidity had apparently ſo very little to do in the ſyſtem, it is really a wonder that it did not occur to philoſophers ſooner, that perhaps there might be nothing for it to do at all, and that there might be no ſuch a thing in nature.

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Since the only reaſon why the principle of thought, or ſenſation, has been imagined to be incompatible with matter, goes upon the ſuppoſition of impenetrability being the eſſential property of it, and conſequently that *ſolid extent* is the foundation of all the properties that it can poſſibly ſuſtain, the whole argument for an immaterial thinking principle in man, on this new ſuppoſition, falls to the ground; matter, deſtitute of what has hitherto been called *ſolidity*, being no more incompatible with ſenſation and thought, than that ſubſtance, which, without knowing any thing farther about it, we have been uſed to call *immaterial*.

I will add in this place, though it will be conſidered more fully hereafter, that this ſuppoſition, of matter having no other properties beſides thoſe of attraction and repulſion, greatly relieves the difficulty which attends the ſuppoſition of the *creation of it out of nothing*, and alſo the continual moving of it by a being who has hitherto been ſuppoſed to have no common property with it. For, according to this hypotheſis, both the creating mind, and the created ſubſtance are equally deſtitute of *ſolidity* or *impenetrability*; ſo that there can be no difficulty whatever in ſuppoſing that the latter may have been the offſpring of the former.

This opinion, which I here maintain, of the *penetrability of matter*, is not my own, but what,

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what, from a conviction of its truth, I have adopted from Father Boſcovich, and Mr. Michell, to both of whom, independently of each other, this theory had occurred. Their ideas upon this ſubject, I have repreſented in my *Hiſtory of Diſcoveries relating to Viſion, Light, and Colours*; and as the doctrine is there placed in ſomewhat of a different light, and in language chiefly borrowed from my authors, I ſhall, in order to throw greater light on the ſubject, quote the whole paſſage relating to it in this place, and with it ſhall cloſe this ſection.

" The eaſieſt method of ſolving all the difficulties attending the ſubject of the *ſubtlety of light*, and of anſwering Mr. Euler's objections to its materiality, is to adopt the hypotheſis of Mr. Boſcovich, who ſuppoſes that matter is not *impenetrable*, as before him it had been univerſally taken for granted; but that it conſiſts of *phyſical points* only, endued with powers of attraction and repulſion, taking place at different diſtances, that is, ſurrounded with various ſpheres of attraction and repulſion; in the ſame manner as ſolid matter is generally ſuppoſed to be. Provided, therefore, that any body move with a ſufficient degree of velocity, or have ſufficient momentum to overcome any powers of repulſion that it may meet with, it will find no difficulty in making its way through any body whatever, for nothing will interfere, or pene-

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" trate one another, but *powers*, ſuch as we " know do in fact exiſt in the ſame place, " and counterbalance or over-rule one an- " other; a circumſtance which never had the " appearance of a contradiction, or even of a " difficulty.

" If the momentum of ſuch a body in mo- " tion be ſufficiently great, Mr. Boſcovich " demonſtrates that the particles of any body, " through which it paſſes, will not even be " moved out of their place by it. With a " degree of velocity ſomething leſs than this " they will be conſiderably agitated, and ig- " nition might perhaps be the conſequence, " though the progreſs of the body in motion " would not be ſenſibly interrupted; and " with a ſtill leſs momentum it might not " paſs at all." *Theoria Philoſophiæ Naturalis*, p. 167.

" This theory Mr. Boſcovich has taken a " great deal of pains to draw out at full " length and illuſtrate; ſhewing that it is by " no means inconſiſtent with any thing that " we know concerning the laws of mecha- " nics, or our diſcoveries in natural philoſo- " phy, and that a great variety of phenomena, " particularly thoſe which relate to *light*, " admit of a much eaſier ſolution upon this " hypotheſis than upon any other.

" The moſt obvious difficulty, and indeed " the only one that attends this hypotheſis, " as it ſuppoſes the *mutual penetrability of* " *matter*, ariſes from the difficulty we meet " with

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" with in attempting to force two bodies into " the ſame place. But it is demonſtrable, that " the firſt obſtruction ariſes from no actual " contact of matter, but from mere powers of " repulſion. This difficulty we can over- " come; and having got within one ſphere " of repulſion, we fancy that we are now " impeded by the ſolid matter itſelf. But the " very ſame is the apprehenſion of the ge- " nerality of mankind with reſpect to the firſt " obſtruction. Why, therefore, may not the " next reſiſtance be only another ſphere of " repulſion, which may only require a great- " er force than we can apply to overcome it, " without diſordering the arrangement of the " conſtituent particles; but which may be " overcome by a body moving with the " amazing velocity of light.

" This ſcheme of the *mutual penetration of* " *matter*, firſt occurred to Mr. Michell on " reading *Baxter on the Immateriality of the* " *Soul.* He found that this author's idea of " matter was, that it conſiſted, as it were, " of bricks cemented together by an imma- " terial mortar. Theſe bricks, if he would " be conſiſtent in his own reaſoning, were " again compoſed of leſs bricks, cemented " likewiſe by an immaterial mortar, and ſo " on *ad infinitum.* This putting Mr. Michell " upon the conſideration of the appearances " of nature, he began to perceive that the " bricks were ſo covered with this immaterial " mortar, that, if they had any exiſtence at

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" all, it could not poſſibly be *perceived*, every " *effect* being produced at leaſt in nine in- " ſtances in ten certainly, and probably in " the tenth alſo, by this immaterial, ſpirit- " tual, and penetrable mortar.

" Inſtead, therefore, of placing the world " upon the giant, the giant upon the tor- " toiſe, and the tortoiſe upon he could not " tell what, he placed the world at once up- " on itſelf; and finding it ſtill neceſſary, in " order to ſolve the appearances of nature, to " admit of extended and penetrable imma- " terial ſubſtance, if he maintained the im- " penetrability of matter; and obſerving far- " ther, that all we perceive by contact, &c. " is this penetrable immaterial ſubſtance, and " not the impenetrable one; he began to " think that he might as well admit of *pene-* " *trable material*, as *penetrable immaterial* " ſubſtance; eſpecially as we know nothing " more of the nature of ſubſtance than that " it is ſomething which ſupports properties; " which properties may be whatever we " pleaſe, provided they be not inconſiſtent " with each other, that is, do not imply the " abſence of each other.

" This by no means ſeemed to be the caſe " in ſuppoſing two ſubſtances to be in the " ſame place, at the ſame time, without ex- " cluding each other, the objection to which " is only derived from the reſiſtance we meet " with to the touch, and is a prejudice that " has taken its riſe from that circumſtance,

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" and is not unlike the prejudice againſt the " antipodes, derived from the conſtant ex- " perience of bodies falling as we account it " downwards.

" I hope I ſhall be excuſed dwelling ſo " long on this hypotheſis, on account both " of the novelty and importance of it, eſpe- " cially with reſpect to the phenomena of " light. If I were to make any alteration in " it, it would be to ſuppoſe the force of the " ſphere of repulſion next to any of the *in-* " *diviſible points*, which conſtitute what we " call ſolid bodies, not to be abſolutely *infi-* " *nite*, but ſuch as may be overcome by the " momentum of light; which will obviate " the objection of Mr. Melville. If, how- " ever, we conſider that Mr. Boſcovich " makes this neareſt power of repulſion not " to extend to any *real ſpace*, but to be con- " fined to the indiviſible point itſelf, it may " appear to be ſufficient for the purpoſe; " ſince the chance of ſuch points impinging " upon one another is ſo little, that it needs " not to be conſidered at all."

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SECTION III.

Of the Seat of the SENTIENT PRINCIPLE *in Man.*

IN the two preceding ſections I have endeavoured to rectify the notions which we have been taught to entertain concerning matter, as not being that *impenetrable*, *inert* ſubſtance that we had imagined it to be. This, being admitted, will greatly facilitate our farther progreſs in theſe diſquiſitions; as I hope we ſhall not conſider matter with that contempt and diſguſt, with which it has generally been treated; there being nothing in its real nature that can juſtify ſuch ſentiments reſpecting it.

I now proceed to inquire whether, when the nature of matter is rightly underſtood, there be any reaſon to think that there is in man any ſubſtance eſſentially different from it, that is, any thing poſſeſſed of other properties beſides ſuch as may he ſuperadded to thoſe of *attraction* and *repulſion*, which we have found to belong to matter, or that may be conſiſtent with thoſe properties. For if this be the caſe, true philoſophy, which will not authorize us to *multiply cauſes*, or kinds of ſubſtance, *without neceſſity*, will forbid us to admit of any ſuch ſubſtance. If *one kind of ſubſtance* be capable of ſupporting all the known

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known *properties* of man; that is, if thoſe properties have nothing in them that is abſolutely incompatible with one another, we ſhall be obliged to conclude (unleſs we openly violate the rules of philoſophizing) that no other kind of ſubſtance enters into his compoſition; the ſuppoſition being manifeſtly *unneceſſary*, in order to account for any appearance whatever.

All the properties that have hitherto been attributed to matter, may be comprized under thoſe of *attraction* and *repulſion* (all the effects of which have been ſhewn to be produced by *powers*, independent of all *ſolidity*) and of *extenſion*, by means of which matter occupies a certain portion of ſpace. Beſides theſe properties, man is poſſeſſed of the powers of *ſenſation* or *perception*, and *thought*. But if, without giving the reins to our imaginations, we ſuffer ourſelves to be guided in our inquiries by the ſimple rules of philoſophizing above mentioned, we muſt neceſſarily conclude, as it appears to me, that theſe powers alſo may belong to the ſame ſubſtance, that has alſo the properties of attraction, repulſion, and extenſion, which I, as well as others, call by the name of *matter*; though I have been obliged to diveſt it of one property which has hitherto been thought eſſential to it, as well as to give it others which have not been thought eſſential to it; and conſequently my idea of this ſubſtance is

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not, in all reſpects, the ſame with that of other metaphyſicians.

The reaſon of the concluſion above mentioned, is ſimply this, that the powers of ſenſation or perception, and thought, as belonging to man, have never been found but in conjunction with a certain *organized ſyſtem of matter*; and therefore, that thoſe powers neceſſarily exiſt in, and depend upon, ſuch a ſyſtem. This, at leaſt, muſt be our concluſion, till it can be ſhewn that theſe powers are incompatible with other known properties of the ſame ſubſtance; and for this I ſee no ſort of pretence.

It is true, that we have a very imperfect idea of what the *power of perception* is, and it may be as naturally impoſſible that we ſhould have a clear idea of it, as that the eye ſhould ſee itſelf. But this very ignorance ought to make us cautious in aſſerting with what other properties it may, or may not, exiſt. Nothing but a preciſe and definite knowledge of the nature of perception and thought can authorize any perſon to affirm, whether they may not belong to an extended ſubſtance, which has alſo the properties of attraction and repulſion. Seeing, therefore, no ſort of reaſon to imagine that theſe different properties are really *inconſiſtent*, any more than the different properties of *reſiſtance* and *extenſion*, I am, of courſe, under the neceſſity of being guided by the *phenomena* in my concluſions

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ſions concerning the proper ſeat of the powers of perception and thought. Theſe phenomena I ſhall now briefly repreſent.

Had we formed a judgement concerning the neceſſary ſeat of thought, by the *circumſtances that univerſally accompany it*, which is our rule in all other caſes, we could not but have concluded, that in man it is a property of the *nervous ſyſtem*, or rather of the *brain*. Becauſe, as far as we can judge, the faculty of thinking, and a certain ſtate of the brain, always accompany and correſpond to one another; which is the very reaſon why we believe that any property is inherent in any ſubſtance whatever. There is no inſtance of any man retaining the faculty of thinking, when his brain was deſtroyed; and whenever that faculty is impeded, or injured, there is ſufficient reaſon to believe that the brain is diſordered in proportion; and therefore we are neceſſarily led to conſider the latter as the ſeat of the former.

Moreover, as the faculty of thinking in general ripens, and comes to maturity with the body, it is alſo obſerved to decay with it; and if, in ſome caſes, the mental faculties continue vigorous when the body in general is enfeebled, it is evidently becauſe, in thoſe particular caſes, the *brain* is not much affected by the general cauſe of weakneſs. But, on the other hand, if the brain alone be affected, as by a blow on the head, by actual preſſure within the ſkull, by ſleep,

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or by inflammation, the mental faculties are univerſally affected in proportion.

Likewiſe, as the mind is affected in conſequence of the affections of the body and brain, ſo the body is liable to be reciprocally affected by the affections of the mind, as is evident in the viſible effects of all ſtrong paſſions, hope or fear, love or anger, joy or ſorrow, exultation or deſpair. Theſe are certainly irrefragable arguments that it is properly no other than *one and the ſame thing* that is ſubject to theſe affections, and that they are neceſſarily dependent upon one another. In fact, there is juſt the ſame reaſon to conclude, that the powers of ſenſation and thought are the neceſſary reſult of a particular organization, as that ſound is the neceſſary reſult of a particular concuſſion of the air. For in both caſes equally the one conſtantly accompanies the other, and there is not in nature a ſtronger argument for a neceſſary connection of any cauſe and any effect.

To adopt an opinion different from this, is to form an hypotheſis without a ſingle fact to ſupport it. And to conclude, as ſome have done, that a material ſyſtem is ſo far from being a neceſſary pre-requiſite to the faculty of thinking, that it is an obſtruction to it, is to adopt a method of argumentation the very reverſe of every thing that has hitherto been followed in philoſophy. It is to conclude, not only *without*, but directly *contrary* to all appearances whatſoever.

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That the perfection of thinking ſhould depend on the ſound ſtate of the body and brain *in this life*, inſomuch that a man has no power of thinking without it, and to ſuppoſe him capable of thinking better when the body and brain are deſtroyed, ſeems to be the moſt unphiloſophical and abſurd of all concluſions. If *death* be an advantage with reſpect to thinking, *diſeaſe* ought to be a proportional advantage likewiſe; and univerſally, the nearer the body approaches to a ſtate of diſſolution, the freer and leſs embarraſſed might the faculties of the mind be expected to be found. But this is the very reverſe of what really happens.

Part of this argument is ſo well repreſented, and ſo forcibly urged, by the excellent Mr. Hallet, that I ſhall quote the entire paſſage from the firſt volume of his *Diſcourſes*, p. 213.

" I ſee a man move, and hear him ſpeak " for ſome years. From his ſpeech I cer- " tainly infer that he *thinks*, as I do. I ſee " then that man is a being who thinks and " acts. After ſome time the man falls down " in my ſight, grows cold and ſtiff. He " ſpeaks and acts no more. Is it not then " natural to conclude that he *thinks* no more? " As the only reaſon I had to believe that he " did think was his motion and ſpeech, ſo " now that this motion and ſpeech ceaſe, I " have loſt the only way of proving that he " had a power of thought.

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" Upon this ſudden death, the one viſible " thing, the one man is greatly charged. " Whence could I infer that the ſame *he* " conſiſts of two parts, and that the inward " part continues to live and think, and flies " away from the body, when the outward " part ceaſes to live and move. It looks as if " the *whole man* was gone, and that all his " powers ceaſe at the ſame time. His mo- " tion and thought die together as far as I can " diſcern.

" The powers of *thought*, *ſpeech*, and *mo-* " *tion* equally depend upon the body, and " run the ſame fate in caſe of mens' declining " in old age. When a man dies through " old age I perceive his powers of ſpeech, " motion, and thought, decay and die to- " gether, and by the ſame degrees. The " moment he ceaſes to move, and breathe, he " appears to ceaſe to *think* too.

" When I am left to mere reaſon, it ſeems " to me that my power of *thought* as much " depends upon my body, as my power of " *ſight* or *hearing*. I could not think in in- " fancy. My powers of thought, of ſight, " and of feeling, are equally liable to be ob- " ſtructed by the body. A blow on the head " has deprived a man of thought, who could " yet ſee and feel and move; ſo that na- " turally the power of thinking ſeems as " much to belong to the body as any power " of man whatſoever. Naturally there ap- " pears no more reaſon to ſuppoſe that a

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" man can *think* out of the body, than he " can *hear ſounds*, or *feel cold*, out of the " body."

Notwithſtanding Mr. Hallet was ſatisfied that there was no good argument from the light of *nature*, in favour either of the immateriality or immortality of the ſoul, he ſtill retained the belief of it on the authority, as he imagined, of *revelation*. But it will be ſeen, in a ſubſequent ſection, that the ſcriptures afford no evidence whatever of a thing ſo contrary to the principles of reaſon; but that the ſacred writers go upon quite different principles, always taking for granted the very thing I am here contending for; and that the notion of the ſoul being a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, was originally a part of the ſyſtem of *heatheniſm*, and was from thence introduced into chriſtianity, which has derived the greateſt part of its corruptions from this ſource.

It is ſtill more unaccountable in Mr. Locke, to ſuppoſe, as he did, and as he largely contends, that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, the faculty of thinking may be a property of the body, and yet to think it more probable that this faculty inhered in a different ſubſtance, viz. an immaterial ſoul. A philoſopher ought to have been apprized, that we are to ſuppoſe no more *cauſes* than are neceſſary to produce the *effects*; and therefore that we ought to conclude, that the whole man is material, unleſs it ſhould appear that

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he has ſome powers or properties that are abſolutely incompatible with matter.

Since then Mr. Locke did not apprehend that there was any real inconſiſtency between the known properties of body, and thoſe that have generally been referred to mind, he ought, as became a philoſopher, to have concluded that the *whole ſubſtance of man*, that which ſupports all his powers and properties, was one uniform ſubſtance, and by no means that he conſiſted of *two ſubſtances*, and thoſe ſo very different from one another as *body* and *ſpirit* are uſually repreſented to be; ſo much ſo, that they have been generally thought incapable of having one common property. Accordingly, the beſt writers upon this ſubject always conſider the union of theſe two very different ſubſtances as a moſt ſtupendous and wonderful thing. " *Le tout pouiſſant*," ſays the author of *La vraye Philoſophie*, " *pou-*
" *voit ſeul etablir un accord ſi intime entre deux*
" *ſubſtances ſi diſcordantes par leur nature.*"

SECTION

SECTION IV.

Additional Conſiderations in Favour of the Materiality of the Human Soul.

IN the preceding ſection, I have repreſented how unphiloſophical it is to conclude that all the powers of man do not belong to *the ſame ſubſtance*, when they are obſerved to have a conſtant and neceſſary dependance upon one another, and when there is not, as far as we know, the leaſt inconſiſtency or incompatibility between them. If there be any foundation for the eſtabliſhed rules of philoſophizing, the argument ought to be concluſive with us, and every thing that can be added to it is really ſuperfluous. However, for the greater ſatisfaction of ſome of my readers, I ſhall, in this ſection, ſubjoin ſome additional arguments, or conſiderations, or rather, in ſome caſes, diſtinct illuſtrations of the preceding argument.

1. That the faculty of thinking neceſſarily depends, for its *exerciſe*, at leaſt, upon a ſtock of ideas, about which it is always converſant, will hardly be queſtioned by any perſon. But there is not a ſingle idea of which the mind is poſſeſſed, but what may be proved to have come to it from the bodily ſenſes, or to have been conſequent upon the perceptions of ſenſe. Could we, for inſtance, have had any idea

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of colour, as *red*, *blue*, &c. without the eyes, and optic nerves; of *ſound*, without the ears, and auditory nerves; of *ſmell*, without the noſtrils, and the olfactory nerves, &c. &c? It is even impoſſible to conceive how the mind could have become poſſeſſed of any of its preſent ſtock of ideas, without juſt ſuch a body as we have; and conſequently, judging from preſent appearances (and we have no other means of forming any judgment at all) without a body, of ſome kind or other, we could have had no ideas at all, any more than a man without eyes could have any particular ideas belonging to colours. The notion, therefore, of the *poſſibility* of thinking in man, without an organized body, is not only deſtitute of all evidence from actual appearances, but is directly contrary to them; and yet theſe appearances ought alone to guide the judgement of philoſophers.

Dr. Clark ſeems have to imagined that he had fully anſwered the argument for the materiality of the human ſoul, from its having received all its ideas from the bodily ſenſes, by aſking whether there might not poſſibly have been *other inlets to ideas* beſides our preſent ſenſes. "If theſe," ſays he, *Demonſtration, &c.* p. 89, "be arbitrary, then the "want of theſe does by no means infer a "total want of perception, but the ſame ſoul "may, in another ſtate, have different ways "of perception."

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To this it is easy to reply, that mere *possibility* is no foundation for any conclusion in this case. We see, in fact, that all our sensations come to us by the way of the corporeal senses; and though our observing this will authorize us to say, that, if the Divine Being had so pleased, we might have had *more*, or *fewer*, or quite *different* senses, and, of course, should have had very different sets of sensations and ideas, it will by no means authorize us to say that it was even *possible* for us to have had sensations and ideas *without any corporeal senses* at all. We have no *example* of any such thing, and therefore cannot say that it is even *possible*, much less that it is actually the case. Present appearances certainly lead us to think, that our mental powers *necessarily* depend upon our corporeal ones; and till some very different appearances present themselves, it must be exceedingly unphilosophical to imagine that the connection is not necessary.

2. The only reason why it has been so earnestly contended for, that there is some principle in man that is not material, is that it might subsist, and be capable of sensation and action, when the body was dead. But, if the mind was naturally so independent of the body, as to be capable of subsisting by itself, and even of appearing to more advantage after the death of the body, it might be expected to discover some signs of its independence before death, and especially when

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the organs of the body were obſtructed, ſo as to leave the ſoul more at liberty to exert itſelf, as in a ſtate of *ſleep*, or *ſwooning*, which moſt reſemble the ſtate of death, in which it is pretended that the ſoul is moſt of all alive, moſt active, and vigorous.

But, judging by appearances, the reverſe of all this is the caſe. That a man does not think during ſleep, except in that imperfect manner which we call *dreaming*, and which is nothing more than an approach to a ſtate of vigilance, I ſhall not here diſpute, but take for granted; referring my readers to Mr. Locke, and other writers upon that ſubject; and that all power of thinking is ſuſpended during a ſwoon, I conclude with certainty, becauſe no appearance whatever can poſſibly lead us to ſuſpect the contrary.

3. If the mental principle was, in its own nature, immaterial, and immortal, all its particular *faculties* would be ſo too; whereas we ſee that every faculty of the mind, without exception, is liable to be impaired, and even to become wholly extinct before death. Since, therefore, all the faculties of the mind, ſeparately taken, appear to be mortal, the ſubſtance, or principle, in which they exiſt muſt be pronounced to be mortal too. Thus we might conclude, that the *body* was mortal, from obſerving that all the ſeparate *ſenſes*, and *limbs*, were liable to decay and periſh.

4. If the ſentient principle in man be immaterial, it can have no *extenſion*, it can neither

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ther have length, breadth, nor thickneſs, and conſequently every thing within it, or properly belonging to it, muſt be *ſimple* and *indiviſible*. Beſides, it is univerſally acknowledged, that if the ſubſtance of the ſoul was not ſimple and indiviſible, it would be liable to corruption, and death; and therefore that no advantage would be gained by ſuppoſing the power of thinking to belong to any ſubſtance diſtinct from the body. Let us now conſider how this notion agrees with the phenomena of ſenſation and ideas, which are the proper ſubject of thought.

It will not be denied but that ſenſations or ideas properly exiſt *in the ſoul*, becauſe it could not otherwiſe retain them, ſo as to continue to perceive and think after its ſeparation from the body. Now whatever ideas are in themſelves, they are evidently produced by external objects, and muſt therefore correſpond to them; and ſince many of the objects or architypes of ideas are diviſible, it neceſſarily follows, that the ideas themſelves are diviſible alſo. The idea of a *man*, for inſtance, could in no ſenſe correſpond to a man, which is the architype of it, and therefore could not be the idea of a man, if it did not conſiſt of the ideas of his *head*, *arms*, *trunk*, *legs*, &c. It, therefore, conſiſts of *parts*, and conſequently is *diviſible*. And how is it poſſible that a thing (be the *nature* of it what it may) that is *diviſible*, ſhould be contained in a ſubſtance, be the na-

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ture of it likewiſe what it may, that is *indiviſible?*

If the architypes of ideas have extenſion, the ideas which are expreſſive of them, and are actually produced by them, according to certain mechanical laws, muſt have extenſion likewiſe; and therefore the mind in which they exiſt, whether it be material or immaterial, muſt have extenſion alſo. But how any thing can have extenſion, and yet be immaterial, without coinciding with our idea of mere empty *ſpace*, I know not. I am therefore obliged to conclude, that the ſentient principle in man, containing ideas which certainly have parts, and are diviſible, and conſequently muſt have extenſion, cannot be that ſimple, indiviſible, and immaterial ſubſtance that ſome have imagined it to be; but ſomething that has real *extenſion*, and therefore may have the other properties of matter.

To this argument for the extenſion and materiality of the human ſoul, the author of *La vraye Philoſophie* replies, in a manner very ſingular, and to me not very intelligible. He ſays, p. 104, " the impreſſion of a circle, or " any object that is diviſible, ſtrikes the or- " gan of ſenſe; this action is tranſmitted " by ſome unknown law to the ſoul, which " is thereby modified, and which refers its " own modifications, indiviſible as *itſelf* is, " to external objects. Thus the idea of a " circle

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"circle is not round, nor has any extenſion, "though it anſwers perfectly to a circle that "is diviſible, and has extenſion." This doctrine he illuſtrates by what is obſerved of thoſe who *dream*, and *walk in their ſleep*, imagining they ſee what is not before them, and alſo by optical deceptions. "This," ſays he, "is the caſe with all *colour*, which is falſely "thought to be in bodies; but though the "coloured body moves, its colour is as im-"moveable as the ſoul that perceives it," p. 108. What he farther adds upon this ſubject is ſtill more unintelligible to me. "The ſen-"ſations, ſimple and indiviſible as they are, "contain, in an eminent manner, the quality "of extenſion, and thereby prove that the "ſubſtance which they modify, viz. the ſoul, "is of an order ſuperior to matter." P. 113.

5. All the defenders of the *ſimple*, *indiviſible*, and *unalterable* nature of the ſoul, that I have met with, appear to me to have overlooked a great variety of mental *affections*, which neceſſarily imply alteration, eſpecially *melioration* and *depravation*, which is ſomething ſo ſimilar to *corruption*, that it has univerſally obtained the ſame name, and which is certainly incompatible with natural and perfect *ſimplicity*. From Mr. Baxter's own acknowledgment, expreſſed in words which it is impoſſible to miſconſtrue, it neceſſarily follows, that, whatever may happen to the ſoul, during its temporary connection with the body, it muſt, whenever it is ſet at liberty from it,

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immediately recover its priſtine purity. But what then becomes of the chriſtian doctrine, upon his own hypotheſis, of vicious habits (which are the proper *diſeaſe* of the mind) inhering in the ſoul after death, and its being liable to puniſhment, in a ſeparate unembodied ſtate, on that account?

Mr. Baxter, however, ſays, vol. ii. p. 161. "The ſoul cannot have a diſorder lodged in "itſelf, nor be ſubject to any diſeaſe. A man "who conſiders the *ſimple nature* of it will "never affirm this.—The ſoul can admit of "no diſeaſe from matter, as having no *parts* "to be diſordered. It can ſuffer no alteration "in its own ſubſtance, if that ſubſtance be "not annihilated.—We would have the ſoul "to grow up, to decay, to ſleep, to be mad, "to be drunk. Who does not ſee all theſe "are ridiculous fancies, too groſs to be entertained concerning a ſimple uncompounded ſubſtance? If the ſoul were mad, or had "the diſeaſe lodged in itſelf, what could cure "it?"

If this reaſoning have any foundation, it will follow, that nothing is requiſite to diſcharge all the vices of the ſoul, but to detach it from its fatal connection with the body, and leave it to itſelf. All vice and diſorder, as it came with the body, and always inhered in it, muſt terminate and depart with it.

SECTION

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SECTION V.

Advantages attending the Syſtem of MATERIALISM, *eſpecially with reſpect to the Doctrines of* REVEALED RELIGION.

IT is a great advantage attending the ſyſtem of materialiſm, that we thereby get rid of a great number of *difficulties*, which exceedingly clog and embarraſs the oppoſite ſyſtem; ſuch, for inſtance, as theſe, *what becomes of the ſoul during ſleep*, in a *ſwoon*, when the body is *ſeemingly dead* (as by drowning, or other accidents) and eſpecially *after death*; alſo *what was the condition of it before it became united to the body*, and *at what time did that union take place?* &c. &c. &c.

If the ſoul be immaterial, and the body material, neither the generation nor the deſtruction of the body can have any effect with reſpect to it. This *foreign principle* muſt have been united to it either at the time of conception, or at birth, and muſt either have been created at the time of ſuch union, or have exiſted in a ſeparate ſtate prior to that period. Now all theſe ſuppoſitions are clogged with great difficulties, and indeed can hardly be conſidered at all, without being immediately rejected, as extremely improbable, if not abſurd.

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Muſt the divine power be neceſſarily employed to produce a ſoul, whenever the human ſpecies copulate? Or muſt ſome of the pre-exiſtent ſpirits be obliged, immediately upon that event, to deſcend from the ſuperior regions, to inhabit the new-formed embrio? If this be the caſe, (which was the original hypotheſis of the ſeparability of the ſoul from the body) by what *rule* muſt this deſcent be regulated? Muſt theſe unembodied ſpirits become embodied in *rotation*, according to ſome rank, and *condition*, or muſt it be determined by *lot*, &c?

If *man* be actuated by a principle diſtinct from his body, every *brute animal* muſt have an immaterial ſoul alſo; for they differ from us in *degree* only, and not at all in *kind*; having all the ſame mental, as well as corporeal powers and faculties that we have, though not in the ſame extent; and they are poſſeſſed of them in a greater degree than thoſe of our race that are *ideots*, or that die *infants*.

Now the ſtate of the ſouls of brutes is perhaps more embarraſſing than that of human beings. Are they originally, and naturally, the ſame beings with the ſouls of men? Have they pre-exiſted, and are they to continue for ever? If ſo, *how* and *where* are they to be diſpoſed of after death; and are they alſo to be re-united to their preſent bodies, as well as the ſouls of men? Theſe are only a few of

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the difficulties which muſt neceſſarily occur to any thinking perſon who adopts the opinion of the eſſential difference between ſoul and body.

Some hypotheſis or other every perſon, who maintains the immaterial ſyſtem, and reflects upon it all, muſt neceſſarily have, in order to ſolve theſe queſtions, and many others of a ſimilar nature. For every general ſyſtem muſt be conſiſtent, and alſo have all its parts properly filled up. The queſtions that I have mentioned muſt perpetually obtrude themſelves upon thoſe perſons whoſe ſyſtem admits of their being aſked, as indeed is evident from the formal diſcuſſion of moſt of them by ſyſtematical writers; and whether any perſon be able to ſatisfy himſelf with reſpect to them or not, he cannot be without ſome hypotheſis or other for that purpoſe. Now I will venture to pronounce, without diſcuſſing the queſtions above mentioned particularly, that there is no method of ſolving them that can give any tolerable ſatisfaction to an ingenuous mind.

Metaphyſicians, who have conceived high notions of the dignity of *immaterial ſubſtances*, and who have entertained a great contempt for every thing *material*, are much embarraſſed when they conſider the *uſe of the body*. The ancients, indeed, who imagined all ſouls to have pre-exiſted, and to have been ſent into the bodies in which they are now confined as a *puniſhment*, for offences committed

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mitted in their pre-existent state, found no difficulty in this case. The body is necessarily a *clog*, and an *impediment* to the soul, and it was provided for that very purpose. But the moderns, who have dropped the notion of pre-existence, and of offences committed prior to birth, and yet retain from that system the intire doctrine of the *contagion of matter*, which is a language that, among others, Mr. Baxter makes use of (see *Matho*, vol. ii. p. 212) must necessarily be exceedingly embarrassed when they connect with this mutilated *heathenish system* the peculiar doctrines of *christianity*.

Indeed, what is advanced by the most acute of these christian metaphysicians upon this subject, is little short of a contradiction in Terms. Mr. Baxter, for instance, says, *Matho*, vol. ii. p. 211, that "nothing could "be fitter than matter to initiate beings, whose "first information of things is from sense, "and to train them up in the elements of "knowledge and admiration." Let us now see what consistency there is between this notion of the use of matter, with what he had said before, p. 173, of the absolute *unfitness* of matter for this purpose of training up the soul in the elements of knowledge.

"We know not," says he, "nor can we "name a greater absurdity, than that union "to a dead and torpid substance should give "the soul life and power, or any degree of "them; or that separation should again de-

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" prive it of theſe. The ſoul, therefore, " muſt be percipient and active in its own " nature, independent of matter." Again he ſays, " matter, when beſt diſpoſed, muſt " limit the power and activity of the ſoul, " and when diſordered and indiſpoſed, may " quite obſtruct or impede its operations, but " can in no manner aid or aſſiſt its power " and energy, otherwiſe than by confining " and determining them to one manner of " exertion. Hence the ſoul, when ſeparate " from matter, muſt be freed from indiſpo- " ſition, and the confinement be taken off " from its natural activity."

The manifeſt contradiction between theſe two accounts of matter, hardly needs to be pointed out. The immaterial principle, it ſeems, is to be *initiated in the elements of knowledge* by its union to a dead and torpid ſubſtance, which is ſo far from *giving it any life or power*, or *any degree of them*, that we cannot name a greater abſurdity, than ſuch a ſuppoſition; a ſubſtance which, *when beſt diſpoſed*, muſt limit the powers and activity of the ſoul, and when *diſordered* and *indiſpoſed*, as it is evidently very liable to be, and indeed is hardly ever otherwiſe, may quite *obſtruct* and *impede* all its operations; and can in no manner *aid* or *aſſiſt* its powers or energy.

If the ſoul, as this ingenious writer ſays, be *percipient and active in its own nature*, and when ſeparate from the body muſt be freed from indiſpoſition, and have a confinement

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taken off from its natural activity, it would certainly have been very happy for it never to have been ſubject to ſuch a *confinement*, and a great advantage never to have been affected by ſuch a *contagion*.

The only ſhadow of conſiſtency that is preſerved in this account is hinted at where he ſays, that "matter can no otherwiſe aid and "aſſiſt the powers of the ſoul, than by con-"fining and determining them to one man-"ner of exertion." This, however, is but a ſhadow of conſiſtency, for, by the very ſame way of reaſoning, it might be proved that a man is a gainer by the loſs of his eyes or ears, and indeed of all his ſenſes except one; becauſe his ſentient powers being by this means *confined and determined to one manner of exertion*, he becomes more perfect in the exerciſe of it; whereas he is certainly a loſer *upon the whole*, by having his ſenſes and faculties thus curtailed. But allowing that ſome ſmall advantage might poſſibly accrue to the ſoul from this great limitation of its percipient and active powers, what chance is there for its receiving any benefit upon the whole; when the thing that is employed to confine it is ſure to become, if we judge from fact and experience, exceedingly diſordered? ſo that, by this writer's own confeſſion, it muſt quite obſtruct and impede all its operations; and when, by its union to this contagious principle, it is liable to be contaminated in ſuch a manner as to be utterly ruined and loſt to every

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every valuable end of exiſtence. Great, indeed, we ſee, is the riſk that the immaterial ſoul runs by its union with this groſs material body, and ſmall, very ſmall indeed, is the advantage that it may happen to derive from it.

It ſeems, however, that when the chriſtian, after having long ſtruggled, and maintained a very unequal combat in its preſent ſtate of confinement, in which his ſoul can have little or no uſe of its native powers and faculties, has, by the benevolent conſtitution of nature, at length got rid of this *incumbrance of clay*, theſe *fetters of matter*, and this dreadful *contagion of fleſh and blood*, and with all the privileges, and all the powers of action and enjoyment, naturally belonging to an *unembodied ſpirit*, has ranged the regions of empyreum for ſome thouſands of years, theſe powers are to be again clogged and impeded by a *ſecond union to matter*, though better tempered than before, and therefore a leſs, though a real and neceſſary incumbrance. And what is moſt extraordinary in the caſe is, that this *ſecond degradation* takes place at a period which chriſtianity points out to us as the great jubilee of the virtuous and the good; when (all mankind being judged according to their works) they ſhall receive the plaudit of their judge, and ſhall enter upon the *inheritance of a kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world*; at which time, and

and not before, they are to be admitted to be for *ever with their Lord Jesus Christ.*

Mr. Baxter, in his *Essay on the Soul*, p. 304, says, that "after the resurrection, the "re-union of souls to their bodies may be "no punishment, or diminution of the happiness designed them, if we conceive it to "be within the reach of infinite power to "bring this union to a state of *indolence*, or "*inoffensiveness on the part of matter.* For "to have no trouble or uneasiness at all "from matter, is precisely the state of happiness with respect to it, that spirits have "which are entirely free from it. But "no attentive man," he adds, "ever "thought that there consisted any real felicity in being united to material substance."

That this account of the effects of the union of the mind with matter is inconsistent with the other quoted from his *Matho*, needs no pointing out. In the one case, matter must *necessarily limit* and *fetter the soul*, whereas in the other, it is possible, though barely possible, that it may *not fetter* it. Upon the most favourable supposition, however, the christian resurrection is barely *no disadvantage.* But can this be that state towards which all christians are taught to look with the most eager expectation, when only their joy is to *commence*, and to *be full. Looking*, as the apostle Peter says, *for that blessed hope.* One would think that

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that ſuch writers as theſe had been but little converſant with the New Teſtament, to the uniform language of which their notions are totally repugnant.

Such have been the prepoſterous effects of mixing theſe *heatheniſh notions* with the principles of our holy religion, which diſclaims all connection with them, and militates againſt them in every article.

On the other hand, the ſyſtem of materialiſm, which revelation uniformly ſuppoſes, is clogged with none of theſe difficulties, or rather abſurdities. Man, according to this ſyſtem, is no more than what we now ſee of him. His being commences at the time of his conception, or perhaps at an earlier period. The corporeal and mental faculties, inhering in the ſame ſubſtance, grow, ripen, and decay together; and whenever the ſyſtem is diſſolved, it continues in a ſtate of diſſolution, till it ſhall pleaſe that Almighty Being who called it into exiſtence to reſtore it to life again.

By the help of the ſyſtem of materialiſm, alſo, the chriſtian removes the very foundation of many doctrines, which have exceedingly debaſed and corrupted chriſtianity; being in fact a heterogeneous mixture of *pagan notions*, diametrically oppoſite to thoſe on which the whole *ſyſtem of revelation* is built. The chriſtian ſyſtem provides no reward for the righteous till the general *reſurrection of the juſt*, nor any puniſhment for the

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wicked, till the *end of the world*, at which time, and not before, the angels will be commiſſioned to *gather out of the kingdom of Chriſt every thing that offends*. Then only will be the great *harveſt*, when the *wheat* (to uſe the language of our Saviour) *will be gathered into the garner*, and the *chaff will be burned with unquenchable fire*.

The immaterial ſyſtem, on the contrary, makes it neceſſary to provide ſome *receptacle for the ſouls of the dead*, which being in a ſtate of conſciouſneſs, muſt neceſſarily be in a ſtate of pleaſure or pain, reward or puniſhment, even antecedent to the day of judgment. Now as there is no hint concerning the *nature*, or *uſe* of ſuch an *intermediate ſtate* in the ſcriptures, the vain imaginations of men have had a moſt ample ſcope for diſplaying themſelves; and among other gainful abſurdities, the prieſts have taken this advantage to found upon it the doctrines of *purgatory*, and the *worſhip of the dead*.

The doctrine of *pre-exiſtence*, or that of all human ſouls having been lapſed angels, which was the true ſource of *Gnoſticiſm*, and moſt of the early corruptions of chriſtianity, could have no other foundation than the notion of there being ſomething in man quite different from his corporeal organized ſyſtem; which, therefore, might have exiſted prior to that ſyſtem, as well as continue after its diſſolution. It was at this time, when *all* ſouls were ſuppoſed to have pre-exiſted, that the

ſoul

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ſoul of Chriſt was not only ſuppoſed to have pre-exiſted, together with the ſouls of other perſons, but, ſuitable to his rank here, had a proportional ſuperior rank and office aſſigned to him before he came into the world. Upon this foundation he was firſt conſidered as the δημιουργος of the Oriental philoſophy, or the immediate maker of the world under the ſupreme Being; then as a peculiar *emanation of the divine eſſence*, and laſtly, as having been from all eternity *equal to God himſelf*. From this it is evident, that the very ſeeds of this dreadful corruption of chriſtianity, which has been the fruitful ſource of many others, could not have been ſown, but in this immaterial, and as it may properly be termed, this heatheniſh ſyſtem.

Had the minds of the primitive chriſtians continued uncontaminated with *the wiſdom of this world*, and conſidered Chriſt as his apoſtles, who lived and converſed with him, evidently appear to have conſidered him, viz. as a *mere man approved of God, by ſigns and wonders which God did by him*, they would have entertained for him all the ſentiments of love and reverence that were due to the *captain of their ſalvation*, and the *firſt begotten from the dead*; who, as their *elder brother*, was *gone to prepare a place for them*, in the heavenly manſions, and who would return with a commiſſion from God to raiſe the dead, and judge the world; but they could never have arrogated for him *divine honours*,

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and consequently the worship that has been paid to the Virgin Mary, and other Popish saints, would not have followed: and the influence of these leading opinions, upon the whole mass of corruptions that came in like a deluge afterward, is easily traced.

SECTION VI.

Considerations more immediately relating to IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCES, *and especially to the* CONNEXION OF THE SOUL AND BODY.

PART I.

Of the PRESENCE *of the Soul with the Body.*

THE idea of an *immaterial substance*, as it is defined by metaphysicians, is entirely a modern thing, and is still unknown to the vulgar. The original, and still prevailing idea concerning a *soul* or *spirit*, is that of a kind of attenuated aërial substance, of a more subtle nature than gross bodies, which have weight, and make a sensible resistance when they are pushed against, or struck at. The *form* of it may be variable, but it is capable, in certain circumstances, of becoming the object

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ject of ſight. Thus when our Lord appeared to his diſciples walking on the ſea, and alſo after his reſurrection, they thought it had been a *ſpirit*; and, therefore, to convince them of their miſtake on the latter of theſe occaſions, he bade them handle him; for that a ſpirit had not fleſh and bones, as they might be convinced that he had. He did not obſerve to them that a ſpirit could not be the object of *ſight*, any more than of *touch*. Alſo, whatever expreſſions might caſually drop from any of the ancient philoſophers, it is evident to all who conſider the whole of their doctrine, that their idea of a ſpirit was widely different from that which is now contended for.

That a ſpirit is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, *indiviſible*, which is eſſential to the modern idea of it, is abſolutely incompatible with the notion that is known to have run through almoſt all the ſyſtems of the ancients, derived originally from the *Eaſt*, *viz.* that all human ſouls, and all finite intelligences, were originally *portions of the great ſoul of the univerſe*; and though detached from it for a time, are finally to be abſorbed into it again; when the ſeparate conſciouſneſs belonging at preſent to each of them will be for ever loſt. How the idea of a ſpirit came to be refined into the very *attenuated ſtate* in which we now find it, I ſhall endeavour to inveſtigate in its proper place; and in the mean time ſhall beſtow a few obſervations upon it, as it appears in the writ-

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ings of the lateſt, and moſt celebrated metaphyſicians.

A ſpirit, then, or an *immaterial ſubſtance*, in the modern ſtrict uſe of the term, ſignifies a ſubſtance that has no *extenſion* of any kind, nor any thing of the *vis inertiæ* that belongs to matter. It has neither *length*, *breadth*, nor *thickneſs*; ſo that it occupies no portion of ſpace; on which account the moſt rigorous metaphyſicians ſay, that it bears no ſort of relation to ſpace, any more than ſound does to the eye, or light to the ear. In fact, therefore, *ſpirit* and *ſpace* have nothing to do with one another, and it is even improper to ſay that an immaterial being *exiſts in ſpace*, or that it *reſides* in one place more than in another; for, properly ſpeaking, it is *no where*, but has a mode of exiſtence that cannot be expreſſed by any phraſeology appropriated to the modes in which matter exiſts. Even theſe ſpiritual and intellectual beings themſelves have no idea of the manner in which they exiſt, at leaſt while they are confined by groſs matter.

It follows alſo from this view of the ſubject, that the *divine mind* can only be ſaid to be *omnipreſent* by way of figure; for, ſtrictly ſpeaking, this term implies *extenſion*, of which all immaterial ſubſtances are utterly incapable. By the omnipreſence of the Deity, therefore, they mean his power of *acting every where*, though he *exiſts no where*. The mind

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mind of any particular perſon, alſo, they ſuppoſe not to be confined within the body of that perſon; but that though itſelf bears no relation whatever to ſpace or place, its exertions and affections are, by the ſovereign appointment of his Creator, confined to a particular ſyſtem of organized matter, wherever that happens to be, and continues ſo limited in its operations as long as the organization ſubſiſts; but, that being diſſolved, the immaterial principle has no more to do with the matter that had been thus organized, than with any other matter in the univerſe. It can neither affect it, nor be affected by it.

Others, however, I believe, conſidering that, though *mathematical points* occupy no real portion of ſpace, they are yet capable of bearing ſome relation to it, by being fixed in this or that place, at certain diſtances from each other, are willing to allow that ſpirits alſo may be ſaid to be in one place in preference to another; and conſequently that they are capable of changing place, and of moving hither and thither, together with the body to which they belong. But this is not the opinion that ſeems to prevail in general; ſince it ſuppoſes ſpirit to have, at leaſt, one property in common with matter, whereas a being ſtrictly *immaterial* (which, in terms, implies a negation of all the properties of matter) ought not to have any thing in common with it.

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Beſides, a mathematical point is, in fact, no *ſubſtance* at all, being the mere *limit*, or termination of a body, or the *place* in void ſpace where a body is terminated, or may be ſuppoſed to be ſo. Mere *points*, mere *lines*, or mere *ſurfaces* are alike the mere *boundaries of material ſubſtances*, and may not improperly be called their *properties*, neceſſarily entering into the definition of particular bodies, and conſequently bear no ſort of relation to what is immaterial. And therefore the *conſiſtent immaterialiſt* has juſtly diſclaimed this idea.

Indeed it is evident, that if nothing but immaterial ſubſtances, or pure intelligences, had exiſted, the very idea of *place*, or *ſpace* could not have occurred to us. And an idea that an immaterial being could never have acquired without having an idea of body, or matter, cannot belong to *itſelf*, but to matter only. Conſequently, according to the ſtrict and only conſiſtent ſyſtem of immateriality, a ſpirit is properly *no where*, and altogether incapable of *local motion*, though it has an arbitrary connection with a body, that is confined to a particular place, and is capable of moving from one place to another. This, therefore, being the only conſiſtent notion of an immaterial ſubſtance, and every thing ſhort of it being mere materialiſm, it is to the conſideration of this idea, that I ſhall here confine myſelf.

Appearances cannot be ſaid to favour the doctrine of theſe very abſtract metaphyſicians. For,

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For, certainly, judging by what appears to us, we ſhould naturally ſay that the ſoul *accompanies the body*, and is contained in it, and therefore changes place together with the body. On this account, therefore, the moſt acute immaterialiſts have taken a good deal of pains to ſhew that, notwithſtanding theſe appearances, which at firſt ſight are acknowledged to be unfavourable to their ſyſtem, there is not properly any motion, or change of place, in the ſoul, let the body to which it belongs rove about ever ſo much.

"For my part," ſays Father Gerdil, as he is quoted by the author of *La vraye Philoſophie*, p. 271, "if I had no other reaſon to ſatisfy me, I ſhould content myſelf with ſaying, with the moſt celebrated philoſophers, of ancient and modern ſchools, that one cannot doubt but that *thought* and *volition* are incapable of moving with the body, becauſe they are evidently without extenſion. But the *ſoul*, of which they are modifications, is of the ſame nature with them. The *ſoul*, therefore, can no more move than the *thought* or the will."

To illuſtrate this paradox, he ſays, p. 272, that "the *void ſpace*, in a carriage drawn by horſes, does not move with the carriage, becauſe it is *nothing*; and though the ſoul be a real ſubſtance, it bears no more relation to place, than if it had been nothing at all." He adds, p. 273, in order to explain how the ſoul can have an idea of extenſion

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tenſion and of ſpace, when itſelf bears no relation to either, that "though the ſoul be "incapable of motion, like the body, it "doth not fail to contain eminently within "itſelf that quality of matter, and therefore "is capable of transferring it upon matter, "and of ſuppoſing it to belong to mat-"ter."

Afterwards, p. 275, in explaining what is meant by the ſoul's willing and acting *in its own body*, he ſays, that "theſe expreſſions, "the *ſoul is in the body, thinks in the body*, "and *goes out of the body*, ſignify nothing "but that the ſoul is *united to the body*, that "it thinks in a dependence upon that union, "and that, after a certain time, the ſoul will "be no longer united with that body; but "that the ſoul is not placed in the body as "the *brain* is in the *ſkull*, or that it is in the "place where the body is." How unintelligibly are perſons reduced to talk, when they quit the road of common ſenſe, forming their ſyſtems not from *facts* and *appearances*, but from *imagination*.

The author of *Letters on Materialiſm*, addreſſed to myſelf, ſeems to think that he has ſaid ſomething to the purpoſe, with reſpect to this difficulty, ariſing from *the place of ſpirits*, by conſidering *ſpace* as nothing more than an *ideal phenomenon ariſing from the extenſive order of co-exiſting bodies*. As this expreſſion, I own, conveys no clear idea to me, I ſhall lay before my readers the whole paragraph, becauſe

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cauſe, though I am not able to get any light from it, it is poſſible that another may.

" To your ſecond objection, that, properly " ſpeaking, *your mind is no more in your body,* " *than it is in the moon; becauſe it is incapable* " *of bearing the leaſt relation to ſpace?* I an- " ſwer, *matter,* indeed, occupies *ſpace,* to " which *ſpirit* has no relation, that is, mat- " ter, as a compounded ſubſtance, bears, in " its various parts, a relation to other bodies. " Space, in itſelf, is nothing real, it is only " an ideal phenomenon ariſing from the ex- " tenſive order of co-exiſting bodies. Take " from the creation every body, or, which " amounts to the ſame, every being capable " of viewing them, and ſpace will no longer " ſubſiſt."

Now it appears to me, that it is impoſſible, even *in idea,* to ſuppoſe the annihilation of ſpace. Let any perſon but for a moment ſuppoſe the annihilation of all *matter,* which is not difficult, and then conſider whether the annihilation of *ſpace* will neceſſarily follow. I do not mean *in imagination,* like the idea of things tending to fall downwards on the oppoſite ſide of the globe of the earth, but *in the nature of things.*

Afterwards this writer conſiders the preſence of the mind with the body, as *atteſted* by its *action upon it,* ſo that ſtill the ſpirit, properly ſpeaking, is *no where,* and has *no motion,* notwithſtanding its ſtrict union with, and its conſtant action upon, a body which is neceſ-

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ſarily confined to ſome particular place, and which it obliges to change its place at pleaſure. How theſe notions ſtrike others I cannot tell; to me nothing can appear more whimſical, or extravagant.

PART II.

Of the MUTUAL INFLUENCES *of the Soul and the Body.*

IT is contended for by all metaphyſicians, who maintain the doctrine of any *proper immaterial principle*, that *ſpirit* and *body* can have no *common property*; and when it is aſked how, then, can they *act upon one another*, and how can they be ſo intimately connected as to be continually and neceſſarily ſubject to each other's influence, it is acknowledged to be a *difficulty*, and a *myſtery* that we cannot comprehend. But had this queſtion been conſidered with due attention, what has been called a *difficulty* would, I doubt not, have been deemed an *impoſſibility*; or ſuch a myſtery as that of the bread and wine in the Lord's ſupper becoming the real body and blood of Chriſt, or that of each of the three perſons in the Trinity being equally God, and yet there being no more Gods than one; which, in the eye of common ſenſe, are not properly *difficulties*, or *myſteries*, but direct *contradictions*; ſuch

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ſuch as that of a thing *being* and *not being* at the ſame time.

Let a man torture his imagination as much as he pleaſes, I will pronounce it to be impoſſible for him to conceive even the poſſibility of *mutual action* without ſome *common property*, by means of which the things that *act* and *re-act* upon each other, may have ſome *connexion*. A ſubſtance that is *hard* may act upon, and be acted upon by, another hard ſubſtance, or even one that is *ſoft*, which, in fact, is only relatively *leſs hard*: but it is certainly impoſſible that it ſhould affect, or be affected by, a ſubſtance that can make *no reſiſtance at all*, and eſpecially a kind of ſubſtance that cannot, with any propriety of ſpeech, be ſaid to be even *in the ſame place* with it. If this be not an *impoſſibility*, I really do not know what is ſo.

But admitting that what appears to me to be an abſolute impoſſibility, viz. that ſubſtances which have no common property can, nevertheleſs, affect, and be affected by, each other, to be no more than a difficulty; it is however a difficulty of ſuch magnitude, as far to exceed that of conceiving that the principle of ſenſation may poſſibly conſiſt with matter; and, therefore, if, of two difficulties, it be moſt philoſophical to take the *leaſt*, we muſt, of courſe, abandon the hypotheſis of two *heterogeneous and incompatible principles in man*, which is clogged with the greater difficulty of conception, and admit that of the *uni-*

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uniformity of his nature, which is only attended with a leſs difficulty.

The great difficulty that attends the ſuppoſition of the union of the ſoul and body, came in with the Carteſian hypotheſis, which goes upon the idea that the eſſence of mind is *thought*, and the eſſence of body *extenſion*, excluſive of every property that had before been ſupppoſed to be common to them both, and by which they might influence one another. And it is very amuſing to obſerve the different hypotheſes that have been formed to account for the ſoul receiving ideas by the corporeal ſenſes, and for the motion of the body in conſequence of the volition of the ſoul.

That the body and mind have no phyſical influence upon one another, Deſcartes could not but allow. He therefore ſuppoſed that the impreſſion of external objects, was only the *occaſional*, and not the *efficient cauſe* of ſenſation in the mind; that volition alſo was only the occaſional, and not the efficient cauſe of the motion of the muſcles; and that in both theſe caſes the real efficient cauſe was the immediate agency of the Deity, exerted according to certain rules which he invariably followed. Thus whenever an object is preſented, the divine Being impreſſes the mind, and whenever a volition takes place, he produces the correſponding motion in the muſcular ſyſtem.

Malebranche refined upon this hypotheſis, ſuppoſing that we perceive the ideas of things not

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not only by the *divine agency*, but *in the divine mind itself*; all ideas being first in the divine mind, and there perceived by us. A general view of his system, with the reasons on which it is founded, is thus given by Lord Bolingbroke. See his Works, vol. iii. p. 543.

"We cannot perceive any thing that is "not intimately united to the soul; but there "being no proportion between the soul and "material things, these cannot be united to it, "or perceived by it. Our souls are, indeed, "united to our bodies, but there is a manner "of union necessary to perception, and an-"other that is not so. God, who is a sub-"stance, and the only intelligible substance, "is intimately united to our souls by his "presence. He is the *place of spirits*, as "*space* is the *place of bodies*; and as he "must have in himself the ideas of all the "beings that he has created, we may see "those ideas in God, as he is pleased to shew "them to us."

The celebrated mathematician and metaphysician, Leibnitz, was as sensible of the impossibility of all proper connection, or influence, between matter and spirit, as the Cartesians, but he explained the correspondence there is between them in quite another, though not a more satisfactory, manner; forming a system, which has obtained the name of *the pre-established harmony*. For, admitting the necessary and physical operation of all causes,

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cauſes, mental and corporeal, he ſuppoſes that the whole train of volitions, from a man's birth to his death, would have taken place in the mind in the ſame order, if there had been no body connected with it; and, on the other hand, that all the motions, and other affections of the body (being properly an automaton) would have been the ſame, if there had been no ſoul connected with it: but that it is pre-eſtabliſhed by the divine Being, that the volitions of the one, and the motions of the other, ſhould ſtrictly correſpond, juſt as they would have done, if they had really been *cauſe* and *effect* to each other.

Neither of theſe hypotheſes having given laſting ſatisfaction, the defenders of the modern doctrine of immateriality have generally contented themſelves with ſuppoſing that there is ſome *unknown real influence* between the ſoul and the body, but that the connection is a *myſtery* to us. And this is not the firſt abſurdity, and impoſſibility, that has found a convenient ſhelter under under that term.

The learned Beauſobre acknowledges this difficulty, even with reſpect to the Deity himſelf, but he gives us no aſſiſtance with reſpect to the ſolution of it. "If," ſays he, vol. i. p. 483, "the ſubſtance of the firſt mover "be abſolutely immaterial, without exten- "ſion, and without ſize *(grandeur)* one cannot "conceive how it ſhould give motion to mat- "ter; becauſe ſuch a ſubſtance can have no "hold

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" hold *(prise)* of them, any more than they " have upon it. We must, therefore, have " recourse to the christian system, according " to which God acts upon matter by an act " of his will only." But if the substance of a spirit cannot act upon matter, how can the *mere volition*, which is the mere act of a spirit, affect it?

Mr. Baxter, who ascribes so much to the agency of the Deity, and so little to matter, is, as might be expected, peculiarly embarrassed with this difficulty. According to him, all the properties of matter, as attraction, repulsion, and cohesion, are the immediate agency of the divine Being. Consequently, as we perceive material things by means of these their *powers*, it but too plainly follows, that, in fact, matter is wholly superfluous; for if it exists, all its operations and effects are resolvable into the pure unaided operation of the Deity. Such a philosopher cannot but be puzzled to answer Bishop Berkley, who supposed that the divine Being himself presented the ideas of all things to our minds, and that nothing material exists. The following appears to me to be a very poor attempt to maintain the real use of matter to impress the mind.

" Those philosophers," says he, vol. ii. p. 333, " who allow the objects of our ideas to " exist, affirm, I think, without necessity, " that the sovereign mind produces the ideas

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" of them in us, in so far, I mean, as the " objects themselves may do this, or other- " wise than by co-operation. Matter I know " cannot act of itself, as it acts only by re- " sistance. But if the resistance between the " matter of our bodies and other matter be " enough to excite the idea of their resistance " in our minds, it would be unnecessary to " suppose God to excite that idea, and the " resistance itself to have no effect. And if " we do not allow the matter of our bodies " affects our minds directly, and by itself, " the union between them may seem to be, " in a great measure, to no purpose."

What does this amount to, but that, since matter *does* exist, it must be of some use, though Mr. Baxter's general hypothesis, agreeably to which he here asserts, that *matter cannot act of itself*, leaves so very little to it, that it might very well have been spared. Pity that so mischievous a thing as he every where represents matter to be, should have been introduced at all, when, without the aid of superior power, it could not do even that mischief.

Mr. Baxter seems to have thought that the connection between the soul and the body subsisted only during a state of *vigilance*; for that, though during sleep, the soul, as he says, vol. ii. p. 11, " is *always active and* " *percipient*, and is never without some real " perception, it most evidently ceases to act " and

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" and perceive by the body." It is, therefore, in fact in an unembodied ſtate. It is pity that we have no evidence of what paſſes in that ſtate; but that in the moment of the re-union of the ſoul to the body, on awaking from ſleep, all that paſſed in this intermediate ſtate is forgotten.

Whatever paſſes in *dreams*, this philoſopher ſuppoſes not to be any thing that the ſoul is concerned in, but the work of other intellectual agents, which occupy the ſenſory the moment that the ſoul abandons it. If we aſk why the ſoul thus abandons the ſenſory, he ſays, it is on account of the " *expence of animal ſpirits*, " neceſſary to keep the former impreſſions " patent, and to produce new ones," and that " the fatigue of continuing to do this is in- " tolerable." But as it is not the *ſoul* that is fatigued, but the *body* only, is there not the ſame expence of animal ſpirits, whether the proper ſoul of the man, or ſome other ſpirit, be at work in the ſenſory? The ſame *quantity of thought* muſt be attended with the ſame expence of animal ſpirits.

The author of *La vraye Philoſophie* has a very ſingular manner of helping this great difficulty concerning the ſoul acting upon the body. I ſhall only quote the paſſage without making any remark upon it. " Without doubt," ſays he, p. 277, " it is not by *thought* " that the ſoul moves the body, for as it is " not by thought, that the ſoul enriches cor-

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" poreal bodies with colours and extenſion, " neither is it by thought that it acts upon " matter, and puts it in motion. It does " both theſe things, and many others of a " ſimilar nature, by its own *energy*. The " ſupreme Being, in creating it, willed that " it ſhould have, in an eminent manner, the " *properties* of matter, without having the " *imperfections* of it."

Others think to provide for the neceſſary mutual action and re-action between ſoul and body, by imagining that there may be ſomething like common properties between them, though by this means they evidently deſtroy the diſtinction between theſe two ſubſtances. This is remarkably the caſe with the author of *Letters on Materialiſm*.

" You tell us," ſays he, p. 73, " that *mat-* " *ter and ſpirit are always deſcribed, as having* " *not one common property, by means of which* " *they can affect, or act upon each other.*— " This may be true in the opinion of thoſe " philoſophers, who conſider all matter as " *paſſive* and *inert*, void of every ſpecies of " *force*, *action*, or *energy*. But probably ſuch " *negative attributes* can ſcarcely conſtitute " the nature of any being. In every ſenti- " ment, indeed, the properties of theſe two " ſubſtances muſt, *in part* at leaſt, eſſentially " differ, becauſe their natures are ever ſaid to " be *diſſimilar*; yet it does not hence follow " that they may not be endowed with powers

" whereby

" whereby mutually to affect and act upon
" each other. A being of a ſuperior order
" may act on an inferior one, placed higher
" on the ſcale. It has acquired nobler pro-
" perties, but it is not therefore deprived of
" ſuch *inferior qualities* as are not unalliable
" with the more exalted ſpecies. Particular-
" ly, this muſt be the caſe where the ſuperior
" being conſtitutes a part of the ſame ge-
" neral ſyſtem? Thus will the ſoul be able
" to act on matter, and conſequently on its
" own body, which experience likewiſe ſeems
" to confirm.

" Why may not matter alſo act upon ſpi-
" rit, at leaſt the moſt *exalted* and *refined part*
" *of matter*, in a manner perhaps inexpli-
" cable, but analogous to its inferior nature
" and powers? Thus reciprocally will the
" body act upon the ſoul. For this nothing
" ſeems more requiſite than that matter, in
" its component elements, ſhould be poſſeſſed
" of an *active force*, juſtly proportioned to
" their order, and rank of being. It muſt
" reſide in the elements, and theſe muſt be
" *ſimple*, becauſe no force could ever inhere
" in a ſubſtance ever diviſible; and were not
" the *elements* active, their *compounds* never
" could be; no more than a percipient brain
" could ariſe from impercipient particles.
" The material elements then, I conceive to
" be *ſimple* and *active*, active in various de-
" grees, according to their ſcale of being, or
" the part they are by infinite wiſdom deſtin-

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" ed to fill. The human body, a compound " of these elements, and the *brain* particular- " ly, must be conceived as an instrument " mounted in the most exact accord of parts " to parts, and as endowed with the greatest " *energetic powers* of which body is suscept- " ible. It is thus rendered a fit habitation for " a substance simple and highly active, as is " the soul.

" The soul, as a superior being, must have, " additionally, other superior attributes, some " of which may be roused into action by the " impulse of an inferior agent the body, " whilst the more eminent (though not, from " the pre-established laws of union, indepen- " dant in their operations) are, however, out " of the reach of any immediate and direct " bodily action. Thus will the various men- " tal powers be progressively brought into " action, and man will feel, will perceive, " will think, and will reason, just as the res- " pective operative causes exert their in- " fluence.

" In the system of *occasional causes* (where- " in all matter is supposed to be passive and " lifeless, and wherein even the soul itself, " though said to be active, never *acts*) the " Deity is introduced as the only mover, and " and real agent, but is represented as ever " determined to act by the view of the dif- " ferent states in which he himself has placed " the external beings. The doctrine of *phy-* " *sical influence* is, in my opinion, the only

" philo-

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" philoſophical notion. Here the two ſub-
" ſtances mutually *act* and *re-act* upon each
" other."

I do not imagine that the more acute immaterialiſts will think themſelves under any obligation to this defender of their principles, either for giving ſpirit ſuch *inferior qualities as are not unalliable with the more exalted ſpecies of matter*, or for enduing matter with that *active power*, which is generally thought peculiar to *ſpirit*; becauſe, in fact, this hypotheſis entirely confounds the two ſubſtances, and lays a foundation for the groſſeſt materialiſm. For the moſt *exalted and refined part of matter* cannot be deemed to differ eſſentially from the *groſſeſt matter*. For difference in *ſize* is all that the terms *exalted* and *refined* can poſſibly ſignify when applied to matter. An immaterial ſoul, therefore, muſt be wholly incapable of action and re-action with the moſt exalted and refined, as well as with the groſſeſt corporeal ſyſtem. A ſoul, capable of this mutual action with body, muſt have ſomething groſs in itſelf, and therefore muſt be degraded from holding that very high and diſtinguiſhed rank in the ſcale of being, which has been aſſigned to it by thoſe who conſider it as *infinitely ſuperior to matter*.

This writer alſo ſays that the *active force* which he aſcribes to matter muſt reſide in the ſimple *elements* of it, becauſe, as he ſays, " no
" force could ever inhere in a ſubſtance ever
" diviſible, and were not the elements active

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"their compounds never could be ſo." But did not this writer know that it is even demonſtrable that *matter is infinitely diviſible*, and that therefore, according to his own conceſſion, no active force *can* ever inhere in it? This writer, therefore, acknowledging, as he does, the neceſſity of a *phyſical influence* between the body and the mind, muſt neceſſarily abandon the notion of *two diſtinct principles*, and adopt that of the *uniform compoſition of the whole man*.

The vulgar, who conſider *ſpirit* as a *thin aërial ſubſtance*, would be exceedingly puzzled if they were to endeavour to realize the modern idea of a proper *immaterial being*; ſince to them it would ſeem to have nothing *poſitive* in its nature, but to be only a *negation of properties*, though diſguiſed under the poſitive appellation of *ſpirit*. To them it muſt appear to be the idea of *nothing at all*, and to be incapable of ſupporting any properties.

Metaphyſicians, however, affirm that we have as clear an idea of ſpirit, as we have of matter, each being equally the unknown ſupport of known properties, *matter* of extenſion and ſolidity, and *ſpirit* of ſenſation and thought. But ſtill ſince the *ſubſtance* is confeſſedly *unknown* to us, it muſt alſo be unknown to us what *properties* it is capable of ſupporting; and, therefore, unleſs there be a real inconſiſtency in the properties themſelves, thoſe which have hitherto been aſcribed to both

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both ſubſtances may belong to either of them.

For this reaſon Mr. Locke, who maintains the immateriality of the ſoul, and yet maintains that, for any thing we know to the contrary, matter may have the property of thought ſuperadded to it, ought to have concluded that this is really the caſe; ſince, according to the rules of philoſophizing, we ought not to multiply cauſes without neceſſity, which in this caſe he does not pretend to.

I ſhall conclude this ſection with a quotation from the author of *Reflections on the Exiſtence of the ſoul, and of the Exiſtence of God*, as repreſented in the *Examen du Fataliſme*, vol. i. p. 390. "If," ſays he, "the operations aſcribed to the mind may reſult from "the powers of matter, why ſhould we ſuppoſe a being that is uſeleſs, and which "ſolves no difficulty? It is eaſy to ſee that "the properties of matter do not exclude "thoſe of intelligence, but it cannot be imagined how a being, which has no property "beſides intelligence, can make uſe of matter. In reality, how can this ſubſtance, "which bears no relation to matter, be ſenſible of it, or perceive it? In order to ſee "things, it is neceſſary that they make an "impreſſion upon us, that there be ſome "relation between us and them, but what "can be this relation?" I ſhall only obſerve upon this paſſage, that we can never leave the

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the road of found philoſophy, without giving advantage to atheiſts and unbelievers.

SECTION VII.

Of the VEHICLE *of the Soul.*

MANY modern metaphyſicians, finding ſome difficulty in uniting together things ſo diſcrepant in their nature as a *pure immaterial ſubſtance* and ſuch *groſs matter*, as that of which the human body and brain are compoſed, have imagined that this connection may be better cemented by means of ſome *intermediate* material ſubſtance, of a more refined and ſubtle nature than that which is the object of the ſenſes of ſight or touch. Upon the diſſolution of the body by death, they ſuppoſe that this ſubtle *vehicle* of the ſoul is ſet looſe from its connection with it, and flies off, unperceived by any of the ſenſes, together with the immaterial ſoul, from which it is inſeparable, into the intermediate ſtate.

This, in fact, is nothing more than taking the εἴδωλον of the ancients, or the popular *ghoſt* of all countries, which was all the thinking principle that they had any idea of, and making it a kind of body to ſomething of which the ancients and the vulgar had no idea. But this modern vehicle of the ſoul is altogether a creature of imagination and hypotheſis, and in reality without explaining any

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any one phenomenon, or removing one real difficulty. For so long as the matter of which this vehicle consists, has what are supposed to be the essential properties of all matter, viz. *solid extent*, its union with a truly immaterial substance must be just as difficult to conceive, as if it had been the subject of all our corporeal senses. To the vulgar, indeed, the *attenuation* of matter may make it seem to approach to the nature of *spirit*; but the philosopher knows that, in fact, no attenuation of matter brings it at all nearer to the nature of a substance that has no common property with matter.

Mr. Wollaston, however, who is certainly a very respectable writer, and treats pretty largely of this subject, of a vehicle for the soul, not attending to these obvious considerations, seems to consider the immaterial soul as a substance capable of the most intimate union with this subtle material vehicle. I shall present my reader with this writer's ideas on the subject, and subjoin some remarks upon it. I might quote what many others have advanced, but there is no end of pursuing such mere creatures of imagination, and the farther discussion of the subject would be inexcusable trifling.

"The human soul," says Mr. Wollaston, p. 364, "is a cogitative substance, clothed in "a material vehicle, or rather united to it, "and as it were inseparably mixed (I had al- "most said incorporated) with it. These act "in

" in conjunction, that which affects the one, " affecting the other.—The ſoul is detained " in the body (the head or brain) by ſome " ſympathy, or attraction between this ma- " terial vehicle and it, till the habitation is " ſpoiled, and this mutual tendency inter- " rupted (and perhaps turned into an averſion) " by ſome hurt or diſeaſe, or by the decays " and ruins of old age, or the like, happen- " ing to the body; and in the *interim*, by " means of this vehicle, motions and im- " preſſions are communicated to and fro."

Again he ſays, p. 370, " If we ſuppoſe the " ſoul to be a being by nature made to inform " ſome body, and that it cannot exiſt and " act in a ſtate of total ſeparation from all " body—that body which is ſo neceſſary to " it, may be ſome fine vehicle, that dwells " with it in the brain, and goes off with it " at death—When it ſhall, in its proper ve- " hicle, be let go, and take its flight into the " open fields of heaven, it will then be bare " to the immediate impreſſion of objects. " And why ſhould not thoſe impreſſions " which affected the nerves that moved, and " affected the vehicle, and the ſoul in it, " affect the vehicle immediately, when they " are immediately made upon it, without the " interpoſition of the nerves. The hand " which feels an object at the end of a ſtaff, " may certainly be allowed to feel the ſame " much better by immediate contact, without " the ſtaff."

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On this I would obſerve, that by whatever conſiderations it appears that a vehicle is neceſſary to the ſoul, the body muſt at leaſt be equally neceſſary to the vehicle. For it by no means follows, that becauſe external objects can affect the vehicle *through the body*, that therefore they would affect it all, and much leſs better, without its aſſiſtance. It would then follow, that becauſe the auditory nerves are affected with ſounds, by means of the external and internal ear, that therefore ſounds would be heard better without the ear, the vibrations of the air acting immediately upon the nerves themſelves; and that becauſe the brain is affected with the ſeveral ſenſations by means of the nerves, that it would perceive every thing to much more advantage if it were expoſed to the influence of all thoſe things to which the nerves are expoſed. Whereas theſe are all contrary to fact.

On the contrary, there is the greateſt reaſon to believe that nothing is provided for us as a *means*, or *inſtrument* of ſenſation, but what was naturally proper, and even neceſſary for the purpoſe; and conſequently that, if theſe means were withheld, the *end* could not be attained. Whereas, therefore, the only means by which we receive our ſenſations are the organs of ſenſe, the nerves, and the brain, we ought to conclude, that without bodily organs, nerves, and brain, we could have no ſenſations or ideas.

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There is something curious in Mr. Wollaston's notion concerning the *place of the soul*, as determined by the specific gravity of the gross body, or of the vehicle to which it is connected; copied, as it should seem, from Plato or Cicero, who give a similar account of the height to which the soul ascends after death, according as it is more or less weighed down by its vicious tendancy to earthly things.

"That general law," says Wollaston, p. 401, "to which bodies are subject, makes it "sink in this fluid of air, so much lighter "than itself, keeps it down, and so deter- "mines the seat of it, and of the soul in it, "to be upon the surface of this earth, where, "or in whose neighbourhood, it was first "produced. But then when the soul shall "be disengaged from the gross matter which "now incloses and encumbers it, and either "becomes naked spirit, or be only veiled in "its own fine and obsequious vehicle, it must "at the same time be either freed from the "laws of bodies, and fall under some other, "which will carry it to some proper mansion "or state; or at least, by the old ones, be "capable of mounting upwards, in propor- "tion to the volatility of its vehicle, and of "emerging out of these regions, into some "medium more suitable, and (if the philoso- "pher may say so) more equilibrious."

This has the appearance of being written in ridicule of the *vehicular system*, but it was

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meant to be a just exposition and defence of it, I would observe also, that this writer, taking it for granted that all these vehicles are specifically lighter than the atmosphere that surrounds the earth, and therefore must ascend in it, makes no provision for the *descent* of any unembodied spirit into any of the *lower regions*, where most of the moderns dispose of the souls of the wicked, and where all the ancients placed the receptacle of all souls without distinction.

Even Dr. Hartley, who ascribes so much to matter, and so little to any thing immaterial in man (nothing but the faculty of simple *perception*) yet supposes that there is something *intermediate* between the soul and the gross body, which he distinguishes by the name of *the infinitesimal elementary body*. But, great as is my admiration of Dr. Hartley, it is very far from carrying me to adopt every thing in him. His language, in this instance, conveys no clear ideas to my mind, and I consider both his *intermediate body*, and *immaterial soul*, as an encumbrance upon his system, which, in every other respect, is most admirably simple.

I do not find that any thing has been said of the state of the vehicle of the soul during sleep. Does the vehicle require rest as well as the body and brain; and if the soul think during sleep, where is the repository of the ideas on which it is employed? Are they con-

contained in the vehicle, or the ſoul itſelf.

Indeed every thing relating to ſleep, is a very puzzling phenomenon, on the ſuppoſition of the diſtinction between the ſoul and the body, eſpecially the little evidence that can be pretended of the ſoul being employed at all in a ſtate of really ſound ſleep, excluſive of dreaming. And ſurely, if there be a ſoul diſtinct from the body, and it be ſenſible of all the changes that take place in the corporeal ſyſtem to which it is attached, why does it not perceive that ſtate of the body which is termed *ſleep*; and why does it not *contemplate* the ſtate of the body and brain during ſleep, which might afford matter enough for reaſoning and reflection? If no *new ideas* could be tranſmitted to it at that time, it might employ itſelf upon the ſtock which it had acquired before, if they really had inhered in it, and belonged to it; taking the opportunity of ruminating upon its *old* ideas, when it was ſo circumſtanced, that it could acquire no *new* ones.

All this we ſhould naturally expect if the ſoul was a ſubſtance really diſtinct from the body, and if the ideas properly *belonged* to this ſubſtance, ſo that it was capable of carrying them all away with it, when the body was reduced to duſt. The ſoul, during the ſleep of the body, might be expected to approach to the ſtate in which it would be when the

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the body was dead, *death* being often compared to a more found *ſleep*. For if it be capable of thinking and feeling when the powers of the body ſhall entirely *ceaſe*, it *might* be capable of the ſame kind of ſenſation and action when thoſe powers are only *ſuſpended*.

SECTION VIII.

OBJECTIONS *to the Syſtem of Materialiſm conſidered.*

MOST of the objections that have been made to the poſſibility of the powers of ſenſation and thought belonging to matter, are entirely founded on a miſtaken notion of matter, as being neceſſarily *inert* and *impenetrable*, and not a thing poſſeſſed of no other powers than thoſe of *attraction* and *repulſion*, and ſuch as may be conſiſtent with them. With ſuch objections as theſe I have properly no concern, becauſe they do not affect my peculiar ſyſtem. Some objections, however, which are founded on the *popular notion of matter*, it may be worth while to conſider; becauſe while they remain unnoticed, they may impede the reception of any ſyſtem that bears the name of *materialiſm*, how different ſoever it may be from any thing that has hitherto been ſo denominated. I ſhall, therefore, briefly reply to every objection that can be

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thought *conſiderable*, either in itſelf, or on account of the perſon who has propoſed it.

OBJECTION I. *From the difficulty of conceiving how Thought can ariſe from Matter.*

IT is ſaid we can have no conception how ſenſation or thought can ariſe from matter, they being things ſo very different from it, and bearing no ſort of reſemblance to any thing like *figure* or *motion*; which is all that can reſult from any modification of matter, or any operation upon it.

But this is an argument which derives all its force from our *ignorance*. *Different* as are the properties of ſenſation and thought, from ſuch as are uſually aſcribed to matter, they may, nevertheleſs, inhere in the ſame ſubſtance, unleſs we can ſhew them to be abſolutely *incompatible* with one another. There is no apparent reſemblance between the ideas of *ſight*, and thoſe of *hearing*, or *ſmelling*, &c. and yet they all exiſt in the ſame mind, which is poſſeſſed of the very different ſenſes and faculties appropriated to each of them. Beſides, this argument, from our not being able to *conceive* how a thing can be, equally affects the immaterial ſyſtem: for we have no more conception how the powers of ſenſation and thought can inhere in an *immaterial*, than in a *material* ſubſtance. For, in fact, we have no diſtinct idea either of

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of the *property*, or of the *ſubſtance* of mind or ſpirit. Of the latter we profeſs to know nothing, but that it is not matter; and even of the property of *perception*, it ſeems to be as impoſſible that we ſhould fully comprehend the nature of it, as that the eye ſhould ſee itſelf.

Beſides, they who maintain the intimate union of ſubſtances ſo diſcrepant in their natures as *matter* and *immaterial ſpirit*, of which they certainly cannot pretend to have any conception, do with a very ill grace urge any objection againſt the ſyſtem of materialiſm, derived from our ignorance of the *manner* in which a principle of thought may be ſuperadded to matter.

I would obſerve, that by the *principle of thought*, I mean nothing more than the power of *ſimple perception*, or our conſciouſneſs of the preſence and effect of ſenſations and ideas. For I ſhall, in theſe diſquiſitions, take it for granted, that this one property of the mind being admitted, all the particular phenomena of ſenſation and ideas, reſpecting their *retention*, *aſſociation*, &c. and the various faculties of the mind, to which thoſe affections of our ſenſations and ideas give riſe, as *memory*, *judgment*, *volition*, the *paſſions*, &c. will admit of a ſatisfactory illuſtration on the principles of *vibration*, which is an affection of a material ſubſtance. I, therefore, admit of no argument for the *ſpirituality* of the ſoul, from the conſideration of the *exquiſiteneſs*, *ſubtlety*, or

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complexneſs of the mental powers, on which much ſtreſs has been laid by ſome; there being in matter a capacity for affections as ſubtle and complex as any thing that we can affirm concerning thoſe that have hitherto been called *mental affections*. I conſider *Hartley's Theory of the Mind*, as a *practical anſwer* to all objections of this kind.

OBJECTION II. *From abſtract Ideas.*

"Matter," ſays Mr. Wollaſton, p. 357, "can never by itſelf entertain abſtracted, or "general ideas, ſuch as many in our minds "are. For could it reflect upon what paſſes "within itſelf, it could poſſibly find there "nothing but material and particular impreſ- "ſions. Abſtract and metaphyſical ideas "could not be found upon it."

But Mr. Locke and others have obſerved, that all actual ideas are, in fact, *particular*, and that abſtraction is nothing more than leaving out of a number of reſembling ideas, what is peculiar to each, and conſidering only what is common to them all.

OBJECTION III. *From the influence of Reaſons.*

Mr. Wollaſton argues, that the mind cannot be material, becauſe it is influenced by *reaſons*.

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reaſons. "When I begin to move myſelf," ſays he, p. 355, "I do it for ſome reaſon, "and with reſpect to ſome end.—But who "can imagine matter to be moved by argu- "ments, or ever ranked ſyllogiſms and de- "monſtrations among levers and pullies?— "Do we not ſee, in converſation, how a "pleaſant thing will make people break out "into laughter, a rude thing into a paſſion, "and ſo on. Theſe affections cannot be the "phyſical effects of the words ſpoken, be- "cauſe then they would have the ſame ef- "fect, whether they were underſtood or not. "It is therefore the *ſenſe* of the words, which "is an immaterial thing, that by paſſing "through the underſtanding, and cauſing "that which is the ſubject of the intellectual "faculties, to influence the body, produces "thoſe motions in the ſpirits, blood, and "muſcles."

I anſwer, that, ſince it is a fact, that *reaſons*, whatever they be, do ultimately move matter, there is certainly much leſs difficulty in conceiving that they may do this, in conſequence of their being the affection of ſome material ſubſtance, than upon the hypotheſis of their belonging to a ſubſtance that has no common property with matter. It is acknowledged, that ſyllogiſms and demonſtrations are not levers and pullies, but neither are the effects of gun-powder, in removing the heavieſt bodies, produced by levers and pullies, and yet they are produced by a material cauſe.

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To ſay that *reaſons* and *ideas* are not things material, or the affections of a material ſubſtance, is to take for granted the very thing to be proved.

OBJECTION IV. *From the Unity of Conſciouſneſs.*

It is aſſerted, that the ſoul of man cannot be material and diviſible, becauſe the *principle of conſciouſneſs*, which comprehends the whole of the thinking power, is neceſſarily ſimple, and indiviſible. But before this can be admitted as any argument, it ſhould be ſtrictly defined what *unity of conſciouſneſs* means. I profeſs that thoſe who have hitherto written about it have given me no clear ideas upon the ſubject. The only meaning that I can annex to the words *unity of conſciouſneſs*, is a feeling or perception of the *unity of my nature*, or *being*; but all that can be inferred from this is, that I am only *one perſon*, *one ſentient and thinking being*, and not two perſons, or two ſentient or thinking beings; which is no more an argument that this one ſentient being cannot be divided, than that a *ſphere*, being one thing, is a proof that it likewiſe conſiſts of indiviſible materials. It is true, that it is impoſſible to divide a ſphere ſo as to make it two ſpheres; but ſtill the *matter* of which it conſiſts is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, diviſible, and the matter of it may be ſo diſ-

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united, that it ſhall entirely ceaſe to be a ſphere. So though that *ſyſtem of intelligence* which we call the *ſoul of a man*, cannot be divided into two ſyſtems of intelligence, it may be ſo divided, or diſſolved, as to become no ſyſtem of intelligence at all. If any perſon can define *unity of conſciouſneſs* in a manner more favourable to the proof of the immateriality of the ſoul, I ſhall be glad to hear it, and to attend to it.

OBJECTION V. *From a ſeparate Conſciouſneſs not belonging to every Particle of the Brain.*

It is ſaid to be a deciſive argument againſt materialiſm, that the *conſciouſneſs of exiſtence* cannot be annexed to the whole *brain*, as a *ſyſtem*, while the individual *particles* of which it conſiſts are ſeparately inconſcious; ſince the whole brain, being a collection of parts, cannot poſſeſs any thing but what is derived from them. See *Letters on Materialiſm*, p. 67.

But ſurely there may be a ſeparate *unity of the whole nervous ſyſtem*, as well as of *one atom*; and if the perception that we call *conſciouſneſs*, or that of any other *complex idea*, neceſſarily conſiſts in, or depends upon, a very *complex vibration*, it cannot poſſibly belong to a ſingle *atom*, but muſt belong to a *vibrating ſyſtem*, of ſome extent.

A certain *quantity of nervous ſyſtem* is neceſſary to ſuch complex ideas and affections

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as belong to the human mind; and the idea of *self*, or the feeling that corresponds to the pronoun *I* (which is what some may mean by consciousness) is not essentially different from other *complex ideas*, that of our *country* for instance. This is a term by which we denote a part of the world subject to that form of government by the laws of which we ourselves are bound, as distinguished from other countries, subject to other political systems of government; and the term *self* denotes that substance which is the seat of that particular set of sensations and ideas of which those that are then recollected make a part, as distinguished from other substances, which are the seat of similar sets of sensations and ideas. But it may be necessary to consider this objection, with respect to the faculty of simple *perception*, exclusive of the general feeling of *consciousness*.

For the same reason that "*activity*, and *per-*" *ceptivity* cannot arise from joining together "dead and inert parts," which is the language of Mr. Baxter, no *powers* whatever could be affirmed of any mass of matter, because matter being infinitely divisible, it is impossible that the *ultimate parts* of it can be possessed of any powers. And there is no more reason in nature why perception may not belong to a *system of matter*, as such, and not to the *component parts of it*, than that *life* should be the property of an intire animal system, and not of the separate parts of it. It may also, just as plausibly, be said that

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that *ſound* cannot conſiſt of a vibration in the air, becauſe no ſound could reſult from the motion of a ſingle particle of that elaſtic fluid; and yet the vibration of the whole maſs of air is nothing more than the vibrations of the ſeparate particles of which it conſiſts. It might alſo be ſaid that no *harmony* could reſult from a harpſichord, becauſe the ſingle notes, ſeparately taken, can make no harmony. Mr. Baxter, however, ſays, *Eſſay on the Soul*, p. 236, that "if an active "and perceptive ſubſtance have parts, theſe "parts muſt of neceſſity be active and per-"ceptive."

This argument has been much hackneyed, and much confided in by metaphyſicians; but, for my part, I cannot perceive the leaſt force in it. Unleſs we had a clearer idea than it appears to me that any perſon can pretend to have, of the nature of *perception*, it muſt be impoſſible to ſay, *a priori*, whether a ſingle particle, or a ſyſtem of matter, be the proper ſeat of it. But judging from *appearances*, which alone ought to determine the judgment of philoſophers, an *organized ſyſtem*, which requires a conſiderable *maſs of matter*, is requiſite for this purpoſe. Alſo, judging by obſervation, a maſs of matter, duly organized, and endued with *life*, which depends upon the due circulation of the fluids, and a proper tone of the ſolid parts, muſt neceſſarily have *ſenſation* and *perception*. To judge of the *perceptive power* without any regard to *facts*,

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facts, and appearances, is merely giving ſcope to our imaginations, without laying them under any reſtraint; and the conſequence of building ſyſtems in this manner is but too obvious. It is high time to abandon theſe random hypotheſes, and to form our concluſions with reſpect to the faculties of the *mind*, as well as the properties and powers of *matter* by an attentive obſervation of *facts*, and cautious inferences from them.

OBJECTION VI. *From the Compariſon of Ideas, &c.*

It is ſaid, there can be no *compariſon of ideas*, and conſequently no *judgment*, or *perception of harmony* or *proportion*, which depends upon compariſon, upon the ſyſtem of materialiſm; for that, if the ideas to be compared be VIBRATIONS in the brain, they muſt be perceived by a different ſubſtance, inſpecting, as it were, and conſidering that ſtate of the brain. See *Letters on Materialiſm*, p. 63.

But if the brain itſelf be the percipient power, as well as the ſubject of theſe vibrations, it muſt both feel the effect of every particular impreſſion that is made upon it, and alſo all that can reſult from the combination of ever ſo many impreſſions at the ſame time; and as things that *agree* and things that *diſagree* cannot impreſs the brain in the ſame manner,

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manner, there is certainly as much foundation for a perception of the difference between *truth* and *falſehood*, as upon any hypotheſis of a ſuperintending mind. For the mind, it is evident, has no ideas but what reſult from the ſtate of the brain, as the author quoted above very expreſsly allows. Conſequently, if there be no impreſſion upon the brain, there can be no perception in the mind; ſo that, upon any hypotheſis that is conſiſtent with known facts, there can be no ſtate of mind to which there is not a correſpondent ſtate of the brain; and, therefore, if the brain itſelf *can* be the ſeat of feeling, or of conſciouſneſs, its feeling or conſciouſneſs may be juſt as *various* and *extenſive* as that of the independent mind itſelf could be. It is impoſſible there ſhould be any difference in this caſe, unleſs the mind could have ſenſations and ideas independent of the ſtate of the brain, which every obſervation proves to be impoſſible.

It is a very groſs miſtake of the ſyſtem of materialiſm to ſuppoſe, with the author of the *Letters on Materialiſm*, that the vibrations of the brain are themſelves the perceptions. For it is eaſy to form an idea of there being vibrations without any perceptions accompanying them. But it is ſuppoſed that the brain, beſides its *vibrating power*, has ſuperadded to it a *percipient* or *ſentient power*, likewiſe; there being no reaſon that we know why this power may not be imparted to it. And this, once admitted, all that we know con-

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concerning the human mind will be found in the material nervous ſyſtem; and this percipient power may as well belong to one *ſyſtem* as to one *atom*.

OBJECTION VII. *From the nature of Attention.*

It has been ſaid that *attention* is a ſtate of mind that cannot be the effect of vibration. See *Letters on Materialiſm*, p. 147. But as *ſimple attention* to any idea is nothing more than the ſimple *perception* of it, ſo a *continued attention* to it is nothing more than a *continued perception* of it; which is the neceſſary conſequence either of the conſtant preſence of the object which excites it, or of the preſence of other aſſociated ideas, in circumſtances in which it muſt neceſſarily make the greateſt figure, and ſtrike the mind the moſt.

I ſhall here introduce ſome more of Mr. Wollaſton's arguments to prove that the body and the mind muſt be different ſubſtances, though I think them unworthy of him. My replies will be very ſhort, and ſometimes *ad hominem*.

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OBJECTION VIII. *From the difference between the Ideas and the Mind employed about them.*

" That which peruſes the impreſſions and " traces of things in the fantaſy and me- " mory muſt be ſomething diſtinct from the " brain, or that upon which thoſe impreſſions " are made. Otherwiſe it would contem- " plate itſelf, and be both *reader* and *book*. Wollaſton, p. 358.

But what is the diſtinction between the reader and the book, in an unembodied ſpirit, which certainly muſt have a repoſitory for its ideas, as well as be provided with a principle of intelligence to make uſe of them? Will not this argument affect the ſimplicity and indiviſibility of ſuch a ſpirit, to ſay nothing of ſuperior intelligences, and of the divine mind?

OBJECTION IX. *From the Expreſſion,* MY BODY, &c.

" As a man conſiders his own body, does " it not appear to be ſomething different from " the *conſiderer*, and when he uſes this ex- " preſſion, *my body*, or *the body of me*, may it " not properly be demanded, who is meant " by *me*, or what *my* relates to?——Man be- " ing ſuppoſed a perſon conſiſting of two

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" parts, ſoul and body, the whole perſon " may ſay of this, or that part of him, *the* " *ſoul of me*, or *the body of me*. But if he " were either all ſoul, or all body, and no- " thing elſe, he could not ſpeak in this man- " ner." Wollaſton, p. 350.

According to this merely *verbal argument*, there ought to be ſomething in man beſides *all the parts* of which he conſiſts. When a man ſays, *I devote my ſoul and body*, what is it that makes the devotement? It cannot be the things devoted. Beſides, in Mr. Wollaſton's own phraſe, it ought, in ſtrictneſs, to be the *body* only that ſays *my ſoul*. Nothing ſurely can be inferred from ſuch phraſeology as this, which, after all, is only derived from vulgar apprehenſions.

OBJECTION X. *From the different Intereſts in Man.*

" It is plain there are two different *intereſts* " in man, on one ſide reaſon, on the other " paſſion, which, being many times directly " oppoſite, muſt belong to different ſubjects. " There are upon many occaſions conteſts, " and, as it were, wars between the mind " and the body, ſo far are they from being " the ſame thing." Wollaſton, p. 350.

I anſwer, the paſſions themſelves are more evidently at variance than paſſion and reaſon, and, therefore, by the ſame argument,

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ought to be referred to different ſubſtances in the human conſtitution. If Mr. Wollaſton meant to refer the *paſſions* to the body, there will be ſome danger leſt *deſire*, *will*, and other faculties, always acknowledged to be *mental*, ſhould go with them; and ſo, before he is aware of it, the whole man will be material, there being nothing left to belong to, or conſtitute the immaterial ſoul.

OBJECTION XI. *From the Mind ſupporting the Body.*

"We may perceive ſomething within us "which *ſupports* the body *(keeps it up)* di- "rects its motions for the better preſervation "of it; when any hurts or evils befall it, "finds out the means of its cure, and the like, "without which it would fall to the ground, "and undergo the fate of common matter. "The body, therefore, muſt be conſidered "as being under the direction and tuition of "ſome other thing, which is (or ſhould be) "the governor of it, and conſequently, upon "this account, muſt be concluded to be dif- "ferent from it." Wollaſton, p. 350.

I anſwer, we alſo ſay that *reaſon* controuls and directs the *paſſions*, influences the *will*, and makes uſe of the *memory*, that thoſe and all the other faculties of the mind are ſubſervient to reaſon, &c. But does it therefore follow,

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follow, that they belong to a different ſubſtance?

OBJECTION XII. *From the ſelf-moving Power of the Soul.*

The ſoul is repreſented by Mr. Baxter and others, as *eſſentially active*, and poſſeſſed of a *ſelf-moving power*, in oppoſition to *matter*, which is neceſſarily *inert* and *paſſive*.

But if we aſk on what authority theſe poſitions are advanced, it is impoſſible they ſhould produce a ſingle *appearance* in favour of them. The ſoul, in its preſent ſtate, and we have nothing elſe by which to judge of its powers, has not a ſingle idea but what it receives by means of the organs of ſenſe; and till it has got *ideas*, it is impoſſible that any of its *powers*, active, or paſſive, could have the leaſt employment; ſo that they could not appear even to *exiſt*. Senſations and ideas comprehend all the objects of thought, and all the exertions, or emotions of the ſoul, as far as we can obſerve, always ſucceed ſenſations or ideas; and, to all appearance, are as much *occaſioned* and *produced* by them, as any effect in nature can be ſaid to be produced by its proper cauſe; the one invariably following the other, according to a certain eſtabliſhed law.

In fact, a *ball*, acted upon by a foreign mechanical impulſe, may juſt as well be ſaid to have

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have a ſelf-moving power as the ſoul of man; ſenſations and ideas being as properly an *impelling force* reſpecting the mind (ſince they always precede, and regulate, both the judgment and the will) as the ſtroke of a rod, &c. is an impelling force with reſpect to the ball. Nothing can prove a ſelf-moving power in the ſoul, but a clear caſe of the deciſion of the judgment, a determination of the will, or ſome other exertion of the mental faculties, *without any preceding ſenſations or ideas*; or, at leaſt, without ſuch as uſually precede ſuch judgments, determinations, or exertions. But while thoſe ſenſations and ideas, which cannot be denied to have a real *influence* upon the mind, always precede mental determinations, &c. it is impoſſible not to conclude, according to the eſtabliſhed rules of philoſophizing, that thoſe ſenſations and ideas are the proper *moving powers* of the ſoul; and that without them it would have been incapable of any motion or determination whatever. And this, if we judge at all from *obſervation* and *experience*, we muſt conclude to be actually the caſe.

OBJECTION XIII. *From the unwearied Nature of the thinking Principle.*

Mr. Baxter likewiſe ſays, *Eſſay on the Human Soul*, p. 433, That "the conſideration of "the indefeaſibleneſs, or unweariedneſs of

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" the principle of thought in us, ſhould " perfectly ſatisfy us of the immateriality of " our thinking part. We feel our bodies " every now and then ſinking down under " their own infirmities; but the thing that " thinks in us would never give over, if the " body could keep up with it. It is buſy all " the day with the body, and all the night " without the body, and all the day with the " body again; and thus in a conſtant circle, " without reſpite or intermiſſion, that we can " perceive by our ſtricteſt enquiry. For the " body no ſooner ſinks down in wearineſs and " ſlumber, than this thing within us enters " upon other ſcenes of action, and hears and " ſees things worth enquiring into, and this " without a ſubſerviency of its organs, which " are then diſabled from their function."

This is altogether a miſrepreſentation of the fact. The *brain*, indeed, is a thing ſo far diſtinct from the reſt of the ſyſtem, as that it may be but little affected by ſeveral diſorders, under which the reſt of the ſyſtem may labour; as the *legs* may be ſound while the *arms* are diſeaſed, or rather as the *bones* may continue ſound, while the *muſcular fleſh* is diſordered, &c. In a caſe of this kind, where the brain is not itſelf immediately affected, as the thinking faculty depends upon the brain, it may be vigorous, when the reſt of the body is very languid. But that the ſoul enters upon new ſcenes of action, without the help of the body in ſleep, is deſtitute of any one fact

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or obſervation to ſupport it. We are, according to all appearance, juſt as much fatigued with *thinking* as with *walking*, and to ſay that it is the *body* only that is fatigued, in this caſe and not the *mind itſelf*, is abſolutely *gratis dictum*. There is juſt the ſame reaſon to conclude, that the *thinking powers* are exhauſted, in the one caſe, as that the *walking powers* are exhauſted in the other. That we think at all, in perfectly ſound ſleep, is by no means probable. On the contrary, according to appearances, the thinking powers are refreſhed by reſt in ſleep, exactly as the muſcular ſtrength is recruited by the ſame means.

OBJECTION XIV. *From abſence of Mind.*

It is ſaid by Mr. Baxter, *Eſſay on the Soul*, p. 428, That "it is altogether inconſiſtent "with the materiality of the thing that thinks "in us, that we are ſometimes ſo wholly "occupied in the contemplation of ſome ab"ſent objects, or ſome purely ideal thing, "that we are quite impercipient of objects "round us, and which at preſent act upon "our ſenſes." Among other inſtances, he afterwards, p. 430, mentions the conſtant *preſſure of our own bodies*, occaſioned by gravitation, whether we walk, ſit, or lie.

But nothing is requiſite to ſolve the difficulty in theſe caſes but the ſuppoſition, that whatever be the effect of any ſenſation or

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idea upon the brain, the impreſſion may be ſo ſtrong as to overpower all other impreſſions. This we know is actually the caſe with the *eye*. Let a man look attentively upon any very bright object, and immediately afterwards turn his eyes upon whatever other objects he pleaſes, and he either will not ſee them at all, or they will all appear to be of the ſame colour; ſo that, in this violent affection of the eye, fainter impreſſions are not ſenſibly perceived, though they cannot but be made upon the eye in thoſe circumſtances, as well as others. Now the *brain* is of the very ſame ſubſtance with the *retina*, and *optic nerves*; and therefore muſt be ſubject to a ſimilar affection.

This writer explains theſe caſes by ſuppoſing that the mind "*voluntarily* employs "itſelf, while it is thus inattentive to things "*preſent*, in the earneſt conſideration of ſome "things that are *abſent*." But *voliti n* is not at all concerned in the caſe; for nothing can be more evident than that this *abſence of mind* is altogether an involuntary thing. It is not *choice* that either leads to it, or prolongs it; for this would imply that the mind had been *aware* of other objects having ſolicited its attention, and that it had peremptorily refuſed to give any attention to them. Whereas at the cloſe of a reverie of this kind, the mind is always inconſcious of any foreign objects having obtruded themſelves upon it at all, juſt as in the caſe of ſound ſleep.

Ob-

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OBJECTION XV. *From the corruptibility of Matter.*

The greateſt cauſe of that averſion which we feel to the ſuppoſition of the ſoul being material, is our apprehenſion, that it will then be liable to *corruption*, which we imagine it cannot be if it be immaterial. But, for any thing that we know, neither of theſe inferences are juſt, and therefore no advantage whatever is, in fact, gained by the modern hypotheſis. All things material are not liable to corruption, if by corruption be meant *diſſolution*, except in circumſtances to which they are not naturally expoſed. It is only very *compound bodies* that are properly liable to corruption, and only *vegetable* and *animal ſubſtances* ever become properly *putrid*, and *offenſive*, which is the real ſource of the objection.

It is poſſible, however, that even a human body may be wholly exempt from corruption, though thoſe we have at preſent are not, as is evident from the account that the apoſtle Paul gives of the bodies with which we ſhall riſe from the dead; when from *earthly* they will become *ſpiritual*; from *corruptible*, *incorruptible*; and from *mortal*, *immortal*.

Beſides, how does it follow that an immaterial ſubſtance cannot be liable to decay or diſſolution, as well as a material one? In fact, all the reaſon that any perſon could ever

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have for imagining this, muſt have been that an immaterial ſubſtance, being, in all reſpects, the reverſe of a material one, muſt be *incorruptible*, becauſe the former is *corruptible*. But till we know ſomething *poſitive* concerning this ſuppoſed immaterial ſubſtance, and not merely its *not being matter*, it is impoſſible to pronounce whether it may not be liable to change, and be diſſolved, as well as a material ſubſtance. Neceſſary *immutability*, is an attribute that cannot be demonſtrated except of God only; and he who made all things, material or immaterial, may have ſubjected them to whatever laws he pleaſes, and may have made the one as much ſubject to change and decay as the other, for any thing that we know to the contrary: ſo that all our flattering notions of the *ſimplicity* and *incorruptibility* of immaterial ſubſtances are mere fancy and chimera, unſupported by any *evidence* whatever. The ſoul has been ſuppoſed to be neceſſarily incorruptible, becauſe it is *indiviſible*, but that argument I preſume was ſufficiently anſwered, when it was ſhewn that ideas which have *parts*, as moſt of our ideas manifeſtly have, cannot exiſt in a ſoul that has *no parts*; ſo that the ſubject of thought in man cannot be that ſimple and indiviſible, and conſequently not that *indiſcerptible* thing that it has been imagined to be.

SECTION

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SECTION IX.

Of the Objection to the Syſtem of Materialiſm derived from the Conſideration of the DIVINE ESSENCE.

IT will be ſaid, that if the principle of thought in *man* may be a property of a material ſubſtance, the *divine Being* himſelf may be material alſo; whereas, it is now almoſt univerſally believed to be the doctrine of revelation, that the Deity is, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word, an *immaterial ſubſtance*, incapable of local preſence; though it will be ſhewn in its proper place, that the ſacred writers ſay nothing about ſuch a ſubſtance.

Conſidering how much this ſubject is above all human comprehenſion, it is no wonder that the moſt oppoſite opinions ſhould have been maintained with reſpect to it. But this conſideration, at the ſame time that it ought to check our boldneſs, ought, likewiſe, to have taught us mutual candour and indulgence.

I am fully aware how difficult it is to expreſs myſelf with clearneſs on a ſubject ſo extremely obſcure, and how hazardous it is to advance the very little that any man can ſay on this ſubject. But I ſhall not, on this account, decline ſpeaking freely and fully to every difficulty that either has been urged

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againſt the ſyſtem of the materiality of man, or that has occurred to myſelf with reſpect to it; and the objections which ariſe from the conſideration of the divine eſſence, are of ſuch particular conſequence, that I ſhall treat of them in this ſeparate ſection. I only beg thoſe who are friends to freedom of thought and inquiry, to attend to the few conſiderations that I ſhall offer on this very difficult ſubject.

In the firſt place, it muſt be confeſſed, with awful reverence, that we know but little of *ourſelves*, and therefore much leſs of our *Maker*, even with reſpect to his *attributes*. We know but little of the *works* of God, and therefore certainly much leſs of his *eſſence*.

In fact, we have no proper idea of any *eſſence* whatever. Our aſcribing impenetrability to matter might make us imagine that we had ſome kind of idea of *its* ſubſtance, though this was fallacious; but now that, by a rigid attention to the phenomena, and a ſtrict adherence to the laws of philoſophizing, we have been obliged to deny that matter has any ſuch property, but merely *powers* of attraction and repulſion, it will hardly be pretended that we have any proper idea of the ſubſtance even of matter, conſidered as diveſted of all its properties. The term ſubſtance, or eſſence, therefore, is, in fact, nothing more than a help to *expreſſion*, as we may ſay, but not at all to *conception*.

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We cannot ſpeak of attraction or repulſion, for example, but as powers belonging to, and reſiding in ſome *thing*, *ſubſtance*, or *eſſence*, but our ideas do not go beyond theſe powers; and when we attempt to form any thing of an idea of the ſubſtance of matter, excluſive of the *powers* which it *has*, and excluſive of the *impenetrability* which it *has not*, all ideas vaniſh from the mind, and nothing, abſolutely nothing, is left for an object of contemplation. If it be ſtill called a ſubſtance, it is, however, as immaterial a one as any perſon can wiſh for. In reality, the term *immateriality* never did, or could ſuggeſt any idea whatever. That the term ſubſtance and eſſence are of no uſe but as modes of expreſſion, is evident from our ſpeaking of the *ſubſtance* or *eſſence of things*, as if they themſelves were only properties.

If then our ideas concerning matter do not go beyond the powers of which it is poſſeſſed, much leſs can our ideas go beyond powers, properties, or attributes, with reſpect to the divine Being; and if we confine our definition of God to theſe, it is not poſſible that we can make any miſtake, or ſuffer by our miſconceptions. Now the powers and properties of the Divine mind, as clearly deduced from the works of God, are not only ſo infinitely ſuperior to thoſe of the human mind, when there is ſome analogy between them, but ſo eſſentially different from them in other reſpects, that whatever term we make uſe of to denote

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denote the one, it must be improperly applied to the other.

In two circumstances that we do know, and probably in many others of which we have no knowledge at all, the human and divine nature, finite and infinite intelligence, most essentially differ. The first is, that our attention is necessarily confined to one thing, whereas he who made, and continually supports all things, must equally attend to all things at the same time; which is a most astonishing, but necessary attribute of the one supreme God, of which we can form no conception; and consequently, in this respect, no finite mind, or nature, can be compared with the Divine.

Again, the Deity not only attends to every thing, but must be capable of either *producing* or *annihilating* any thing. For since all that we know of bodies, are their powers, and the divine Being changes those powers at pleasure, it is evident that he can take them all away, and consequently annihilate the very substance; for without powers, substance is nothing. And since he can communicate powers, it is evident that he can produce substance. So that, in this respect also, as the Divine *powers*, so the Divine *nature* must be essentially different from ours; and consequently no common term except such comprehensive terms as *being*, *nature*, &c. can be properly used to express them both.

Again,

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Again, as the Divine nature has properties incompatible with all created and finite natures, ſo though there muſt be ſome common property in all beings that have any action or influence upon one another, there is no evidence of the Divine nature being poſſeſſed of the properties of other ſubſtances in ſuch a *manner* as to be intitled to the ſame appellation. For example, the Divine eſſence cannot be the object of any of our ſenſes, as every thing that we call *matter* is. For though the divine Being, in order to his *acting* every where, muſt *be* every where, we are not ſenſible of his preſence by our ſight, hearing, or feeling, &c.

There is, therefore, upon the whole, manifold reaſon to conclude, that the Divine nature, or eſſence, beſides being ſimply unknown to us, as every nature or eſſence is, has properties moſt eſſentially different from every thing elſe; and therefore we ſhall certainly deceive ourſelves if we call things ſo different from one another by any common name.

Upon the whole, it is plain, that no proof of the materiality of man can be extended, by any juſt analogy, to a proof or evidence of a ſimilar materiality of the Divine nature; for the properties or powers being different, the ſubſtance or eſſence (if it be any convenience to us to uſe ſuch terms at all) muſt be different alſo.

If

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If by the term *immaterial* we ſimply mean to denote a ſubſtance that has properties and powers eſſentially different from thoſe of created matter, it is plain that I have no objection to the term, and in this ſenſe I do believe it is, in fact, uſed by the generality of mankind. But if, with modern metaphyſicians, we intend to denote by it a ſubſtance that has no property whatever in common with matter, and that even bears no relation to ſpace, I muſt deny that any ſuch ſubſtance exiſts; becauſe, according to ſuch a definition, the divine Being is neceſſarily cut off from all communication with, and all action or influence upon, his own creation.

But let us make uſe of what terms we pleaſe to expreſs the Divine nature, or mode of exiſtence, we are not able to come any nearer to an adequate conception concerning them. God is, and ever muſt remain the *incomprehenſible*, the object of our moſt profound reverence, and awful adoration. Compared with him, all other beings are as *nothing, and leſs than nothing. He filleth all in all, and he is all in all.*

I would obſerve, however, and I think it but juſtice to thoſe who may happen to ſee this ſubject in a different light from that in which I have here repreſented it, that ſhould any perſon, on account of the very few circumſtances in which the Divine nature reſembles other natures, think proper to apply the

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the term material to both, the hypotheſis advanced in this treatiſe concerning the nature of matter, which excludes impenetrability, or ſolidity from being a property of it, (by which, as we may ſay, the *reproach of matter* is wiped off) makes this to be a very different kind of materialiſm from that groſſer ſort, which, however, has been maintained by many pious chriſtians, and was certainly the real belief of moſt of the early Fathers.

It is only on account of the notion that matter is neceſſarily *inert*, and abſolutely incapable of intelligence, thought, or action, that it has been deemed dangerous to aſcribe it either to a finite, or to the infinite mind; but when this reproach is wiped away, the danger vaniſhes of courſe. It is the powers of ſupreme intelligence, omnipotence, unbounded goodneſs, and univerſal providence, that we reverence in the Deity; and whatever be the eſſence to which we believe theſe powers belong, it muſt appear equally reſpectable to us, whether we call it material or immaterial; becauſe it is not the *ſubſtance*, of which we have no idea at all, but the *properties* that are the object of our contemplation and regard.

All that we can pretend to know of God, is his infinite wiſdom, power, and goodneſs. We ſee, and feel the effects and influence of theſe every moment of our lives; but it is impoſſible we ſhould ſee or feel the *ſubſtance* to which theſe powers belong; and,

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therefore, all that we can conceive, or pronounce concerning it, muſt be merely hypothetical; and provided that every perſon is fully ſatisfied that his own ideas of the Divine eſſence are conſiſtent with the *known attributes of divinity*, they muſt neceſſarily be equally ſafe, and equally innocent. We are all agreed with reſpect to every thing that *concerns us*, viz. the *divine works*, and the *divine attributes*; and we differ only with reſpect to an opinion which, circumſtanced as this is, cannot poſſibly affect us.

It is ſaid, that matter can only *be acted upon*, and is neceſſarily incapable of *acting*, or *beginning action*. This concluſion we have been led to form, by obſerving that every motion in matter, with which we are acquainted, was preceded by ſome other motion; which we therefore conſider, and properly enough, as the *cauſe* of the ſubſequent motion. But, for the very ſame reaſon, we might conclude, that what we call *ſpirit*, or *mind*, is equally incapable of beginning action or motion; becauſe every idea, every thought, and every determination of the mind of man, is preceded, and, ſtrictly ſpeaking, *cauſed* by ſome other idea of the mind, or ſenſation of the body; and, therefore, judging by what we know of ourſelves, *mind* ought to be concluded to be as incapable of beginning motion as the *body* itſelf. As far as we know from experience, both are equally paſſive, the one being abſolutely governed by intellectual laws,

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and influences, and the other by corporeal ones.

Of the *beginning of motion, or action*, we muſt ſit down with acknowledging, that we have, in reality, no conception at all; and the difficulty is by no means removed, or in the ſmalleſt degree leſſened, by ſhifting it from *matter* to *mind*. Mr. Locke very juſtly obſerves, *Eſſay*, vol. ii. p. 147, that "it is as "hard to conceive ſelf motion in a created im-"material, as in a created material being, con-"ſider it how we will." And certainly the difficulty of our conception is not leſſened by transferring it from a created to an uncreated being.

We know there muſt be a *firſt cauſe* of all things, becauſe things do actually exiſt, and could never have exiſted without a cauſe, and all *ſecondary cauſes* neceſſarily lead us to a *primary one*. But of the nature of the *exiſtence* of this primary cauſe, concerning which we know nothing but by its *effects*, we cannot have any conception. We are abſolutely confounded, bewildered, and loſt, when we attempt to ſpeculate concerning it, and it is no wonder that this ſhould be the caſe. We have no *data* to go upon, and no force of mind to ſupport us in it. All we can ſay is, that this ſpeculation, attended as it is, with inſuperable difficulties, is attended with juſt the ſame, and no greater difficulty, on the idea of the mind being material or immaterial. And the ſyſtem of materialiſm has unqueſtion-

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ably this advantage, that it is entirely free from another difficulty, viz. *how an immaterial ſubſtance can act upon matter*; a difficulty which, in my idea, amounts to an abſolute *impoſſibility*, as thoſe ſubſtances have hitherto been defined.

As to the difficulty ariſing from the divine material eſſence penetrating other matter, it has no place at all in the hypotheſis advanced from Mr. Boſcovich and Mr. Michell; and certainly this idea is much more conſonant to the idea which the ſacred writers give us of the omnipreſence of the divine Being, and of his *filling all in all*, than that of a being who bears no relation to ſpace, and therefore cannot properly be ſaid to *exiſt any where*; which is the doctrine of the rigid immaterialiſts.

In the ſcriptures, the divine Being is ſaid to be a *ſpirit*; but all that is there meant by ſpirit is an *inviſible power*. The divine works are viſible and aſtoniſhing, but *himſelf no man has ſeen, or can ſee*.

That ſuch an idea as many have, or affect to have, of the ſtrict immateriality of the divine nature, as not exiſting in ſpace, is not an idea of much importance, at leaſt, may with certainty be concluded from its not being ſuggeſted to us in the ſcriptures, and eſpecially in the Old Teſtament. All that we are there taught concerning the nature of God, is that he made all things, that he ſees and knows all things, that he is preſent in all places, and that he ſuperintends and governs

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all things; alſo, that he had no beginning, that he can have no end, and that he is incapable of any change. Farther than this we are not taught.

On the contrary, it appears to me, as will be ſeen in its proper place, that the idea which the ſcriptures give us of the divine nature is that of a Being, properly ſpeaking, *every where preſent*, conſtantly ſupporting, and at pleaſure controling the laws of nature, but not the object of any of our ſenſes; and that, out of condeſcenſion, as it were, to the weakneſs of human apprehenſion, he choſe, in the early ages of the world, to ſignify his peculiar preſence by ſome *viſible ſymbol*, as that of a ſupernatural bright cloud, or ſome other appearance, which could not but impreſs their minds with the idea of a real local preſence. He is alſo generally repreſented as reſiding in the heavens, and from thence inſpecting and governing the world, and eſpecially the affairs of men. This, indeed, is not a philoſophically *juſt*, but it is an *eaſy*, and a very *innocent* manner of conceiving concerning God.

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SECTION X.

Of the Principles of HUMAN NATURE *according to the Scriptures.*

HAD man conſiſted of *two parts*, ſo eſſentially different from each other as *matter* and *ſpirit* are now repreſented to be, and had the immaterial been the principal part, and the material ſyſtem only ſubſervient to it, it might have been expected that there would have been ſome expreſs mention of it, or declaration concerning it (this being a thing of ſo much conſequence to us) in the *ſcriptures*, which contain the hiſtory of the creation, mortality, and reſurrection of man. And yet there is not only a moſt remarkable ſilence on the ſubject of the immateriality of the human ſoul in theſe ſacred books, even where we ſhould moſt naturally have expected ſome account of it, but many things are there advanced, which unavoidably lead us to form a different concluſion; and nothing can be be found in thoſe books to countenance the vulgar opinion, except a few paſſages ill tranſlated, or ill underſtood, ſtanding in manifeſt contradiction to the uniform tenor of the reſt.

The hiſtory of the creation of man is ſuccinctly delivered in Gen. ii. 7. *And the Lord God formed man of the duſt of the ground, and breathed*

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breathed into his noſtrils the breath of life, and man became a living ſoul. We ſee here, that the *whole man* (for nothing is ſaid of his *body* in particular) was made of the duſt of the ground. No part of him is ſaid to have had a higher or different original; and ſurely ſo very important a circumſtance as that of an *immaterial principle*, which could not be from the *duſt*, would not have been omitted, if there had been any ſuch a thing in the compoſition.

When the whole man was completely formed, and not before, we are next informed, that God made this man, who was *lifeleſs* at firſt, to *breathe* and *live*. For it evidently follows from the text, that nothing but the circumſtance of *breathing* made the difference between the *unanimated earth*, and the *living ſoul*. It is not ſaid that when one conſtituent part of the man was made, another neceſſary conſtituent part, of a very different nature, was ſuperadded to it; and that theſe two, united, conſtituted the man; but only that that ſubſtance which was formed of *the duſt of the earth* became a *living ſoul*, that is became *alive*, by being made to *breathe*.

That no ſtreſs is to be laid upon the word נפש, which we tranſlate *ſoul* (though it would be moſt of all abſurd to ſuppoſe, as we muſt have done, from a fair conſtruction of this paſſage, that the *duſt of the earth* could be converted into an *immaterial ſoul*) is evident from the uſe of the ſame term in other places,

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in which it is uſed as ſynonimous to *man*, *the whole man*, and in ſome manifeſtly ſignifies nothing more than the *corporeal*, or *mortal part of man*.

Gen. xlvi. 26, *All the ſouls that came with Jacob into Egypt, which came out of his loins.* The immaterial principle certainly could not come from his loins.

Exod. xviii. 4, *The ſoul that ſinneth it ſhall die.* Ez. xiii. 19, *To ſlay the ſouls that ſhould not die, and to ſave the ſouls that ſhould not live.* Pſ. vii. 1, 2, *Save me, leſt he tear my ſoul, rending it in pieces.* In all theſe paſſages it is moſt evident that the word *ſoul* is ſynonimous to *man*, and that it refers more immediately to his *body*; ſo that by *man becoming a living ſoul*, nothing can be underſtood beſides his being *made alive*; and the paſſage ſuggeſts no hint of any thing but the property of *life* being ſuperadded to that corporeal ſyſtem which was intirely formed of the duſt of the earth, in order to make a complete living man.

Sometimes the word that is here rendered ſoul is uſed to expreſs the *dead body* itſelf, and is ſo tranſlated by us; as Lev. xxi. 1, 11, *There ſhall none be defiled for the dead among his people, neither ſhall he go in to any dead body, nor defile himſelf for father or mother.* Ib. xix. 28, *Ye ſhall not make any cuttings in your fleſh for the dead.* Numb. xix. 13, *Whoever touches the dead body of any man that is dead.* In this paſſage the periphraſis is very re-

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remarkable; and if, in this paſſage, the word נפש ſhould be rendered ſoul, it muſt be tranſlated thus, *Whoſoever touches the dead ſoul of a man who ſhall die.* See alſo Hagg. ii. 13.

In other paſſages, where the ſame word is by us rendered *ſoul*; there would have been much more propriety in tranſlating it *life*, which does not denote a *ſubſtance* but a *property*.

Pſ. lxxxix. 48, *Who can deliver his ſoul* [life] *from the hand of the grave.* Job xxxiii. 30, *To bring back his ſoul* [life] *from the pit.* Gen. xxxv. 18, *And it came to paſs as her ſoul,* [her life] *was departing for ſhe died.* 1 Kings xvii. 22, *And the ſoul* [the life] *of the child came to him again.*

The ſame obſervation may be made with reſpect to the correſponding word in the Greek, ψυχη, in the New Teſtament; as in Luke xii. 20, *Thou fool, this night ſhall thy ſoul* [thy life] *be required of thee*; that is, this night *thou ſhalt die.*

Beſides, whatever principles we may be led to aſcribe to *man* from this account of his formation in Gen. ii. 7, the very ſame we ought to aſcribe to the *brutes*; becauſe the very ſame words are uſed in the account of them by the ſame writer, both in the Hebrew and in the Septuagint, though they are differently rendered in our tranſlation. For Gen. i. 24, we read, *And God ſaid, let the earth bring forth the living creature* [נפש חיה] [*living ſoul*] and

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again, Gen. ii. 19, *And whatſoever Adam called every living creature* [living ſoul] *that was the name thereof.* For this obſervation I am indebted to an ingenious and worthy friend, and I think it valuable and deciſive in the caſe.

Let us now proceed to the account which the ſcriptures give us of the *mortality of man*, to ſee whether we can find in any paſſage relating to this ſubject ſome trace of an immortal ſoul.

Death is firſt threatened to man in theſe terms, Gen. ii. 17, *Of the tree of knowledge, of good and evil, thou ſhalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eateſt of it thou ſhalt ſurely die.* Here is no exception made of any part of the man that was not to die. The natural conſtruction of the ſentence imports, that whenever the decree ſhould take place, whatever was alive belonging to man would wholly ceaſe to live, and become *lifeleſs earth*, as it had been originally.

The ſame inference may be made from the account of the actual *ſentence of death* paſſed upon Adam, after his tranſgreſſion. Gen. iii. 19, *In the ſweat of thy face ſhalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it waſt thou taken. For duſt thou* [not thy body only] *art, and unto duſt ſhalt thou return.* If in this there be any alluſion to an immaterial and immortal part in man, it is wonderfully concealed; for nothing appears, upon the face of the paſſage, but that, as the *whole man*

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man had been *lifeleſs earth*, he would become lifeleſs earth again. Every other conſtruction is an expreſs contradiction both to the words, and the ſpirit of the ſentence. For what would have ſignified the death of the *body*, to Adam, if there ſtill remained an *inextinguiſhable principle of life?* and eſpecially if, as the immaterialiſts in general ſuppoſe, he would afterwards have enjoyed a *better life* than he could have had in conjunction with the body; which could only be a clog to it, and obſtruct its exerciſe and enjoyment.

Beſides, according to the common hypotheſis, all the puniſhment that is mentioned in this ſentence, is inflicted upon the mere *paſſive inſtrument* of the ſoul, whilſt the *real criminal* was ſuffered to eſcape.

In general, to interpret what the ſcriptures ſay of the *mortality of man*, which is the uniform language both of the Old and New Teſtament on this ſubject, of the *mortality of the body only*, which is a part of the man that is of the leaſt value, and wholly inſignificant when compared with the other part of his conſtitution, *the mind*, is exactly of a piece with the Trinitarian interpretation of thoſe paſſages in the goſpels, which repreſent Chriſt as *inferior to his father*, of his *human nature only*; ſuppoſing the Evangeliſts to have neglected the conſideration of his *ſuperior divine nature*; though if there had been any ſuch thing, it was more eſpecially requiſite that it

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ſhould have been particularly attended to in thoſe very paſſages.

When the wickedneſs of men was ſo great that God was reſolved to deſtroy them from the face of the earth by a flood, he ſays, Gen. vi. 3, *My ſpirit ſhall not always ſtrive with man, for that he alſo is fleſh* (בשר). Here is no mention of any other ſuperior principle.

When this flood took place, and almoſt the whole race of mankind was deſtroyed by it, there is ſtill no mention made of their immaterial ſouls, or what became of them. We only read, Gen. vii. 22, *All in whoſe noſtrils was the breath of life, of all that was on the dry land died. And every living ſubſtance was deſtroyed which was upon the face of the ground, both man, and cattle, and the creeping things, and the fowls of heaven; and they were deſtroyed from the earth.*

Another occaſion on which we might naturally expect ſome account of the immaterial principle in man, if there had been any ſuch thing, is where an account is given of the *deaths of remarkable perſons.* And yet, though we have, in the ſcriptures, very circumſtantial accounts of the deaths of ſeveral eminent perſons, with reſpect to none of them is there the leaſt hint dropped, that the *body only* was dead, but that the *immaterial ſoul* was altogether unaffected by what had happened to its groſs companion. This ſentiment, which is capable of a vaſt variety of expreſſion, never fails to occur upon ſimilar occaſions with us; and,

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and, for the ſame reaſons, could not have failed to occur to the ſacred writers, if they had had any idea of ſuch a thing.

Particular mention is made of the deaths of Abraham, Iſaac, Jacob, Joſeph, Aaron, Moſes, David, and many others; but all that is ſaid upon any of theſe occaſions, is either that the dying perſon was *gathered to his people*, or that he *ſlept with his fathers*. Now certainly *ſleep* does not give us the idea of a perſon's being *alive*, and *active*, and eſpecially of his entering upon a *new mode of being*, in which he ſhould be more alive, more active, and more vigorous than he had ever been before.

In the account of the death of Joſeph, it is ſaid, Gen. l. 26, *They embalmed him, and he was put into a coffin in Egypt*. It is not ſaid that there was any part of him that was *not embalmed*, and that could not be put into a coffin. Our different notions dictate a very different language. Upon our grave-ſtones we never ſee inſcribed, *Here lies ſuch a perſon*, but always here lies the *body*, or *the remains*, or *what was mortal* of ſuch a perſon. Such an influence have *ideas* upon *language* and *cuſtoms*; and the ſame would they have had upon the language and cuſtoms of thoſe ancient times, if the ideas and notions had then exiſted.

We have accounts in the ſcriptures of ſeveral perſons having been recalled from death, and having come to life again; as of the dead

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dead man who was raiſed to life by the touch of the prophet's bones, of two children by Elijah and Eliſha; of Jairus's daughter, the young man at Nain, and of Lazarus by our Saviour; and of other perſons by the apoſtles; and more eſpecially of the death and reſurrection of our Lord himſelf. Yet, upon none of theſe occaſions, is there the leaſt mention made of the *immaterial ſoul*, which, upon the common hypotheſis, muſt have been in a ſtate of happineſs or miſery, and have been recalled from thence to its old habitation. This looks as if, in the apprehenſion of the ſacred writers, there was no ſuch a thing as a ſeparate ſoul to be recalled; but that on the contrary, the caſe was ſimply this, viz. that the *life*, which is no more than a *property*, had been loſt, and was reſtored again. This too would be conſidered as an *advantage*; whereas it has the appearance of cruelty and injuſtice, in the caſe of a good man, as of Lazarus, who had been dead four days, to recall him from a ſtate of unmixed happineſs, to the troubles and miſeries of this life, and ſubject him once more to the pains of death.

If there be an immaterial ſoul in man, and eſpecially if the body be a clog to its operations and enjoyments, it was no favour to Enoch or Elijah to remove them to another life with ſuch an incumbrance; and the general reſurrection, as I have obſerved before, which we are taught to regard as *the great object*

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object of chriſtian hope, is not merely *ſuperfluous*, but even *undeſirable*; ſince virtue would naturally have had a much more complete reward without the body.

It is ſo evidently the doctrine of the ſcriptures, that the ſtate of retribution does not take place till after the general reſurrection, that it is now adopted by great numbers, who, nevertheleſs, cannot be brought to give up the notion of an immaterial ſoul. But I wiſh they would conſider what notion they really have of an immaterial ſoul paſſing thouſands of years without a ſingle idea or ſenſation. In my opinion, it approaches very nearly to its being *no ſubſtance at all*; juſt as matter muſt intirely vaniſh, when we take away its property of *extenſion*.

If, together with the opinion of the intire ceſſation of thought, they will maintain the real *exiſtence* of the ſoul, it muſt be for the ſake of the *hypotheſis* only, and for no real *uſe* whatever. They who maintain that, without a reſurrection, there is a ſufficient reward for virtue, and a ſtate of puniſhment for vice, taking place immediately after death, have a *ſolid reaſon* for contending for an immaterial principle, unaffected by the cataſtrophe to which the body is ſubject. But I can ſee no reaſon in the world why any *chriſtian*, who, as ſuch, neceſſarily believes the doctrine of a reſurrection (this being the proper fundamental article of his faith) ſhould be ſo zealous for it; and, indeed, why he

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ſhould not be rather *jealous* of ſuch a notion, as intefering with his *proper ſyſtem*, ſuperſeding it, and making it *ſuperfluous*, and really *undeſirable*. The doctrine of a ſeparate ſoul moſt evidently embarraſſes the true chriſtian ſyſtem, which takes no ſort of notice of it, and is uniform and conſiſtent without it. In the ſcriptures, the heathens are repreſented to be *without hope*, and all mankind as *periſhing* at death, if there be no *reſurrection of the dead*.

Perſons who attend to the ſcriptures cannot avoid concluding, that the *operations* of the ſoul depend upon the body; and that between death and the reſurrection there will be a *ſuſpenſion* of all its powers. And it is obvious to remark, that if this be the fact, there muſt be a ſufficient *natural reaſon* why it ſhould be ſo; and, therefore, there is fair ground to preſume, that the ſoul cannot be that *independent being* that has been imagined.

According to the chriſtian ſyſtem, the body is neceſſary to all the *perceptions* and *exertions* of the mind: and if this be the caſe, what *evidence* can there be that it is not dependent upon the body for its *exiſtence* alſo? that is, what evidence can there be that the faculty of thinking does not inhere in the body itſelf, and that there is no ſuch thing as a *ſoul* ſeparate from it? A philoſopher, on ſeeing theſe appearances, would more naturally conclude that the body appeared to have greater powers than he imagined it could have

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have had, than that an immaterial ſpirit could be ſo neceſſarily dependant upon a groſs body, as not to be able to perceive or think without it. This appears to me, on the firſt face of things, to be by much the more natural concluſion, excluſive of the obligation that all philoſophers are under, not to admit more *cauſes* than are abſolutely *neceſſary*.

But the moſt extraordinary aſſertion that I have yet met with, relating to the ſubject, is, that the doctrine of the natural immortality of the ſoul is neceſſary to be eſtabliſhed, before any regard can be paid to the ſcripture doctrine of a reſurrection. For it is ſaid, "that "if the ſoul be not naturally capable of ſur- "viving the body, or if death is unavoid- "ably its *deſtruction*, then the reſurrection "muſt be the reſurrection of what was *not* "*in being*, the reſurrection of *nothing*." It is true that a *property* ſuch as I conſider the *power of thinking* to be, cannot exiſt without its *ſubſtance*, which is an organized ſyſtem. But if this property of thinking neceſſarily attends the property of *life*, nothing can be requiſite to the reſtoration of all the powers of the man, but the reſtoration of the body, (no particle of which can be loſt) to a ſtate of life.

If we ſearch the ſcriptures for paſſages more particularly expreſſive of the *ſtate of man at death*, we find in them not only no trace of *ſenſe*, *thought*, or *enjoyment*, but, on the contrary, ſuch declarations as expreſsly exclude

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exclude it; as Pſ. vi. 5, *In death there is no remembrance of thee. In the grave who ſhall give thee thanks?* ſpoken by David when he was praying for recovery from ſickneſs. Pſ. cxv. 47, *The dead praiſe not the Lord, neither they that go down into ſilence*; and Pſ. cxvi. 4, *His breath goeth forth, he returneth to the earth, in that very day his thoughts periſh.*

Job, ſpeaking of man as utterly inſenſible in death, expreſſes himſelf ſo very fully and diſtinctly, that it is not poſſible to miſtake his meaning. Job, xiv. 7, *There is hope of a tree if it be cut down, that it will ſprout again, and that the tender branch thereof will not ceaſe. Though the root thereof wax old in the earth, and the ſtock thereof die in the ground, yet through the ſcent of water it will bud, and bring forth boughs like a plant. But man dieth, and waſteth away, yea man giveth up the ghoſt, and where is he? As the waters fail from the ſea, and the flood decays and dries up, ſo man lieth down, and riſeth not till the heavens be no more. They ſhall not awake, nor be raiſed out of their ſleep.*

Nothing can be more evident than that Job conſidered man as altogether inſenſible in death, and that he had no notion of his *body* being one thing, and *himſelf*, the *ſentient principle*, another. But I cannot help concluding that in the verſes immediately following thoſe quoted above, he expreſſes his belief of a reſurrection

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ſurrection to a future life. V. 13, *O that thou wouldſt hide me in the grave, that thou wouldſt keep me ſecret until thy wrath be paſt; that thou wouldſt appoint me a ſet time, and remember me. If a man dies, ſhall he live again? All the days of my appointed time will I wait* [in the *grave*, as it ſeems to me] *till my change come. Thou ſhalt call, and I will anſwer thee: thou wilt have a deſire to the work of thy hands.*

It is ſtill more evident from that celebrated paſſage in the 19th chapter of this book, that all the hope that Job had of a future life was founded on his belief of a *reſurrection*, and not on a ſtate of *ſeparation from the body*, of which he does not appear to have had any idea.

Job. xix. 25, *I know that my redeemer liveth, and that he ſhall ſtand at the latter day upon the earth. And though, after my ſkin, worms deſtroy this body, yet in my fleſh ſhall I ſee God; whom I ſhall ſee for myſelf, and mine eyes ſhall behold, and not another, though my reins be conſumed within me.*

Solomon evidently conſiders the whole of man as equally mortal with brutes. After having ſaid Ecc. iii. 17, *God ſhall judge the righteous and the wicked, for there is a time there for every purpoſe, and for every work*; he adds, v. 18, *I ſaid in my heart concerning the eſtate of the ſons of men, that God might manifeſt them, and that they might ſee that they themſelves are beaſts. For that which befalleth the*

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the ſons of men befalleth beaſts; even one thing befalleth them. As the one dieth, ſo dieth the other. Yea they have all one breath. So that a man has no pre-eminence over a beaſt; for all is vanity. All go to one place. All are of the duſt, and all return to duſt again.

Some conſider this paſſage as put into the mouth of a perſon who objects againſt religion, or as an objection which had occurred to the writer himſelf; but I ſee no appearance of any ſuch thing; and the doctrine is perfectly agreeable to the uniform tenor of the ſcriptures. After the paſſage quoted above, he adds, *Who knoweth the ſpirit of man that goeth upward, and the ſpirit of the beaſt that goeth downward to the earth?* But if this paſſage be interpreted in a ſenſe conſiſtent with what goes before, it can only mean that, notwithſtanding the difference in the *form* and *poſture* of a man and a beaſt; in conſequence of which the *breath* of man goes *upwards*, and that of a beaſt goes *downwards*, there is no difference between them when they die. Accordingly, in the very next verſe, he ſays of man, *Who ſhall bring him to ſee what ſhall be after him?* evidently conſidering him as in a ſtate of inſenſibility and perfect ignorance. Beſides, *upwards* and *downwards* in this place, may not relate to the *breath*, or any thing repreſented by the breath, but *to the poſture of the body in walking*, man walking with his head upwards, and the beaſt with his head looking downwards.

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This writer, indeed, ſpeaking of death, uſes this expreſſion, Ecc. xii. 7, *Then ſhall the duſt return to the earth as it was, and the ſpirit ſhall return unto God who gave it.* But as it is contrary to the whole tenor of the ſcriptures, to ſuppoſe that the ſouls of departed men are in heaven, *with God, and Chriſt*, where they are ſaid not to be till after the reſurrection, the meaning of this paſſage can only be, that God, who gave *life*, will take it away; the word *ſpirit* denoting nothing more than *breath*, or *life*. By the ſame kind of figure *our lives* are ſaid, Coll. iii. 3, after death, to be *hid with Chriſt in God*, and that *when Chriſt, who is our life, ſhall appear, we alſo ſhall appear with him in glory.* From which it is evident, that, notwithſtanding the *lives* of good men are, figuratively ſpeaking, ſaid to be *with God*, they are not to *appear*, or be manifeſted, till the appearance, or ſecond coming of Chriſt; ſo that the *ſpirit*, or *life*, *going to God*, and *remaining with him*, does not imply any ſtate of perception, or enjoyment.

Our Saviour, indeed, ſeems to uſe the term *ſoul* as expreſſive of ſomething diſtinct from the body, but, if he did (which, however, is not certain) he might do it in compliance with the prevailing opinion of the times; in the ſame manner as he applies the term *poſſeſſed of dæmons, to madmen*, and even ſpeaks to madmen, as if they were actuated by evil ſpirits, though he certainly did not believe

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the existence of such dæmons. He says, however, Matt. x. 28, *Fear not them who kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him, who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.*

But when we consider that, according to the uniform tenor of the scriptures, and especially our Saviour's own discourses and parables, there is no punishment in hell till after the resurrection, it will be evident that his meaning could only be, that men have power over us only in *this life*, but God in *the life to come*; meaning by the *soul*, the *life*, and in this place, the *future and better life* of man in opposition to the *present*. Also when the apostle Paul, 1 Thess. v. 23, says, *I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless until the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ*, he only uses these terms as denoting, in the philosophy of his time (which had spread even among the Jews) all that constituted a *complete man*, without hinting at the possibility of any *separation* of the several parts.

Had the sacred writers really believed the existence of the soul, as a principle in the human constitution, naturally distinct from, and independent of the body, it cannot but be supposed that they would have made some *use* of it in their arguments for a future life. But it is remarkable that we find no such argument in all the New Testament.

St. Paul, though he writes largely upon the subject, and to Greeks, by whom the doctrines

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of Plato were reſpected, lays the whole ſtreſs of his argument upon *the promiſe of God by Jeſus Chriſt*, confirmed to us by his reſurrection from the dead. According to him, who muſt certainly be allowed to have underſtood chriſtianity, and who would not ſlightly undervalue any *proper* ſupport of its doctrines; *if Chriſt be not raiſed, our faith is vain*; and *they who are aſleep in Chriſt*, that is, they who have died in the profeſſion of chriſtianity, *are periſhed*. But how could they have been ſaid to have *periſhed*; or how could he conclude, as he does, that upon the ſuppoſition of there being no reſurrection of the dead, we may ſafely neglect all the duties of morality, adopting the Epicurean maxim, *Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die*; if the ſoul ſurvive the body, enjoying all its thinking faculties, and conſequently be the proper ſubject of moral retribution? Indeed what occaſion could there be for a reſurrection, or general judgment, upon that hypotheſis?

A paſſage in the book of Revelation may alſo be interpreted in a manner equally favourable to this doctrine. We read, Rev. xx. 4, *I ſaw under the altar the ſouls of them that were beheaded for the witneſs of Jeſus, and for the word of God, &c. and they lived and reigned with Chriſt a thouſand years. But the reſt of the dead lived not again till the thouſand years were ended.* It is plain, therefore, that he ſaw them not as *unembodied ſouls*, but as *living men*, after a real reſurrection, and

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therefore he did not see the rest of the dead souls at all; for being *dead*, they had no *souls* or *lives*.

I shall conclude this section with some observations of Mr. Hallet; "Hence we see "why the scriptures never speak of the *im-* "*mortality of the soul*, as many divines have "done. Tillotson takes notice of the fact, "and wonders at it. The reason that he as- "signs for the silence of the scriptures on "this head is, that the doctrine of the na- "tural immortality of the soul is taught so "plainly by the light of nature, that every "man's reason can easily discover it, and so "a revelation needs not mention it, but "might take it for granted. Whereas it now "appears that the true reason why the scrip- "tures do not teach it, is because it is not "true". *Discourses*, Vol. I, p. 277.

With respect to the importance of the opinion, he says, "It is of no consequence in the world "to any purpose of religion, whether the soul "of man be material or immaterial. All "that religion is concerned to do, is to prove "that that which now thinks in us shall "continue to think, and to be capable of "happiness or misery for ever. This reli- "gion proves from the express promises and "threatenings of the gospel. But religion "is not concerned to determine of what *na-* "*ture* this thinking immortal substance is. "For my part, I judge it to be immaterial; "but if a man should think that the soul is

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" mere matter, endowed with the power of " thought, he would not overturn any article " in religion, that is of the leaſt conſequence " to promote the *ends* of religion. For while " a man thinks that his ſoul is matter, he ne- " ceſſarily thinks that God, who made matter " capable of thinking, and endowed the " matter of his ſoul in particular with the " power of thought, is capable, by the ſame " almighty power, of preſerving the matter " of his ſoul capable of thinking for ever. " And when he ſhall have proved that it is " the *will of God* that that thing which now " thinks in him ſhall continue to think for " ever, he has proved the immortality of the " ſoul, even upon his ſuppoſition of its being " material, in the only way in which we who " apprehend it to be immaterial are capable " of proving its *actual immortality*. For this " can only be proved by ſhewing, that it is " the will of God that it ſhall be immortal." *Hallet's Diſcourſes*, p. 214.

To what is advanced in this ſection, I beg my reader to add what is obſerved in the third volume of my *Inſtitutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*, concerning the doctrine of an *intermediate ſtate*; every argument againſt this doctrine tending to prove that there is no *ſeparate ſoul* in man, but that his percipient and thinking powers are nothing more than the neceſſary reſult of the *life* of the body.

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SECTION XI.

Of the DIVINE ESSENCE *according to the Scriptures.*

HAD the Deity been an immaterial ſubſtance, in the modern ſtrict metaphyſical ſenſe of the word (for in the common ſenſe of it, as ſignifying a being that has properties and powers, not only infinitely *ſuperior* to, but moſt eſſentially *different* from, every thing that we call *matter*, it has been ſeen that I do not object to it) and had this idea of God been of real conſequence, either to his own honour, or to the virtue and happineſs of mankind, it might have been expected that it would have been ſtrongly and frequently inculcated in the ſcriptures, as we find the doctrine of the *unity of his nature*, of his almighty *power*, his perfect *knowledge*, and his unbounded *goodneſs* to be. But if we look into the ſcriptures, we find a very ſtriking difference in this caſe.

The ſcriptures abound with the ſtrongeſt aſſertions, and the moſt ſolemn declarations concerning the unity of God, and concerning his power, wiſdom and goodneſs; but though we find in them that his attributes are diſplayed every where, and that nothing can confine their operations, we meet with nothing at all determinate with reſpect to the *divine eſſence*. Nay,

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till we come to the times of David, and the later prophets, the Divine Being is represented in such a manner, that we can hardly help imagining that the patriarchs must have conceived of him as a being of some unknown form, though surrounded by an insupportable splendour, so as to be invisible to mortal eyes.

Now, had even this opinion been a *dangerous one* (though it is not philosophically just) there would certainly have been something said to guard us against it, and prevent our entertaining a notion so dishonourable to God, and so injurious to ourselves. But it is remarkable that nothing of this kind does occur.

We often find the *presence of the Lord* mentioned, as if there was upon earth some place where he particularly *resided*, or which he *frequented*. One instance of this we have in the Antediluvian history. Cain says, Gen. iv. 14, *Behold thou hast driven me out this day from the face of the earth, and from thy face shall I be hid.* Again, v. 16, *And Cain went out from the presence of the Lord.*

At the building of the tower of Babel, we read, Gen. xi. 5, *And God came down to see the city, and the tower which the children of men builded.* This is an expression which I can hardly think would have been used by David or Isaiah, who represent the Divine Being with much more dignity, as *sitting on the circle of the heavens, and from thence beholding all the inhabitants of the earth.* But

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the other repreſentation is more adapted, as we may ſay, to the *infantile* ſtate of the world.

To Moſes God ſeems to have appeared in the ſymbol of a *denſe bright cloud*; but his firſt appearance to him in the buſh, was in a *flame of fire*. It is ſaid, Exod. iii. 4, *that the angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire, out of the midſt of the buſh.* But it appears from the converſation afterwards, that it was no angel, but *God himſelf*, who ſpake to him; the *fire* being, perhaps, called the *angel* of God, becauſe it was the emblem of his preſence, or was that by which he choſe to manifeſt himſelf. For it is ſaid, v. 4, *And when the Lord ſaw that he turned aſide to ſee, God called to him out of the midſt of the buſh, and ſaid, I am the God of thy fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Iſaac, and the God of Jacob*, &c. When Moſes aſked his name, he ſays I AM THAT I AM, a name peculiarly characteriſtic of the true God, denoting, as is generally thought, his *neceſſary exiſtence*.

The viſible appearance which repreſented the divine preſence to the Iſraelites in the wilderneſs, was a *cloud* by day, and *fire* by night, Ex. xiii. 21, *And the Lord went before them by day in a pillar of a cloud, to lead them the way; and by night in a pillar of fire, to give them light.* Through this pillar it is ſaid, v. 24, that *the Lord looked upon the hoſt of the Egyptians, and troubled them.*

But,

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But, in general, the Divine Being appeared unto Moſes in a *denſe bright cloud*, Ex. xix. 9, *And the Lord ſaid unto Moſes, Lo I come unto thee in a thick cloud, that the people may hear when I ſpeak with thee, and, may believe thee for ever.*

After the hiſtory of the golden calf, there is another account of an appearance of God to Moſes, and many others with him, which has ſomething in it very peculiar. Ex. xxiv. 9, *Then went up Moſes and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and ſeventy of the elders of Iſrael, and they ſaw the God of Iſrael. And there was under his feet, as it were, a paved work of ſapphire ſtone, and as it were the body of heaven in its clearneſs; and upon the nobles of the children of Iſrael he laid not his hand; and they ſaw God, and did eat and drink.* Whether this was only the ſame appearance of a bright cloud, or of fire, from which the Divine Being had before ſpoken to Moſes, or ſomething farther, does not diſtinctly appear. In the Septuagint it is only ſaid, and *they ſaw the place where the God of Iſrael ſtood*; and it appears from Maimonides, (ſee his *More Nevochim*) that the more intelligent Jews did not conſider this, or any other ſimilar paſſage, as importing that God had any *form*, or was really the *object of ſight*; but only ſome ſymbol of the more immediate preſence of God.

It ſhould ſeem that Moſes imagined there was ſome other more *proper form of God* concealed within the cloud from which he had uſually

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uſually ſpoken to him: for he expreſſes an earneſt wiſh to have a nearer view of the majeſty of God. Immediately after it is ſaid, Exod. xxxiii. 11, that *the Lord ſpake unto Moſes face to face, as a man ſpeaketh to his friend*; we are informed, v. 18, that he deſired that God would *ſhew him his glory*. In anſwer to which it is ſaid, v. 20, *Thou canſt not ſee my face; for there ſhall no man ſee me and live. And the Lord ſaid Behold there is a place by me, and thou ſhalt ſtand upon a rock, and it ſhall come to paſs while my glory paſſeth by, that I will put thee in a cleft of the rock, and will cover thee with my hand while I paſs by; and I will take away mine hand, and thou ſhalt ſee my back parts, but my face ſhall not be ſeen.*

If our modern metaphyſicians would attend a little to ſuch paſſages of ſcripture as theſe, and conſider what muſt have been the ſentiments of the writers, and of thoſe who were preſent at the ſcenes deſcribed in them (though I readily acknowledge that ſuch repreſentations as theſe were uſed by way of accommodation to the low and imperfect conceptions of the Jews, or the paſſages may admit an interpretation different from the literal ſenſe of them) they would not be ſo much alarmed as they now are, or affect to be, at every thing like *materiality* aſcribed even to the Divine Being; and much leſs to human minds. It is the *attributes*, the *powers* and the *character*

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racter of the Deity that alone concerns us, and not his *eſſence*, or *ſubſtance*.

The circumſtances which attended the giving of the law, which were very awful, and calculated to impreſs the mind in the ſtrongeſt manner, could not leave upon it the idea of an *immaterial being*, but of a being capable of local preſence, though of no known form. Exod. xix. 16, *And it came to paſs on the third day, in the morning, that there were thunders and lightenings, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud, ſo that all the people that were in the camp trembled. And Moſes brought forth the people out of the camp to meet with God, and they ſtood at the nether part of the mount. And mount Sinai was altogether on a ſmoke, becauſe the Lord deſcended upon it in fire, and the ſmoke thereof aſcended as the ſmoke of a furnace, and the whole mount quaked greatly. And when the voice of the trumpet ſounded long, and waxed louder and louder, Moſes ſpake, and God anſwered him by a voice. And the Lord came down upon mount Sinai, on the top of the mount, and the Lord called Moſes up to the top of the mount, and Moſes went up.*

Again it is not ſaid that an *angel*, but that *God himſelf* ſpake all the words of the ten commandments. Exod. xx. 1, *And God ſpake all theſe words, ſaying; I am the Lord thy God, who have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the houſe of bondage*, &c. The two tables of ſtone, containing the ſame commandments,

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ments, are alſo ſaid to have been *written with the finger of God.* Exod. xxxi. 18.

An *audible voice* is certainly calculated to give us the idea of a locally preſent being, and this is frequently repreſented as proceeding immediately from God, when he reveals his will to the prophets. It was not only to Moſes that he thus ſpake *face to face*, but to Samuel when he was a child. 1 Sam. iii. 4, *And the Lord called Samuel, and he anſwered, Here am I.*

In the New Teſtament, alſo, an audible voice proceeded three ſeveral times from the Divine Majeſty, to bear teſtimony to the miſſion of Chriſt. The firſt time at his baptiſm, Matt. iii. 17, *And lo a voice from heaven, ſaying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleaſed.* Again, on the mount of transfiguration, Matt. xvii. 5, *Behold a white cloud overſhadowed them, and behold a voice from the cloud, which ſaid, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleaſed; Hear ye him.* And laſtly, in the temple, in the week of crucifixion. John xii. 28, *Jeſus ſays, Father, glorify thy name. Then came there a voice from heaven, ſaying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again.*

The Iſraelites juſtly conſidered the true God as ſtanding in a peculiar relation to themſelves, and as the Divine Being had promiſed to *dwell among them*, it was natural for them to take it in too literal a ſenſe. Exod. xxix. 45, *And I will dwell among the children of Iſrael, and will be*

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be their God, and they ſhall know that I am the Lord their God, that brought them forth out of the land of Egypt, that I may dwell among them. I am the Lord their God. On this account Jonah might imagine that he could flee from the preſence of God by leaving the land of Canaan, in which he dwelt. Jonah i. 3, *And Jonah roſe up to flee unto Tarſhiſh, from the preſence of the Lord.* But the ſubſequent events in the hiſtory of that prophet convinced him that God was equally preſent in all places.

Seeing God, in viſion, is by no means uncommon with the ancient prophets. Iſ. vi. 1, *In the year that king Uzziah died, I ſaw alſo the Lord* [אדוני] *ſitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple, &c. Then ſaid I, Woe is me, for I am undone, becauſe I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midſt of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have ſeen the king, the Lord of hoſts. Then flew one of the ſeraphim unto me——and ſaid unto me, Lo thine iniquity is taken away, and thy ſin purged. And I heard the voice of the Lord, ſaying, Whom ſhall I ſend, and who will go for us. Then ſaid I, Here am I, ſend me.*

Micaiah ſays, 1 Kings xxii. 19, *I ſaw the Lord* [יהוה] *ſitting on his throne, and all the hoſt of heaven ſtanding by him, on his right hand and on his left. And the Lord ſaid, Who ſhall perſuade Ahab, &c.*

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Dan. vii. 9, *I beheld till the thrones were cast down, and the ancient of days did sit, whose garment was as white as snow, and the hair of his head like pure wool. His throne was like a fiery flame, and his wheels as burning fire. A fiery stream issued out, and came forth from before him. Thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him——I saw in the night visions, and behold one like the son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the ancient of days, and they brought him near before him, &c.*

Amos ix. 1, *I saw the Lord* [אדוני] *standing upon the altar, and he said, &c.*

Heb. iii. 2, *O Lord I have heard thy speech and was afraid—God came from Teman, and the holy one from mount Paran. His glory covered the heavens, and the earth was full of his praise, and his brightness was as the light: He had horns* (or *bright beams*, as it is rendered in the margin) *coming out of his hands—He stood and measured the earth.*

This language is not unknown to the New Testament. Rev. iv. 2, *Immediately I was in the spirit, and behold a throne was set in heaven, and one sat on the throne; and he that sat was, to look upon, like a jasper, and a sardine stone; and there was a rainbow round about the throne, in sight like unto an emerald——And the four living creatures rest not day or night, saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, who was, and is, and is to come. And when those living creatures give glory, and honour, and*

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and thanks, to him that ſat on the throne, who liveth for ever and ever, the four and twenty elders fall down before him that ſat on the throne, and worſhip him that liveth for ever and ever, and caſt their crowns before the throne; ſaying, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou haſt created all things, and for thy pleaſure they were and are created.

Many paſſages in the books of ſcripture, and eſpecially in the Pſalms, give us the moſt exalted ideas of the *univerſal power and preſence* of God. But ſtill this is ſo far from ſuggeſting the idea of proper *immateriality*, which bears no relation to ſpace, that they naturally give us the idea of a Being that is locally preſent every where, but inviſible, and penetrating all things.

Solomon ſays, in his prayer at the dedication of the temple, 1 Kings viii. 27, *But will God indeed dwell on earth? Behold heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee, how much leſs this houſe that I have built.* Iſ. lxvi. 1, *Thus ſaith the Lord, The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my foot-ſtool. Where is the houſe that ye build unto me, and where is the place of my reſt?* Jer. xxiii. 23, *Am I a God at hand, ſays the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himſelf in ſecret places that I ſhall not ſee him? Do not I fill heaven and earth, ſays the Lord?* To the ſame purpoſe is that ſublime paſſage in Pſalm cxxxix. 7, *Whither ſhall I go from thy ſpirit, or whither*

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ther ſhall I flee from thy preſence. If I aſcend up into heaven thou art there. If I make my bed in the grave, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermoſt parts of the ſea, even there ſhall thine hand lead me, and thy right hand ſhall hold me.

Job ſays, ch. xxiii. 3, *Oh that I knew where I might find him, that I might come even to his ſeat. Behold I go forward, but he is not there, and backward but I cannot perceive him; on the left hand, where he doth work, but I cannot behold him. He hideth himſelf on the right hand, that I cannot ſee him.*

When the Divine Being is expreſsly ſaid to be *inviſible*, no words are ever added to ſuggeſt to us that it is becauſe he is *immaterial*; but we are rather given to underſtand, that we cannot ſee God on account of the *ſplendour* that ſurrounds him. This will be ſeen in ſome of the paſſages quoted above; and the idea ſuits very well with the following paſſage of St. Paul, 1 Tim. vi. 15, *The King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, who only hath immortality, dwelling in light which no man can approach unto, whom no man hath ſeen, nor can ſee; to whom be honour and power everlaſting, Amen.* The apoſtle John alſo ſays, John i. 18, *No man hath ſeen God at any time*; but he ſays nothing of the reaſon of it.

When our Saviour ſays, John iv. 24, *God is a ſpirit, and they that worſhip him muſt worſhip him in ſpirit and in truth*; there is no

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reference whatever to the *immateriality* of the divine nature, but only to his *intelligence*, and *moral perfections*; and therefore requiring *truth in the inward part*, or a ſpiritual, as oppoſed to a corporeal homage; and this very paſſage is alledged by ſome of the fathers as an argument for the corporeity of the divine nature.

When the Divine Being compares himſelf with *idols*, which is frequent in Iſaiah, Jeremiah, and other prophets, on which occaſion they are ſaid to be *wood and ſtone*, incapable of *motion*, *knowledge*, or *ſenſe*, it is never ſaid, by way of contraſt, as might naturally be expected in this connection, that the true God is altogether *immaterial*, and incapable of local preſence. On the contrary, we find nothing on theſe occaſions but declarations concerning the divine *power* and *knowledge*, eſpecially with reſpect to *future events*, on which ſubject the true God more eſpecially challenges the falſe ones.

I think I may conclude this ſection with obſerving, that our modern metaphyſical notions, concerning the ſtrict immateriality of the Divine Being, were certainly not drawn from the ſcriptures. In thoſe ſacred books we read of nothing but the infinite *power*, *wiſdom*, and *goodneſs* of God; and to impreſs our minds with the more awful ideas of him, he is generally repreſented as reſiding in heaven, and ſurrounded with a ſplendor, through which no mortal eye can pierce. But he is

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ſo far from being ſaid to be what we now call immaterial, that every deſcription of him, even in the New Teſtament, gives us an idea of ſomething *filling*, and *penetrating all things*, and therefore of no form, or known mode of exiſtence.

For my part, I do not ſee how this notion of immateriality, in the ſtrict metaphyſical ſenſe of the word, is at all calculated to heighten our veneration for the Divine Being. And though, as is no wonder, we are utterly confounded when we attempt to form any conception of a being properly *pervading*, and *ſupporting all things*, we are ſtill more confounded when we endeavour to conceive of a being that has *no extenſion*, *no common property with matter*, and *no relation to ſpace*. Alſo, by the help of theſe principles, which I have been endeavouring to eſtabliſh, we get rid of two difficulties, which appear to me to be abſolutely inſuperable upon the common hypotheſis, viz. how an immaterial being, not exiſting in ſpace, can *create*, or act upon, matter; when, according to the definition of the terms, they are abſolutely incapable of bearing any relation to each other.

SECTION

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SECTION XII.

Of the Arguments for the BEING *and* PERFECTIONS *of* GOD, *on the Syſtem of Materialiſm.*

NOTWITHSTANDING the opinion of the *materiality of man* has, in reality, nothing at all to do with the doctrine concerning *God*, yet as it has often been charged with *leading to Atheiſm*, I ſhall ſhew, in this ſection, that our practical knowledge of God ſtands independent of any conception whatever concerning even the *divine eſſence*; from whence it will clearly follow, *a fortiori*, that it muſt certainly be altogether independent of any opinion concerning *human nature*.

The arguments for the being and attributes of a God ſtand preciſely upon the ſame footing on the material or the immaterial ſyſtem, except the ſingle article of *materiality* or *immateriality* itſelf, which relating to the *eſſence of the Deity* only, is no attribute that any way reſpects us, and cannot in the leaſt contribute to heighten, or to leſſen, our love and reverence for him, our obligation to obedience, or our ſubmiſſion to his will. Conſidering, however, the prejudices that may ariſe on this ſubject, it may not be amiſs to review ſome of the arguments, as laid down in my *Inſtitutes of Natural Religion*, where I made

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ſuch a diſtribution of the ſubject, as I hope will make the diſcuſſion of it more eaſy than it had been before.

By a *God*, I mean an *intelligent firſt cauſe*. This being proved, I conſider what other properties or attributes are neceſſarily connected with the idea of a firſt cauſe, and afterwards thoſe which the examination of the works of God leads us to aſcribe to him. Laſtly, the divine goodneſs being the only *moral quality* that we directly diſcover, I conſider how it is neceſſarily branched out into the different modifications of *juſtice*, *mercy*, *veracity*, &c.

In the proof of an intelligent cauſe of all things, it is impoſſible that the conſideration of the *divine eſſence* can be at all concerned. For the ſame reaſon that the *table* on which I write, or the *watch* that lies before me, muſt have had a maker, *myſelf*, and the *world* I live in muſt have had a maker too: and a *deſign*, a *fitneſs of parts to each other*, and to an end are no leſs obvious in the one caſe than in the other. I have, therefore, the very ſame reaſon to conclude that an intelligent mind produced the one, as the other (meaning by the word *mind* the ſubject of intelligence) and my idea of the *degree* of intelligence requiſite for each of theſe productions riſes in proportion to the number of particulars neceſſary to be attended to in each, and the completeneſs with which they are adapted to the ends which they manifeſtly ſubſerve. Judging by this obvious rule, I neceſſarily con-

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conclude, that the intelligence of the being that made myſelf and the world muſt infinitely exceed that of the perſon who made the table or the watch.

This ſimple argument for the being of a God, or an intelligent maker of all things, notwithſtanding Dr. Oſwald, out of his great zeal for religion, has muſtered up all his logic to invalidate it, I conſider as *irrefragable*, whether we be able to proceed any farther in the inquiry or not,

Again, for the ſame reaſon that the *maker* of the *table*, or of the *watch*, muſt be different from the table or the watch, it is equally manifeſt that the maker of *myſelf*, of the *world*, and of the *univerſe* (meaning by it all the worlds that we ſuppoſe to exiſt) muſt be a being different from myſelf, the world, or the univerſe; which is a ſufficient anſwer to the reaſoning of Spinoza, who, making the *univerſe itſelf* to be God, did, in fact, deny that there was any God. I am not acquainted with any arguments more concluſive than theſe; that is, ſuppoſing a God to exiſt, it is not in nature poſſible, that there could have been more, or ſtronger evidence of it than we find. This argument is, in fact, the foundation of all our practical and uſeful knowledge concerning God, and in this the conſideration of materiality or immateriality has certainly no concern.

The argument alſo againſt an *eternal ſucceſſion of finite beings*, of *men*, for inſtance;

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none of which had any more knowledge or ability than another, is the very ſame on both the hypotheſes, here being an effect without any adequate cauſe; ſince this *ſucceſſion of men* muſt have required, at leaſt, as much intelligence and power as the production of a *ſingle man*, that is, an intelligence and power infinitely exceeding that of any man, and conſequently that of any one in this ſuppoſed ſucceſſion of men.

Alſo the conception of a being who had *no cauſe* is attended with juſt the ſame, and no greater difficulty on the ſuppoſition of this primary cauſe of all things being *material*, or *immaterial*. The *beginning of motion* in *matter*, or the *beginning of thought* in *mind*, is, in this view, the very ſame thing; becauſe, judging by ourſelves (from whence we get all the *data* that we have for forming any judgment in the caſe at all) every thought is as much cauſed by ſomething in the body or the mind preceding it, and influencing the mind, by certain invariable laws, as every motion of the body. We have no experience of any thing that can help us to form any judgment at all concerning the *original beginning of motion*, or *primary activity*, in any reſpect. To ſay that an immaterial being is capable of this, but that a material one is incapable of it, is merely deceiving ourſelves, and concealing our ignorance, and total want of conception, in *words* only, without any ideas adequate to the ſubject.

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A firſt cauſe, therefore, being proved in a manner quite independent of any conſideration of materiality or immateriality, it follows that the *eternity* and *unchangeableneſs* of the firſt cauſe ſtands upon the very ſame grounds upon either hypotheſis, being derived ſimply from the conſideration of an uncauſed being.

If, from the conſideration of theſe neceſſary attributes of a *firſt cauſe*, we proceed to the conſideration of *the works of God*, we find innumerable things exactly ſimilar to ſuch as would unavoidably lead us to the ideas of *power*, *wiſdom*, and *goodneſs* in man; and therefore we are neceſſarily led to aſcribe wiſdom, power and goodneſs to this firſt cauſe. But to what kind of *eſſence* theſe attributes belong, material or immaterial, the effects themſelves give us no information.

Laſtly, the philoſopher admits the belief of *one God*, in oppoſition to a multiplicity of Gods, on account of the *unity of deſign* apparent in the univerſe; and becauſe it is contrary to the rules of philoſophizing to ſuppoſe more cauſes than are neceſſary to explain effects. In this great argument, therefore, materiality or immateriality are equally unconcerned.

And in the ſame manner it might be ſhewn that the argument for a *Divine Providence* ſuffers no injury whatever by this hypotheſis. If nothing was *made*, it is equally certain that nothing can *happen*, or *come to paſs*, without a

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deſign; and there can be no reaſon whatever why this ſhould not extend to the ſmalleſt things, and the moſt ſeemingly inconſiderable events, as well as to things of greater magnitude, and events of greater apparent moment. Beſides, the ſmalleſt things, and the moſt trifling circumſtances, may have the moſt important influences; and therefore they could not be neglected in the comprehenſive plan of Divine Providence, without an inattention to things of the greateſt conſequence that might depend upon them. So that, in a truly philoſophical view, there is nothing exaggerated in our Saviour's ſaying, that *Even a ſparrow falls not to the ground without the will, the knowledge, and deſign of our heavenly father*, and that *the very hairs of our heads are numbered.*

If, after this candid, explicit, and I hope clear and ſatisfactory view of the ſubject, any perſon will tax my opinions, according to which the divine eſſence is nothing that was ever called matter, but ſomething eſſentially different from it (though I have ſhewn that the belief of all his attributes and providence is compatible with *any* opinion concerning his eſſence) with *atheiſm*, I ſhall tax him with great *ſtupidity*, or *malignity*. In my own idea I have all the foundation that the nature of things admits of for a firm belief in a firſt, eternal, unchangeable, and intelligent cauſe of all things; and I have all the proof that can be given of his almighty power, infinite goodneſs,

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neſs, and conſtant providence. And this ſyſtem of *natural religion* affords all the foundation that can be had in ſupport of *revealed religion*, the hiſtory of which is contained in the books of ſcripture, which I moſt cordially and thankfully receive; and the truth of which I have endeavoured, in the beſt manner I have been able, to prove, in the ſecond volume of my *Inſtitutes of Natural and Revealed Religion.*

That the hypotheſis even of the *materiality of the divine nature* is not a dangerous one, is even demonſtrable from this ſingle conſideration, that it is, in fact, the idea that all the vulgar actually do form of God, whenever they think of him at all. For a ſubſtance properly *immaterial* cannot give us any *proper idea* whatever, and ſome idea or other we cannot avoid having whenever we think of a being poſſeſſed of the attributes that we aſcribe to God. It is neceſſarily either the idea of a being of ſome particular, though perhaps variable, form, or elſe infinitely diffuſed, and not the object of our ſenſes. If, therefore, this idea could do harm, almoſt all mankind muſt have received that harm; and notwithſtanding all our laboured refinements, the evil is, with reſpect to the bulk of mankind at leaſt, naturally irremediable. But no harm whatever has come from it, nor is any to be apprehended.

To ſhew that I am not ſingular in my idea of the perfect innocence of any method of expreſſing

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expreſſing the divine eſſence, I ſhall cloſe this ſection with the teſtimony of ſome of the moſt pious and reſpectable writers of the laſt and preſent age, and who cannot be ſuſpected of any undue prejudice, becauſe they did not embrace the ſyſtem they plead in favour of. The writers I ſhall produce are Ramſay, Cudworth and Beauſobre.

" True atheiſm conſiſts in denying that " there is a ſupreme intelligence which has " produced the world by his power, and go- " verns it by his wiſdom." *Ramſay*, p. 274.

" All corporealiſts muſt not be condemned " for atheiſts, but only thoſe of them who " aſſert that there is no conſcious intellectual " nature preſiding over the whole univerſe." *Cudworth*, p. 136.

" I am well perſuaded that God is a *pure* " *intelligence*; but the more I reflect on the " ſubject, the more diſpoſed I find myſelf to " treat the contrary opinion with indulgence. " The ableſt Carteſians acknowledge that we " have no idea of a ſpiritual ſubſtance. We " only know by experience that it thinks, " but we do not know what is the *nature* of " the being, whoſe modifications are thoughts. " We do not know what is the *foundation*, " the *ſubject*, in which the thoughts inhere.

" Secondly, whatever be the error of be- " lieving God to be corporeal, religion ſuf- " fers nothing by it. Adoration, the love of " God, and obedience to his ſovereign will, " remain intire. He is not the leſs the *moſt* " *holy*,

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" *holy*, the *moſt high*, the *almighty*, and the " *immortal* — Were Tertullian, Melito, &c. " who believed God to be corporeal, on that " account, the leſs good chriſtians? Laſtly, " what ought at leaſt to moderate the rage of " thoſe who are always ready to dart their " anathemas, is, that the wiſeſt of the Fathers " acknowledge not only that the divine na- " ture is inexplicable, but that we cannot " ſpeak of it without making uſe of ex- " preſſions which agree to corporeal ſubſtances " only. *Beauſobre*, Vol. I, p. 485.

SECTION XIII.

Obſervations on PERSONAL IDENTITY *with reſpect to the future ſtate of Man.*

THE opinion of the mortality of the thinking part of man is thought by ſome to be unfavourable to morality and religion, but without the leaſt reaſon, as they who urge this objection at preſent muſt be unacquainted with the ſentiments of chriſtian divines upon the ſubject in ancient and preſent times. The excellent biſhop of Carliſle has ſufficiently proved the inſenſibility of the ſoul from death to the reſurrection (which has the ſame practical conſequences) to be the doctrine of the ſcriptures, and the learned archdeacon Blackburne has traced the corruption of it from the earlieſt ages.

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In fact, the common opinion of the ſoul of man ſurviving the body was (as will be ſhewn) introduced into chriſtianity from the Oriental and Greek philoſophy, which in many reſpects exceedingly altered and debaſed the true chriſtian ſyſtem. This notion is one of the main bulwarks of popery; it was diſcarded by Luther, and many other reformers in England and abroad; and it was wiſely left out in the laſt correction of the articles of the church of England, though incautiouſly retained in the burial ſervice. Now can it be ſuppoſed that the apoſtles, the primitive Fathers, and modern reformers, ſhould all adopt an opinion unfavourable to morality?

It was objected to the primitive chriſtians, as it may be at preſent, that if all our hopes of a future life reſt upon the doctrine of a *reſurrection*, we place it upon a foundation that is very precarious. It is even ſaid, that a proper reſurrection is not only, in the higheſt degree, improbable, but even actually impoſſible; ſince, after death, the body putrefies, and the parts that compoſed it are diſperſed, and form other bodies, which have an equal claim to the ſame reſurrection. And where, they ſay, can be the propriety of rewards and puniſhments, if the man that riſes again be not identically *the ſame* with the man that acted and died?

Now, though it is my own opinion that we ſhall be *identically the ſame beings* after the reſurrection that we are at preſent, I ſhall, for the

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the ſake of thoſe who may entertain a different opinion, ſpeculate a little upon their hypotheſis; to ſhew that it is not inconſiſtent with a ſtate of future rewards and puniſhments, and that it ſupplies motives ſufficient for the regulation of our conduct here, with a view to it. And, metaphyſical as the ſubject neceſſarily is, I do not deſpair of ſatisfying thoſe who will give a due attention to it, that the propriety of rewards and puniſhments, with our hopes and fears derived from them, do not at all depend upon ſuch a kind of identity as the objection that I have ſtated ſuppoſes.

If I may be allowed, for the ſake of diſtinction, to introduce a new term, I would ſay that *the identity of the man*, is different from the *identity of the perſon*; and it is the latter, and not the former, that we ought to conſider in a diſquiſition of this kind. The diſtinction I have mentioned may appear a paradox, but in fact ſimilar diſtinctions are not uncommon, and they may illuſtrate one another.

Aſk any perſon to ſhew you the *river Thames*, and he will point to water flowing in a certain channel, and you will find that he does not conſider the *banks*, or the *bed* of the river, to be any part of it. And yet though the water be continually and viſibly changing, ſo as not to be the ſame any one day with the preceding, the uſe of language proves that there is a ſenſe in which it may be called, to every real purpoſe, the *ſame river* that it was a thouſand

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thouſand years ago. So alſo the *Nile*, the *Euphrates*, and the *Tiber* have an identity *as rivers*, independently of the *water*, of which alone they conſiſt. In the ſame manner *foreſts*, which conſiſt of *trees* growing in certain places, preſerve their identity, though all the trees of which they conſiſt decay, and others grow up in their places.

In like manner, though every perſon ſhould be ſatisfied of what I believe is not true, that, in the courſe of nutrition, digeſtion and egeſtion, every particle of the body, and even of the brain (and it ſhould be taken for granted that the whole man conſiſted of nothing elſe) was entirely changed, and that this change, though gradual and inſenſible, could be demonſtrated to take place completely in the courſe of a year, we ſhould, I doubt not, ſtill retain the idea of a real *identity*, and ſuch a one as would be the proper foundation for approbation, or ſelf reproach, with reſpect to the paſt, and for hope and fear with reſpect to the future. A man would claim his wife, and a woman her huſband, after more than a year's abſence, debts of a year's ſtanding would not be conſidered as cancelled, and the villain who had abſconded for a year would not eſcape puniſhment.

In fact, the univerſal and firm belief of this hypotheſis would make no change whatever in our preſent conduct, or in our ſenſe of *obligation*, reſpecting the duties of life, and the propriety of rewards and puniſhments; and con-

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conſequently all hopes and fears, and expectations of every kind, would operate exactly as before. For notwithſtanding the complete change of the *man*, there would be no change of what I ſhould call the *perſon*.

Now if the water of a river, the trees of a foreſt, or the particles that conſtitute the man, ſhould change *every moment*, and we were all acquainted with it, it would make no more difference in our conduct, than if the ſame change had been conſidered as taking place more ſlowly. Suppoſing that this change ſhould conſtantly take place during ſleep, our behaviour to each other in the morniug would ſtill be regulated by a regard to the tranſactions of the preceding day. In this caſe, were any perſon fully perſuaded, that every particle of which he conſiſted ſhould be changed, he would, nevertheleſs, conſider himſelf as being the *ſame perſon* to-morrow, that he was yeſterday, and the ſame twenty years hence, that he was twenty years ago; and, I doubt not, he would feel himſelf concerned as for a *future ſelf*, and regulate his conduct accordingly.

As far as the idea of identity is requiſite as a foundation for rewards and puniſhments, the *ſameneſs and continuity of conſciouſneſs* ſeems to be the only circumſtance attended to by us. If we knew that a perſon had by diſeaſe, or old age, loſt all remembrance of his paſt actions, we ſhould, in moſt caſes, immediately ſee that there would be an impropriety in

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puniſhing him for his previous offences, as it would anſwer no *end* of puniſhment, to himſelf or others. In the caſe, however, of *notorious criminality*, the aſſociation of a man's crime, with every thing belonging to him, is ſo ſtrong, and ſo extenſive, that we wreak our vengeance upon the dead body, the children, the habitation, and every thing that had been connected with the criminal; and likewiſe in the caſe of *diſtinguiſhed merit*, we extend our gratitude and benevolence to all the remains and connections of the hero and the friend. But as men habituate themſelves to reflection, they lay aſide this *indiſcriminate vengeance*, and confine it to the perſon of the criminal, and to the ſtate in which he retains the remembrance of his crimes. Every thing farther is deemed barbarous and uſeleſs.

Admitting, therefore, that the man conſiſts wholly of *matter*, as much as the *river* does of *water*, or the *foreſt* of *trees*, and that this matter ſhould be wholly changed in the interval between death and the reſurrection; yet, if, after this ſtate, we ſhall all know one another again, and converſe together as before, we ſhall be, to all intents and purpoſes, the *ſame perſons*. Our *perſonal identity* will be ſufficiently preſerved, and the expectation of it at preſent will have a proper influence on our conduct.

To conſider the matter philoſophically, what peculiar excellence is there in thoſe particles of matter which compoſe my body, more than

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thoſe which compoſe the table on which I write; and conſequently what *rational motive* can I have for preferring, or attaching myſelf to the one more than to the other. If I knew that they were inſtantly, and without any painful ſenſation to myſelf, to change places, I do not think that it would give me any concern. As to thoſe who are incapable of reflecting in this manner, as they cannot underſtand the *objection*, there is no occaſion to make them underſtand the *anſwer*.

However, notwithſtanding I give this ſolution of the difficulty, for the ſatisfaction of ſceptical and metaphyſical perſons, I myſelf believe the doctrine of the *reſurrection of the dead* in another and more literal ſenſe. Death, with its concomitant putrefaction, and diſperſion of parts, is only a *decompoſition*; and whatever is *decompoſed*, may be *recompoſed* by the being who firſt compoſed it; and I doubt not but that, in the proper ſenſe of the word, *the ſame body* that dies ſhall riſe again, not with every thing that is *adventitious* and *extraneous* (as all that we receive by nutrition) but with the ſame *ſtamina*, or thoſe particles that really belonged to the *germ* of the organical body. And there can be no proof that theſe particles are ever properly deſtroyed, or interchanged. This opinion was advanced by Dr. Watts, and no man can ſay that it is unphiloſophical.

That excellent philoſopher Mr. Bonnet ſuppoſes (and advances a variety of arguments

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from new and curious experiments on the reproduction of the parts of animals to prove) that all the *germs* of future plants, organical bodies of all kinds, and the reproducible parts of them, were really contained in the first germ; and though the consideration confounds us when we contemplate it, we are not more confounded than in the contemplation of other views of the system of which we make a part; and the thing is no more incompatible with our idea of the omnipotence of its author. Those who laugh at the mere mention of such a thing have certainly a small share of *natural science*, which indeed generally accompanies conceit and dogmatism.

This idea of the doctrine of the resurrection is perfectly agreeable to the light in which St. Paul represents it (though I should not condemn his comparison, if it should be found not to be so complete) when he compares it to the revival of a *seed* that has been sown in the earth, and become seemingly *dead*. For the *germ* does not die, and in our future transformation we may be as different from what we are in our present state, as the *plant* is from the *seed*, or the *butterfly* from the *egg*, and yet be essentially the same.

Dr. Hartley also, and others, suppose that, strictly speaking, there will be nothing more *miraculous* in our resurrection to a future life, than there was in our *birth*, to the present; for that, in the circumstances in which the world will be at the general consummation of all things,

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things, these *germs*, as we may call them, may naturally and necessarily revive, according to some fixed, but to us unknown laws of nature.

There have even been unbelievers in revelation, who have seen nothing to object to in this supposition.

"Let us not," says the author of *Man a Machine*, p. 84, "pretend to say that every "machine, or animal, is intirely annihilated "after death, nor that they put on another "form, since we are quite in the dark as to "this point. To affirm an immortal ma-"chine to be a chimera, a fiction of our "brain, appears to be as absurd as it would "seem in caterpillars, when they see the dead "bodies of their kind, bitterly to lament the "fate of their species, which would seem to them "to be utterly destroyed. The soul of these "insects is too narrow and confined to be "able to comprehend the transformation of "their nature. Never did any one of the "acutest amongst them entertain the least "notion that he would become a butterfly. "It is the very same case with us. What "do we know of our future destiny more "than we do of our original?"

I shall close this section with some observations respecting a *term* I made use of when I gave to the public the first hint of the sentiment maintained in this treatise, which was in my edition of *Dr. Hartley's Theory*. It

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was that, according to appearances, *the whole man becomes extinct at death.* This was thought to be rather incautious by ſome of my friends, and my enemies eagerly catched at it, as thinking I had given them a great advantage over me; and yet I ſtill think the term very proper, and that to object to this application betrays an ignorance even of the real meaning of that Engliſh word.

Some of them ſeem to have ſuppoſed that by *the extinction of the whole man*, I mean the abſolute *annihilation* of him, ſo that when a man dies, whatever it was that conſtituted him, *ceaſes to exiſt.* But then I muſt have ſuppoſed that the moment a man is dead, he abſolutely *vaniſhes away*, ſo that his friends can find nothing of him left to carry to the grave. Mr. Hallet, treating of this ſubject, uſes an expreſſion much more nearly approaching to the idea of *annihilation*, when he ſays (ſee p. 30 of this treatiſe) "It looks "as if the whole man *was gone*," and I do not know that the expreſſion was ever objected to.

Nor does the word *extinction*, as it is generally underſtood, imply any ſuch thing as *annihilation.* When we ſay that *a candle is extinguiſhed*, which is uſing the word in its primary and moſt proper ſenſe, we ſurely do not mean that it is annihilated, and therefore that there is nothing left to light again. Even the *particles of light* which it has emitted we only ſuppoſe to be *diſperſed*, and there-

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fore capable of being *collected* again. As, therefore, a candle, though extinguiſhed, is capable of being lighted again, ſo, though a man may be ſaid, figuratively ſpeaking, *to become extinct at death*, and his capacity for thinking ceaſe, it may only be for a time: for no particle of that which ever conſtituted the man is loſt. And, as I obſerved before, whatever is *decompoſed* may certainly be *recompoſed*, by the ſame almighty power that firſt compoſed it, with whatever change in its conſtitution, advantageous or diſadvantageous, he ſhall think proper; and then the powers of thinking, and whatever depended upon them, will return of courſe, and the man will be, in the moſt proper ſenſe, *the ſame being that he was before.*

This is preciſely the apoſtle Paul's idea of *the reſurrection of the dead*, as the only foundation for a future life; and it is to this to which I mean to adhere, excluſive of all the additional vain ſupports which either the *Oriental*, or *Platonic* philoſophy has been thought to afford to this great doctrine of *pure revelation*. I have, however, been repreſented as having, by this view of the ſubject, furniſhed a ſtronger argument againſt revelation than any that infidelity has hitherto diſcovered, and the atheiſts of the age have been deſcribed as *triumphing* in my conceſſions; when, whatever triumph atheiſts may derive from *my* conceſſions, and my writings, the

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very ſame they may derive from the writings of *St. Paul* himſelf, which is certainly much more to their purpoſe.

Farther, though I have been charged with being an abbettor of *atheiſm*, it has been by perſons who have urged againſt my opinion the hackneyed objection that all unbelievers of ancient and modern times have made againſt the doctrine of *any reſurrection*, viz. from the conſideration of the matter that once compoſed the human body entering, afterwards, into the compoſition of plants, animals, &c. not conſidering that this objection equally affects the doctrine of St. Paul, and that of all chriſtians, who maintain what may, by any poſſible conſtruction of the words, be called *a reſurrection of the dead*; which certainly requires that it is ſomething that *dies*, and is put into the grave (and an *immaterial ſoul* is never ſuppoſed to die at all) that muſt *revive*, and *riſe again* out of it.

SECTION XIV.

Of the Origin of the popular Opinions concerning the Soul.

THOUGH *truth* be a thing altogether independent of the *opinions of men*, yet when any erroneous doctrine has prevailed long in the world, and has had a very general ſpread,

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ſpread, we are apt to ſuſpect that it muſt have come from ſome ſufficient authority, unleſs we be able to trace the riſe and progreſs of it, and can aſſign ſome plauſible reaſon for its general reception. On this account I ſhall enter into a pretty large hiſtorical detail concerning the ſyſtem that I have, in this treatiſe, called in queſtion; and I hope to be able to ſhew, that it can by no means boaſt ſo reſpectable an origin as many are willing to aſcribe to it. On the contrary, I hope to make it appear that it has ariſen from nothing but mere ſuperſtition, and the vain imaginations of men, flattering themſelves with a higher origin than they had any proper claim to, though the preciſe date of the ſyſtem may be of too remote antiquity to be aſcertained with abſolute certainty at this day.

The notion of the ſoul of man being a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, has been ſhown, and I hope to ſatisfaction, not to have been known to the writers of the ſcriptures, and eſpecially thoſe of the Old Teſtament. According to the uniform ſyſtem of revelation, all our hopes of a future life are built upon another, and I may ſay an oppoſite foundation, viz. that of the *reſurrection* of ſomething belonging to us that *dies*, and is buried, that is the *body* which is always conſidered as *the man*. This doctrine is manifeſtly ſuperfluous on the idea of the ſoul being a ſubſtance ſo diſtinct from the body as to be unaffected by its death, and able to ſubſiſt, and even to be

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more free and happy, without the body. This opinion, therefore, not having been known to the *Jews*, and being repugnant to the ſcheme of *revelation*, muſt have had its ſource in *heatheniſm*; but with reſpect to the *date* of its appearance, and the *manner of its introduction*, there is room for conjecture and ſpeculation.

As far as we are able to collect any thing concerning the hiſtory of this opinion, it is evidently not the growth of Greece or Rome, but was received by the philoſophers of thoſe countries either from Egypt, or the countries more to the eaſt. The Greeks in general refer it to the Egyptians, but Pauſanias gives it to the Chaldeans, or the Indians. I own, however (though every thing relating to ſo very obſcure a ſubject muſt be in a great meaſure conjectural) that I am inclined to aſcribe it to the Egyptians; thinking, with Mr. Toland, that it might poſſibly have been ſuggeſted by ſome of their known cuſtoms reſpecting the dead, whom they preſerved with great care, and diſpoſed of with a ſolemnity unknown to other nations; though it might have ariſen among them from other cauſes, without the help of thoſe peculiar cuſtoms.

The authority of Herodotus, the oldeſt Greek hiſtorian, and who had himſelf travelled into Egypt, is very expreſs to this purpoſe. He ſays (Ed. Steph. p. 137,) that "the Egyptians were the firſt who maintained that the "ſoul of man is immortal, that when the "body

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"body dies it enters into that of some other "animal, and when it has transmigrated "through all terrestrial, marine and flying "animals, it returns to the body of a man "again. This revolution is completed in "three thousand years." He adds, that "several Greeks, whose names he would not "mention, had published that doctrine as "their own."

Mr. Toland's hypothesis is as follows, and I think I should do wrong to omit the mention of it. My reader may judge of the probability of it for himself. "The funeral rites "of the Egyptians," he says (*Letters to Serena*, p. 45), "and their historical method of "preserving the memory of deserving persons, seems to have been the occasion of "this belief. Their way of burying was by "embalming the dead bodies, which they deposited in a subterranean grotto, where they "continued intire for thousands of years; so "that before any notion of separate or immortal souls, the common language was "that *such a one was under ground*, that *he "was carried over the river Acherusia by "Charon* (the title of the public ferryman for "that purpose) and *laid happily to rest in the "Elysian fields*, which was the common burying place near Memphis."

This hypothesis is rendered more probable by an observation of Cicero's. He says (*Tusculan Questions*, Ed. Glasg. p. 37,) "the bodies "falling to the ground, and being buried there, "it

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" it was imagined that the deceaſed paſſed the " reſt of their life under ground." Among other abſurdities flowing from this notion, he ſays that, though the bodies were buried, they ſtill imagined them to be *apud inferos*; and whereas they could not conceive the mind to exiſt of itſelf, they gave it a form or figure.

I think, however, that the notion of there being ſomething in man diſtinct from his body, and the cauſe of his feeling, thinking, willing, and his other mental operations and affections, might very well occur in thoſe rude ages without ſuch a ſtep as this; though no doubt the cuſtom above mentioned would much contribute to it. Nothing is more common than to obſerve how very ready all illiterate perſons are to aſcribe the cauſe of any difficult appearance to an *inviſible agent*, diſtinct from the ſubject on which the operation is exerted. This led the Jews (after the heathens) to the idea of madmen being poſſeſſed of dæmons, and it is peculiarly remarkable how very ready mankind have always been to aſcribe the unknown cauſe of extraordinary appearances to ſomething to which they can give the name of *ſpirit*, after this term had been once applied in a ſimilar manner. Thus that which ſtruck an animal dead over fermenting liquor was firſt called the *gas*, or *ſpirit of the liquor*, while the fermented liquor itſelf alſo, being poſſeſſed of very active powers, was thought to contain *another kind of ſpirit*; and many times do we hear

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hear ignorant perſons, on ſeeing a remarkable experiment in philoſophy, eſpecially if *air*, or any *inviſible fluid*, be concerned in it, perfectly ſatisfied with ſaying that is the *ſpirit of it*. Now, though the idea of a ſpirit, as a diſtinct ſubſtance from the body, did not perhaps immediately occur in all theſe caſes, their conceptions might afford a foundation for ſuch an hypotheſis.

It would be moſt natural, however, at firſt, to aſcribe the cauſe of thought to ſomething that made a *viſible* difference between a living and a dead man; and *breathing* being the moſt obvious difference of this kind, thoſe powers would be aſcribed to his *breath:* and accordingly we find, that in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin languages, the name of the *ſoul* is the ſame with that of *breath*. From whence we may ſafely infer, that originally it was conſidered as nothing elſe, and hence the cuſtom of receiving the *parting breath* of dying perſons, as if to catch their departing ſouls. And though, to appearance, the breath of a man mixes with the reſt of the air, yet, the nature of air being very little known, it was not at all extraordinary, that it ſhould have been conſidered as not *really* mixing with the atmoſphere, but as aſcending by its levity to the higher regions above the clouds. And men having got this idea, the notion of its having *come down from above the clouds*, where God was ſuppoſed to reſide, would naturally enough follow.

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But living bodies differ from dead ones by their *warmth* as well as by the circumſtance of breathing. Hence might come the idea of the principle of life and thought being a kind of *vital fire*; and as flame always aſcends, men would, of courſe, imagine that the ſoul of man, when ſet looſe from the body, would aſcend to the *region of fire*, which was ſuppoſed to be above the atmoſphere. From theſe leading ideas it could not be difficult for the imagination of ſpeculative men to make out a complete ſyſtem of *pre-exiſtence* and *tranſmigration*; and there being ſo much of *fancy* in it, it is ſtill leſs to be wondered at, that it ſhould have been diverſified ſo much as we find it to have been in different countries, and different ſchools of philoſophy.

Diſeaſes and other evils having their ſeat in the *body*, the *matter* of which it is compoſed might eaſily be conceived to be the ſource of thoſe and all other evils; a diſordered mind being, in many caſes, the evident effect of a diſordered body; and they who were diſpoſed to believe in a benevolent deity, would by this means eaſily make out to themſelves a reaſon for the *origin of evil*, without reflecting any blame upon God on that account. They would aſcribe it to the *untractable nature of matter*.

Laſtly, what could be more natural to account for the ethereal ſoul being confined to ſuch a body or clog, as the ſuppoſition of its being a puniſhment for offences committed in a pre-exiſtent ſtate?

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But the notion of a proper *immaterial being*, without all *extenſion*, or *relation to place*, did not appear till of late years in compariſon; what the ancients meant by an immaterial ſubſtance being nothing more than an *attenuated matter*, like *air*, *ether*, *fire*, or *light*, conſidered as fluids, beyond which their idea of *incorporeity* did not go. Pſellus ſays, that the antient Heathens, both Greeks and other, called only the groſſer bodies, τα παχυλερα των σωματων corporeal. *Le Clerc's Index Philologicus*, MATERIA.

Indeed, the vulgar notion of a *ſoul*, or *ſpirit*, wherever it has been found to exiſt, has been the ſame in all ages; and in this reſpect even the learned of antient times are only to be conſidered as the vulgar. We gather from Homer, that the belief of his time was, that the ghoſt bore the ſhape of, and exactly reſembled, the deceaſed perſon to whom it had belonged, that it wandered upon the earth, near the place where the body lay, till it was buried, at which time it was admitted to the ſhades below. In both theſe ſtates it was poſſeſſed of the intire conſciouſneſs, and retained the friendſhips and enmities of the man. But in the caſe of deified perſons, it was ſuppoſed that, beſides this ghoſt, there was ſomething more ethereal or divine belonging to them, like *another better ſelf*, that aſcended to the upper regions, and was aſſociated with the immortal gods.

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We learn from Offian, that it was the opinion of the times in which he lived, that the ſouls of heroes went immediately after death to the hills of their country, and the ſcenes which they had frequented in the moſt happy times of their lives. It was thought too, that dogs and horſes ſaw the ghoſts of the deceaſed. They alſo imagined that the ghoſts ſhrieked near the place where a death was to happen ſoon after; from which circumſtances, as well as ſeveral others, it is evident that, in their idea, the ſoul was material, ſomething like the ειδωλον of the Greeks. *Fingal*, p. 21, 35.

All the Pagans of the Eaſt, ſays Loubiere, (quoted by Mr. Locke, *Eſſay*, vol. II, p. 162) do truly believe that "there remains ſome-"thing of a man after his death which ſub-"ſiſts independently and ſeparately from his "body. But they give extention and figure "to that which remains, and attribute to it all "the ſame members, all the ſame ſubſtances, "both ſolid and liquid, which your bodies "are compoſed of. They only ſuppoſe that "ſouls are of a matter ſubtle enough to eſcape "being ſeen or handled."

When it had been imagined that the vital and thinking powers of man reſided in a diſtinct principle or ſubſtance, it would be natural to aſcribe ſuch a principle to every thing that had *motion*, and eſpecially a regular motion, and that had any remarkable *influences*, good or bad, particularly to ſuch reſplendent bodies as the *ſun*, *moon*, *ſtars*, and *planets*. Accordingly,

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ingly, we find it to be one of the oldeſt opinions in heathen antiquity, that thoſe heavenly bodies were animated as well as men. This opinion was even held by Origen, and other philoſophizing chriſtians.

Mr. Toland, however, conjectures that another Egyptian cuſtom might facilitate the introduction of this ſyſtem. "Among other "methods," he ſays (*Letters to Serena*, p. 46) "the Egyptians had of perpetuating "events, the ſureſt of all was to impoſe the "names of memorable perſons and things on "the conſtellations, as the only *eternal mo-* "*numents*, not ſubject to the violence of men "or brutes, nor to the injury of time or "weather. This cuſtom was derived from "them to other nations, who changed, in- "deed, the names, but gave new ones to the "ſtars for the ſame end. And the inconſi- "derate vulgar, hearing the learned conſtant- "ly talk of certain perſons, as *in the ſtars*, "believed them at laſt to be really there, and "that all the others were *under ground*." One may add, that this might poſſibly give riſe to the notion of a *twofold ſoul*, one that went under ground, and another that went to the ſtars.

Upon the whole, Mr. Toland's conjecture appears to me not to be deſtitute of probability. How far the Egyptians really carried their notions concerning the ſtate of human ſouls, before or after death, doth not diſtinctly appear, becauſe we have no Egyptian writings.

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writings. But it is probable that their ideas never ripened into such a system as was afterwards found in the East, on account of their empire and civil polity having been too soon overturned, and the country having undergone such a number of revolutions. Accordingly we find that those who introduced as much of this system as was received in Greece did, in general, travel into the East for it.

SECTION XV.

A View of the different Opinions that have been held concerning the DIVINE ESSENCE, *especially with a View to the Doctrine of Immateriality.*

I HAVE considered the doctrine of proper *immateriality* both by the light of nature, and also of the scriptures, without finding any foundation for it in either. I shall now endeavour to trace what have been the notions that men in different ages, and systems of philosophy, have entertained with respect to it; having little doubt but that it will appear, to the satisfaction of all unprejudiced persons, that the strict metaphysical notion of immateriality is really a *modern thing*, being unknown to all the wise ancients, whether heathens or christians; and therefore that the rejection of it ought not to give any alarm to the serious christian. It is no article in his faith

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faith that I am oppugning, but really an *upstart thing*, and a *nonentity*.

I shall begin with an account of opinions concerning the *supreme mind*, the parent and source of all intelligence, and afterwards consider the doctrines relating to the *human soul*. In this historical detail I shall also occasionally mention a few other circumstances, which may serve to shew the derivation of all the philosophical opinions concerning God from the same source.

It will throw considerable light upon this subject, to reflect that it was a maxim with all the ancients, even till the time of the later christian Fathers and schoolmen, though I believe it to be false in itself, that nothing could be made out of nothing. *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* In fact, the idea of *creation*, in the modern sense of the word, never occurred to them; they always meaning by it only a *forming* or *new modelling* of things, and in this sense their maxim was true, for a carpenter must be provided with *wood* before he can make any instrument of wood. The ancients, therefore, in general, supposed that two distinct things, or *principles*, had been from eternity, viz. *matter* and *spirit*, or *God*, and that inferior intelligences could not, in their opinion, be made from nothing, any more than gross bodies, the universal opinion was, that they were *emanations from the supreme mind*. And, as they generally considered the Divine Being as a *fire*, or *light*, they explained the pro-

duction of minds by the lighting of one candle at another, or by some other comparison of the same nature.

Now, since these are ideas that are known to have run through all the systems of the ancients, it is evident, that, in whatever terms they might express themselves, they could not, in reality, consider the Divine Being as strictly speaking, *without extension*, *indivisible*, or *indiscerptible*, which is essential to proper immateriality. In fact, by such terms as *spiritual*, *incorporeal*, &c. as was observed before, they could only mean a more subtle and refined kind of matter, such as air, flame, light, &c. Also wherever the notion of the *absorption of all souls into the Deity*, or soul of the universe, prevailed, it is evident that the soul could not be considered in the light in which modern metaphysicians consider it; and this is known to have been a notion universally prevalent in the East, and in Greece.

The Indian philosophers, says Beausobre (vol. ii. p. 467,) think that the Deity has a luminous body, invisible at present, because it is concealed behind another, either the heavens or the world; but that it will be revealed (i. e. become visible) some time. The Magi and Chaldeans also say that God in his body resembles light, and in his mind *truth*. *Stanley by Le Clerc*, p. 25. But truth is only a *property*, and no *substance* whatever. According to the same author, p. 26, the first production of this great intellectual light or fire, was the υπερκοσμιον φως, the supramundane light,

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which is defined to be *an infinite, incorporeal, and lucid ſpace, the happy ſeat of intellectual natures.* Of this it is not eaſy to form an idea; but it may receive ſome little illuſtration from a notion of the Cabbaliſts, who ſay that all ſpirits were made out of the *holy Ghoſt*, or ſpirit of God, which was made firſt.

The Cabbaliſts, indeed, ſay that all creatures are emanations from the eternal Being, and that the attributes of the Deity being infinite, may produce an infinity of effects. It is extended when this ſubſtance compoſes ſpirits, and contracted when it makes matter (Baſnage, vol. iii. p. 93,) ſo that it is evident they could have no notion of any thing properly immaterial. This doctrine of the Cabbaliſts exiſts in the Eaſt, and probably came from thence.

The divine fire, the Magi ſay, was diſtributed to all creatures, and before all to the *prima mens*, as the oracles of Zoroaſter teach, and then to other eternal and incorporeal natures, in which claſs are included innumerable inferior gods, angels, good demons, and the ſouls of men.

To come to the Greek philoſophy, we find that Pythagoras, after the Magi, ſays that God, in his body, reſembles light, and in his ſoul truth. He is the univerſal ſpirit, that penetrates and diffuſes itſelf through all nature. *Ramſay*, p. 257. Heraclitus defines God to be a ſubtle and ſwift ſubſtance, το λεπτολαλον και το ταχιστον, which permeates and pervades the whole univerſe. *Cudworth*, p. 505.

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This is certainly no proper description of immateriality. Democritus also said that God was of the form of fire, ἐμπυροειδη. *Plutarch De Placitis Philosophorum*, lib. i.

Austin says, that he learned of the philosophers the incorporality of God; but it is not easy, says Beausobre (vol. i. p. 482,) to determine what they meant by the *incorporality of God*. In their language it did not exclude *extension*, or *body* in a philosophical sense. Xenophanes, for example, believed that God was one, and eternal, but by this he only meant that he was not material, organized, and like a man. The ασωματα, or the *incorporal* of the Greeks, he adds, means nothing more than a subtle body, for example like the air, as Origen has shewed in his *Principles*. Among the Latins, Austin imagined that there was a *spiritual matter*, out of which God made souls, ib. which agrees with the notion above mentioned of the Jewish Cabbalists.

As to Plato, the same writer says, "I cannot say precisely what was his idea of the "spirituality of God. The manner in which "he expresses the formation of souls implies "that his *indivisible substance* is not absolutely "without extension. He supposed that God "took of both substances, the divisible and "the indivisible, and, mixing them together, made a third, which is a soul. But "this mixing of two substances, and the "reciprocal action of the one upon the "other, cannot be conceived, if the one "be extended and the other be absolute-

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" ly without extenſion." Ib. p. 482. Beſides, Plato ſpeaks of God as διὰ παντὸν ἰοῦσα pervading all things, and he derives the word δίκαιον, which is applied to God, from διὰ ἰὸν *paſſing through*, which does not ſuggeſt the idea of a proper immaterial being.

God, angels, and dæmons, ſays Porphyry and Jamblichus, are made of matter, but have no relation to what is corporeal. *Encyclopedie*, Article *Immaterialiſm*.

According to Cudworth, p. 19, *Ariſtotle* defines incorporeal ſubſtances very properly, and ſays that God is ſuch a ſubſtance; but if he did not make mind a mere *property*, he could only mean that it was ſomething of a ſubtle nature that eluded our ſenſes.

The opinion of the Stoics concerning God, had nothing of incorporeal in it, but many circumſtances which ſhew it to have been derived from the Oriental philoſophy, as were other particulars of their doctrine. The following account of it is given by the accurate Mrs. Carter.

" The Stoics plainly ſpeak of the world as " God, or of God as the ſoul of the world, " which they call his ſubſtance, and I do not," ſhe ſays, " recollect any proof that they be- " lieved him to exiſt in the extramundane " ſpace. Yet they held the world to be finite " and corruptible, and that, at certain periods, " it was to undergo ſucceſſive conflagrations, " and then all beings were to be reſorbed into " God, and again reproduced by him." *Diſ-*

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ſertation prefixed to her Tranſlation of Epictetus, p. 7.

"They ſometimes define God to be an intelligent fiery ſpirit, without form, but paſſing into whatever things it pleaſes, and aſſimilating itſelf to all; ſometimes an active operative fire. They, moreover, expreſsly ſpeak of God as corporeal, which is objected to them by Plutarch. Indeed, they define all eſſence to be body. Ib. p. 8. They held the eternity of matter, as a paſſive principle, but that was reduced into form by God, and that the world was made, and is continually governed by him. p. 9. They imagined the whole univerſe to be peopled with gods and dæmons, and among other divinities they reckoned the ſun, moon, and ſtars, which they conceived to be animated and intelligent, or inhabited by particular deities, as the body is by the ſoul, who preſided over them, and directed their motions." Ib. p. 10.

The doctrine of the early chriſtian heretics, who are known to have derived their opinions from the Eaſt, may help to throw ſome light upon thoſe ancient tenets, as they may be preſumed to be very nearly the ſame. The Valentinians and Manicheans ſaid that God was an eternal, intelligent, and pure light, without any mixture of darkneſs, as we learn from Beauſobre, vol. i. p. 466. He elſewhere obſerves that this is the language of the Magi, the Cabbaliſts, and many of the Greek philoſophers.

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losophers. Ib. p. 468. It appears by another circumstance, that they did not consider the divine essence as so far incorporeal as to be *invisible*, for they maintained that the luminous substance that was seen by the apostles on the mount of transfiguration was God. Ib. 470. Also, though the Manicheans said that God was indivisible and simple, they supposed that he had real extension, and was even bounded by the regions of darkness, with which the divine essence did not mix. Ib. 503, 513. Austin, while he was a Manichean, thought that God was corporeal, and extended, dispersed through the world; and into infinite space; because, as he observes, he could form no idea of a substance that had neither place nor extension. Ib. 473. From these circumstances we may learn in what sense to understand other philosophers and divines of those early ages, when they speak of the *simplicity*, *spirituality*, and *indivisibility* of the divine essence.

I now proceed to give some account of the opinions of some of the *christian Fathers* on this subject, which, I doubt not, will greatly surprize those of my readers who are not much acquainted with christian antiquity. It is, however, almost wholly taken from that learned and excellent critic Beausobre. The ablest and most orthodox christian Fathers, he says, vol. i. p. 468, always say that God is a *light*, and a *sublime light*, and that all the celestial powers which surround the Deity are

lights of a second order, rays of the first light. This is the general ſtyle of the Fathers before and after the council of Nice. The *word*, they ſay, is a light, that is come into the world, proceeding from the ſelf-exiſtent light, an emanation of *light from light*. p. 469.

The chriſtians, ſays the ſame writer, who were always unanimous with reſpect to the *unity* of God, were by no means ſo with reſpect to his *nature*. The ſcriptures not being explicit on the ſubject, each adopted what he thought the moſt probable opinion, or that of the philoſophical ſchool in which he had been educated. Thus an Epicurean who embraced chriſtianity was inclined to clothe the Deity with a *human form*, a Platoniſt ſaid that God was *incorporeal*, and a Pythagorean that he was an *intelligent light*, or *fire*. Another imagined that the eſſence of God was corporeal, but ſubtle, and etherial, penetrating all bodies. Another, with Ariſtotle, that it had nothing in it of the elements that compoſed this world, but believed it to be of a *fifth nature*.

"In general," ſays my author, p. 474, "the idea of a ſubſtance abſolutely *incorporeal* "was not a common idea with chriſtians at "the beginning. When I, he adds, conſider "with what confidence Tertullian, who "thought that God was corporeal, and *figured*, "ſpeaks of his opinion, it makes me ſuſpect "that it muſt have been the general opinion "of the Latin church. Who can deny, ſays "he, that God is a body, though he is a ſpi-

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"rit? Every ſpirit is a body, and has a *form* "proper to it. Melito, ſo much boaſted of for "his virtues and knowledge, compoſed a trea-"tiſe to prove that God is corporeal." p. 474.

The incorporality of the Fathers, p. 472, did not exclude *viſibility*, nor in conſequence all ſorts of corporality. For there would be a manifeſt contradiction in ſaying that corporeal eyes can ſee a being that has abſolutely no extenſion. Thoſe biſhops alſo, who compoſed the council of Conſtantinople, which decreed that there is an emanation from the divine eſſence of an *uncreated light*, which is, as it were, his garment, and which appeared at the transfiguration of Chriſt, muſt have believed God to have been a luminous ſubſtance; for it is impoſſible that a viſible, and conſequently a corporeal light, ſhould be an emanation from a pure ſpirit. p. 472.

On the mention of this ſubject, it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that there was a famous diſpute among the Greeks of the fourteenth century, whether the light which ſurrounded Chriſt at his transfiguration was created or uncreated. Gregorius Palamas, a famous monk of mount Athos, maintained that it was uncreated, and Barlaam maintained the contrary opinion. It was objected to Palamas, that an uncreated light could not be ſeen by mortal eyes. But Leo Allatius attempted to remove this difficulty, by ſaying that if mortal eyes were fortified by a divine virtue, they might ſee the Deity himſelf. p. 470.

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When, continues my author, p. 476, I conſider the manner in which the Greek Fathers explain the *incarnation of Chriſt*, I cannot help concluding that they thought the divine nature corporeal. The incarnation, ſay they, is a perfect mixture of the two natures, the ſpiritual and ſubtle nature penetrates the material and corporeal nature, till it is diſperſed through the whole of that nature, and mixed entirely with it, ſo that there is no place in the material nature that is void of the ſpiritual nature. p. 476.

Clemens of Alexandria ſays, in ſo many words, that *God is corporeal. Encyclopedie*, Article *Immaterialiſm*. Juſtin ſays, All ſubſtance, which, on account of its tenuity, cannot be ſubject to any other, has nevertheleſs a *body*, which conſtitutes its eſſence. If we call God *incorporeal*, it is not that he is ſo in reality, but to ſpeak of him in the moſt reſpectable manner. It is becauſe the eſſence of God cannot be perceived, and that we are not ſenſible of it, that we call it incorporeal. Ib.

Tertullian believed God to be a body, becauſe he thought that what was not a body was *nothing*. He ſays, when we endeavour to form an idea of the divinity, we cannot conceive of it but as a very pure *luminous air*, diffuſed every where. *Beauſobre*, p. 477. Origen obſerved that the word *incorporeal* is not in the Bible. p. 484; and Jerom reproached him with making God corporeal. Maximus did not believe the *immenſity* of the divine

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divine ſubſtance, nor could any of thoſe who thought him corporeal; becauſe it was a maxim with them, that two ſubſtances could not be in the ſame place at the ſame time. p. 475. Auſtin ſays that God is a *ſpiritual light*, and that this light is no other than *truth*. Is truth nothing, ſays he, becauſe it is not diffuſed through ſpace, finite or infinite. p. 481. This is the very language of the Magi.

Thoſe paſſages of ſcripture which ſpeak of God as a *ſpirit*, were ſo far from deciding this controverſy in favour of the immateriality of the divine eſſence, that thoſe chriſtians who believed God to be corporeal alledged, in favour of their opinion, that very expreſſion of our Saviour, that *God is a ſpirit*. Can you, ſays Gregory Nazianzen, conceive of a ſpirit without conceiving *motion*, and *diffuſion*, properties which agree only to body. Origen ſays that every ſpirit, according to the proper and ſimple notion of the word, ſignifies a body. This is confirmed by Chalcidius. The idea of a ſpirit, according to the ancients, was nothing but an inviſible, living, thinking, free, and immortal being, which has within itſelf the principle of its actions and motions. p. 485.

If the modern metaphyſician be ſhocked at what he has heard already, what will he ſay of the *Anthropomorphites*, who maintained that God had even a human form? and yet Beauſobre ſays, p. 502, that this error is ſo ancient,

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ancient, that it is hardly poſſible to find the origin of it. They ſuppoſed that God had a body, ſubtle like light, but with organs exactly like the human body, not for *neceſſity* but for *ornament*, believing it to be the moſt excellent of all forms. This opinion muſt have been very common in the Eaſt. The contrary opinion was even conſidered as hereſy, becauſe it was the opinion of Simon Magus. Melito, biſhop of Sardis, wrote in favour of this opinion, and though it was combated by Novatian in the Weſt, and by Origen in the Eaſt, it ſtill kept its ground in the church. The monks, who ſoon became very powerful, undertook its defence, and almoſt all the anchorites of Nitria were ſo attached to it, that, on this account, they raiſed violent ſeditions againſt their patriarch Theophilus, and exclaimed againſt the memory and writings of Origen. p. 502.

They who did not believe the immenſity of God, believed, nevertheleſs, his *infinity*, becauſe he knows all things, and acts every where. There is but one true God, ſays the author of the Clementine Homilies. He is adorned with the moſt *excellent form*; he preſides over all beings, celeſtial and terreſtrial, and conducts all events. He is in the world, as the heart is in the man; and from him, as from a center, there is continually diffuſed a vivifying and incorporeal virtue, which animates and ſupports all things. p. 507.

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As we come nearer to the preſent time, we ſhall find that the metaphyſical turn of thoſe who are uſually called *ſchoolmen*, refined upon the notions of the early Fathers, as will appear more diſtinctly when I recite their opinions concerning the human ſoul; but ſtill ſome of the properties of matter were aſcribed to ſpirits even till very near our times. It is ſomething remarkable, however, that we find in the works of Gregory the Great, who flouriſhed in the ſixth century, expreſſions more nearly approaching to the modern language than any that were generally uſed long after his time. The only queſtion is whether he had preciſely the ſame ideas to his words.

He ſays that God penetrates every thing without extenuation, and ſurrounds every thing with extenſion; he is *ſuperior et inferior ſine loco, amplior ſine latitudine, ſubtilior ſine extenuatione.* Speaking of Satan going out from the preſence of God, he ſays, how can he go from him who *per molem corporis nuſquam eſt, ſed per incircumſcriptam ſubſtantiam nuſquam deeſt?* Opera, p. 6. H. I.

Damaſcenus, who wrote in the eighth century, ſays that God is not *in loco*, for he is a place to himſelf, filling all things, and himſelf embracing *(complectens)* all things; for he, without any mixture, pervades all things, *omnia permeat.* Opera, p. 281.

Photius, in the ninth century, ſays that God is not in the world as created beings are, but in a more ſublime manner; that he is in every thing,

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thing, and above all things; that he is in all things by his operation, but that his *act* being his *ſubſtance*, one may truly ſay he is, both in act and ſubſtance, every where. Dupin, vol. vii. p. 109.

Gautier of Mauritania, in the twelfth century, maintained againſt Thierry, that God is omnipreſent by his eſſence, as well as by his power. Ib. vol. x. p. 173.

T. Aquinas, alſo, and the other ſchoolmen, ſay that God is every where by his *eſſence*, as well as his *power*. Summa, p. 281, He ſays farther, that God is a *pure act*, *purus actus*, p. 7, that he is in all places and all things, not excluding other things, but as *containing them*, not contained by them: and as the whole ſoul is in every part of the body, ſo the whole Deity is in all, and every thing. *Deus totus eſt in omnibus et ſingulis.* p. 7, 16. If they had any ideas to this language, which indeed is not eaſy to ſuppoſe, they muſt have conſidered the divine eſſence as not deſtitute of extenſion, and in this ſtate the opinion continued till the reformation.

Crellius, giving a ſummary view of what was generally aſſerted concerning God, mentions the following poſitions, which he juſtly conſiders as contradictory; that God is infinite (with reſpect to immenſity) and yet wholly contained in the ſmalleſt particle of duſt, or point of ſpace; that he ſo exiſts in any whole body, that there is no part of the body that is not full of God, nor, on the other

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other hand, is there any part of the divine essence that is not in the body. De Deo, cap. 27.

Bayle says that, till Descartes, all doctors, divines and philosophers gave extension to spirit, an infinite one to God, and a finite one to angels and rational souls. He and his followers, say the writers of the *Encyclopedie* (Article *Immensité*) first denied that God was present any where by his *substance*, but only by his *knowledge* and *power*, having *no relation to place*; that otherwise he would be extended and corporeal, for he made extension to be a proper definition of matter.

Beausobre, indeed, says, vol. i. p. 482, that philosophers before Descartes made the extension of spirits not to be material, nor composed of parts, and that spirits are, with respect to the place that they occupy, *toti in toto*, et *toti in singulis partibus*. The Cartesians, says he, have overturned all these opinions; maintaining that spirits have no extension, nor local presence. But he adds this system is rejected as absurd. It has appeared, however, that *local presence* was not admitted by all the writers here referred to.

Some very respectable writers, since Descartes, have rejected his metaphysical notions. Thus Beza, in answer to Marnix, who maintained that the divine omnipresence respected his *power* and *majesty* only, asserted his *proper* and *substantial immensity*. Beausobre, vol. i. p. 507.

We

We ſhall the leſs wonder at Deſcartes's metaphyſical refinements with reſpect to the divine *eſſence* and *preſence*, when we conſider the manner in which he proved the *being* of God. He diſcovered within himſelf the idea of an eternal, infinite, and all-perfect being. But every idea having an archetype, this muſt have one; and *exiſtence* being a perfection, this perfect being, or God, muſt actually and neceſſarily exiſt.

SECTION XVI.

An Account of the different Opinions that have been maintained concerning the SOUL.

THE ſtate of opinions relating to the *divine eſſence* is a ſufficient guide to us with reſpect to the doctrine concerning the *human ſoul*, and other finite intelligences, as they neceſſarily correſpond to one another. But for this reaſon, in order to gain intire ſatisfaction with reſpect to either ſubject, we muſt examine them both ſeparately. I ſhall, therefore, in this ſection, go over the ſame ground as in the laſt, in order to ſelect what has been advanced concerning the *human ſoul*, as diſtinct from the Divine Being. And this will be the more uſeful, as it will, at the ſame time, ſhew the derivation of the philoſophical doctrine on this ſubject in the Weſtern part of the world, from the Oriental ſyſtem. So that in the

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the more ancient times, there was no material difference of opinion with respect to it. And the many wild opinions that have been entertained in later times will be an instructive warning to us, of the consequence of departing from the dictates of *revelation*; which are indeed those of the soundest *philosophy*, and of *common sense*.

PART. I.

The Opinions of the HEATHENS *and* JEWS.

THE opinion of the ancient *Persians* concerning the soul is clearly enough expressed in the following verse from the *Oracles of Zoroaster*, whether they be genuine or not.

Εισι ψαντα πυρος ενος εκγεγαωτα. L. 29.

They are all produced from one fire. Souls were, therefore, of the nature of *fire*. We find, however, in later times, several distinctions with respect to the soul in the Eastern part of the world; and these also were copied, with some variation, by the Greeks and christians. The hypothesis of *two souls*, one of a celestial substance, or the rational soul, and the other material, the seat of the passions, was very generally received. It was, says *Beausobre* (vol. ii. p. 420.) that of the Magi, the Chaldeans, and Egyptians;

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and Pythagoras and Plato had it from them. It was alſo an old opinion in the Barbaric philoſophy, that man derives his body from the earth, his ſoul, ψυχη, from the moon, and his ſpirit, πνευμα, from the ſun; and that after death each of them returns to its proper origin. ib. vol. i. p, 309. We find, alſo, ſome difference of opinion with reſpect to the place where the ſouls were diſpoſed of after death. The Chaldeans thought that the place of departed ſpirits was *above the world*, but the Greeks thought it was *below*. *Stanley by Le Clerc*, p. 175.

We have no very ſatisfactory account of the philoſophy of the *Chineſe*. It appears, however, that Confuſius believed no future ſtate of rewards and puniſhments. Being aſked what angels or ſpirits are, he anſwered they are *air*, and this ſays Leland (*Neceſſity of Revelation*, vol. ii. p. 295,) is the notion that the Chineſe have of the ſoul. They look upon it to be a material thing, though highly rarefied.

When we come to the *Greek philoſophy*, we find a conſiderable variety of opinions with reſpect to the eſſence of the ſoul; but all of them, who believed that there was properly any ſuch thing as a ſoul, held the opinion of its being an *emanation from the Divine Being*. Cudworth ſays, p. 38, 39, that all the ancients who aſſerted the ſoul's immortality, held that it was not generated, or made out of nothing; for that then it might return to nothing, and

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therefore they commonly began with proving its pre-exiſtence, proceeding from thence to prove its permanency after death. And Cicero ſays that it was a principle univerſally acknowledged, that whatever is born, and has a beginning, muſt alſo have an end.

Dicæarchus, ſays Cicero (*Tuſc. Que*, p. 64, Ed. Glaſg.) wrote three books to prove that the minds of men are mortal; but in another place he ſays, that he maintained that there was *no ſoul*. Ariſtoxenus ſaid that the ſoul was *harmony*, and Xenocrates that it was *number*. ib. p. 26, 27. And according to him, ib. p. 38, Pherecydes Syrius was the firſt that taught that the minds of men are *ſempiternos*, eternal, in which he was followed by his diſciple Pythagoras. Pherecydes had that opinion from the Eaſt.

Thales (ſays Cicero, in his *Book of Conſolation*) ſays that Apollo himſelf declared that the ſoul is a *part of a divine ſubſtance*, and that it returns to heaven as ſoon as it is diſengaged from this mortal body. All the philoſophers of the Italic ſchool were of this ſentiment. It was their conſtant doctrine, that ſouls deſcend from heaven, and that they are not only the works of the Divinity, but a participation of his eſſence. Ramſay, p. 271. According to Diogenes Laertius, Thales maintained that the ſoul is immortal, becauſe that from which it is taken [αποσπασθαι] is immortal. *Gali's Philoſophia Generalis*, p. 178. Euripides alſo, (according to Cicero, *Tuſc. Queſt.*

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p. 56) held that the mind was God, and that if God be either *anima*, or *fire*, the ſame muſt be the mind of man; or if it be a *fifth ſubſtance*, of which Ariſtotle ſpeaks, it muſt be the ſame both with reſpect to God and the ſoul.

It is the doctrine of Plato concerning the ſoul that makes the greateſt figure of thoſe of the Greek philoſophers, and that which the chriſtians have made the moſt uſe of. I ſhall, therefore, give a fuller detail concerning it. He diſtinguiſhed *three ſorts of ſouls*, differing in purity and perfection, the *univerſal ſoul*, thoſe of the *ſtars*, and thoſe of *men*. Beauſobre, vol. ii, p. 362. Of thoſe he diſtinguiſhed two parts, the ſuperior, which was an emanation from the Deity himſelf, and the inferior, which derived its origin from the more ſpiritual part of matter. Ib. vol. i, p. 379, 559. But according to Cicero, (*Tuſc. Queſt.* p. 27) Plato ſuppoſed the ſoul to be *threefold*, and placed reaſon in the *head*, anger in the *breaſt*, and deſire *ſubter præcordia*.

Plato's account of the cauſe of the *deſcent of the ſoul* has ſomething peculiar in it, but which was not unknown in ſome of the Oriental ſyſtems. Others ſuppoſed that they were condemned to a confinement in theſe bodies for offences committed in a pre-exiſtent ſtate; whereas he repreſents their *deſire of theſe mortal bodies* to have been their original ſin. He ſuppoſed, ſays Beauſobre, vol. ii, p. 332, that ſouls were touched with a ſecret deſire to unite themſelves to bodies, and that this *terreſtrial thought* was a

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weight which dragged them to this lower world. The Eſſenes, he ſays, had the ſame opinion. The following is his poetical account of it from Ramſay, p. 288. "Plato "ſays that every ſoul that follows faithfully "the ſublime law remains pure, and without "ſpot; but if it content itſelf with nectar "and ambroſia, without following the cha-"riot of Jupiter, to go and contemplate truth, "it grows heavy, its wings are broken, it "falls upon the earth, and enters into a hu-"man body, more or leſs baſe according as it "has been more or leſs elevated; and that it "is only after ten thouſand years that theſe "ſouls are re-united to their principle, their "wings not growing, and being renewed in "leſs time."

According to the Platonic philoſophy, there muſt be ſomething very corporeal in the compoſition of the ſouls of the wicked. Socrates, in the Phædo, ſays that the ſouls of thoſe who minded the body, and its appetites and pleaſures, having ſomething in them ponderous and earthy, muſt, after their departure out of the body, be drawn down to the earth, and hover about the ſepulchres, till they enter again into bodies ſuited to their former nature. But that they who live holy and excellent lives, being freed from thoſe earthly places, as from priſons, aſcend to a pure region above the earth, where they dwell; and thoſe of them who were ſufficiently purged by philoſophy live all their time without the

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body, and aſcend to ſtill more beautiful habitations. *Leland*, vol. ii, p. 307. In his tenth book *of Laws*, he ſays, that thoſe who have been guilty of ſmaller ſins, do not ſink ſo deep as others, but wander about near the ſurface of the region; whereas they that have ſinned more frequently, and more heinouſly, fall into the depth, and into thoſe lower places which are called *Hades*. ib. p. 313.

It is generally acknowledged that there is great uncertainty with reſpect to the opinion of *Ariſtotle* on this ſubject. It is probable that he was ſometimes inclined to the opinion of man having no ſoul diſtinct from the body; as when he ſays, according to Plutarch, that ſleep is common to the ſoul as well as the body. But when he ſpeaks of the ſoul as a ſubſtance diſtinct from the four elements, and makes it to be *a fifth kind of ſubſtance*, it ſhould ſeem that he meant to declare himſelf to be of the opinion of thoſe who held the ſoul to be of divine origin, and to be eternal. Cudworth ſays that it muſt needs be left doubtful whether he acknowledged any thing immortal in us or not. p. 55.

Cicero, when he ſpeaks as a philoſopher, ſeems to adopt the ſentiments of Plato with reſpect to the ſoul. He ſays, *Humanus animus, decerptus ex mente divina, cum nullo alio niſi cum deo ipſo (ſi hoc fas ſit dictu) comparari poteſt.* Leland, vol. ii, p. 326.

"In all the firſt book of Tuſculan Queſti-
" ons," ſays Mr. Locke (*Eſſay*, vol. ii, p. 160)

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160) "where he lays out so much of his reading and reason, there is not one syllable "shewing the least thought that the soul was "an immaterial substance, but many things "directly to the contrary—That which he "seems most to incline to was, that the soul "was not at all *elementary*, but was of the "same substance with the heavens, which "Aristotle, to distinguish it from the four "elements, and the changeable bodies here "below, which he supposes made up of them, "called *Quinta Essentia*. In all which there "is nothing of immateriality, but quite the "contrary."

He adds farther, that "the expressions "which drop from him, in several parts of "the book, evidently shew that his thoughts "went not at all beyond matter. For example, that the souls of excellent men and "women ascended into heaven, of others "that they remained here on earth: that the "soul is hot, and warms the body: that, as "it leaves the body, it penetrates, and divides, "and breaks through our thick cloudy moist "air: that it stops in the region of fire, and "ascends no farther, the equality of warmth "and weight making that its proper place, "where it is nourished, and sustained with "the same things wherewith the stars are "nourished and sustained; and that by the "conveniency of its neighbourhood it shall "there have a clearer view, and fuller know-"ledge, of the heavenly bodies; that the

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" ſoul alſo, from this height, ſhall have a " pleaſant and fairer proſpect of the globe of " the earth, the diſpoſition of whoſe parts " will then lie before it in one view: that it " is hard to determine what conformation, " ſize, and place, the ſoul has in the body: " that it is too ſubtle to be ſeen: that it is in " the human body as in a houſe, or a veſſel, " or a receptacle. All which are expreſſions " that ſufficiently indicate that he had not in " his mind ſeparated materiality from the idea " of the ſoul." To theſe remarks of Mr. Locke, I will add that, had any ſuch opinion as that of an *immaterial principle*, in the modern ſenſe of the word, been known in the time of Cicero, who has collected and diſcuſſed all the opinions of the Greek philoſophers on that, as well as on almoſt every other queſtion of importance, it would certainly have been found in his writings.

It is much doubted, however, whether, in reality, Cicero did not give into the Epicurean and atheiſtical notions of his time; ſince he expreſſes himſelf very much to that purpoſe in his private letters; and it is remarkable that Cæſar, ſpeaking in open ſenate, conſiders all the accounts of what became of men after death as entirely fabulous, and in ſuch a manner as if he well knew he ſpoke the ſentiments of all his hearers.

The *Stoics* ſometimes adopted the common philoſophical doctrine, and ſometimes departed from it; but upon the whole they may be ranked

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ranked with thoſe who adopted the principles of the Oriental ſyſtem on this ſubject, as well as on ſeveral others. Mrs. Carter ſays, "they "held both ſuperior intelligences, and like-"wiſe the ſouls of men to be a portion of the "eſſence of God, or parts of the ſoul of the "world, and alſo to be corporeal and periſh-"able. Some of them, indeed, maintained "that human ſouls ſubſiſted after death, but "they were, like all other beings, to be con-"ſumed at the conflagration. Cleanthes "taught that all ſouls laſted till that time; "Chryſippus only thoſe of the good. Se-"neca is perpetually wavering, ſometimes "ſpeaking of the ſoul as immortal, and at "others as periſhing with the body; and in-"deed," ſhe ſays, "there is nothing but con-"fuſion, and a melancholy uncertainty to be "met with in the Stoics on this ſubject." p. 11.

"M. Antoninus, on the ſuppoſition that "ſouls continue after death, makes them to "remain for ſome time in the air, and then "to be changed, diffuſed, kindled, and re-"ſumed into the productive intelligence of "the univerſe. But in another place he vin-"dicates the conduct of providence on the "hypotheſis that the ſouls of good men are "extinguiſhed by death." p. 12. "In ge-"neral, however, he holds the language of "other philoſophers on this ſubject, call-"ing the ſoul, νους, μιλοχος θειας απομοιρας, and "απρροια, and απεσπασμα τυ διος. See Suicer.

"Thus

" Thus alſo Seneca, *Dei pars eſt*; and Ma-
" nilius, *Pars ipſe deorum eſt.*" "Nothing,"
ſays Mrs. Carter, p. 17, " can excuſe their
" idolatry of human nature (on this ſuppoſi-
" tion) which they proudly and inconſiſtent-
" ly ſuppoſed to be perfect and ſelf-ſufficient.
" Seneca carries the matter ſo far as, by an
" implied antitheſis, to give his wiſe man the
" ſuperiority to God. Even Epictetus ſome-
" times informs his readers that they are not
" inferior to the gods."

Galen declares he was quite ignorant of the nature of the ſoul, but that he much ſuſpected that it was corporeal. Leland, vol. ii, p. 281.

Hitherto we have certainly found nothing like a proper *immaterial ſoul*, as it is deſcribed by modern metaphyſicians; and it is remarkable that when we come to the opinions of the *chriſtian Fathers*, we find that, inſtead of their ideas being more ſpiritualized on this ſubject, they were conſiderably more groſs than thoſe of many of the heathens, as we have ſeen to have been the caſe with reſpect to their opinions concerning the divine eſſence. But before I recite their opinions, I ſhall take ſome notice of thoſe of the Jews.

Preſently after the time of our Saviour, and not much, I imagine, before, the more ſpeculative of the Phariſees began to adopt the doctrine of the heathens concerning the ſoul, as a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body. If we judge by the hiſtory of the goſpel, we cannot

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cannot but conclude that this was not then the common belief. At leaſt Martha, the ſiſter of Lazarus, does not appear to have known any thing of it; nor does it appear from that part of the hiſtory, that even the Phariſees in general had adopted it. And though it be ſaid of the Sadducees, ſo late as the year A. D. 60, as diſtinguiſhed from the Phariſees, Acts xxxiii. 8, that *they ſay there is no reſurrection, neither angel, nor ſpirit*, it is not certain that by ſpirit (πνευμα) in this place is meant the ſoul of a man, eſpecially as it is ſaid of the Phariſees that they confeſs *both*, τα αμφοτερα, as if there had been in fact but *two articles* mentioned before.

Nor is it quite certain that even the opinions of the Phariſees in general, in the time of Joſephus, were quite ſo conformable to the notions of the Greeks as he has repreſented them. That himſelf, Philo, and others, had adopted that ſyſtem is evident enough; but the diſpoſition of Joſephus to accommodate his hiſtory to the taſte of his readers, and his deſire to recommend his nation and religion to his maſters, are well known.

There can be no doubt, however, but that after the age of Joſephus the philoſophizing Jews went into all the depths of Oriental myſticiſm. Philo Judæus calls the human ſoul, αποσπασμα, or απαυγασμα, from the Deity. *Gale's Philoſophia Generalis*, p. 370. The Cabbaliſts, as I mentioned before, ſuppoſed that ſpirits are made not from nothing, but from

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from the Holy Ghoſt: and that ſpirits produce ſpirits, as ideas produce ideas. Beauſobre, vol. i, p. 588, 590. They alſo thought that the ſoul, being an emanation from the Deity, had the power of multiplying itſelf without end, becauſe every part of the Deity is infinite; ſo that they believed that all ſouls were contained in that of Adam, and ſinned with him. ib. vol. ii, p. 288. Like the Greeks, the Jews in general, in the time of Joſephus, thought that the place of departed ſouls was under the earth.

PART. II.

The Opinions of the CHRISTIAN FATHERS *to the ſixth Century.*

WE find nothing ſaid by any chriſtian writer concerning the ſoul before Juſtin Martyr, who had been a Platonic philoſopher, and who, uſing their language, ſpeaks of ſouls as emanations from the Deity. Beauſobre, vol. ii, p. 350.

But as this doctrine of the high *deſcent of the ſoul* has not the leaſt countenance in the ſcriptures, we ſoon find that it did not meet with a hearty reception among chriſtians, and that it was abandoned by all who were not peculiarly addicted to philoſophy. Irenæus expreſsly denied the tranſmigration of ſouls; he believed that they were immortal only through

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through grace, and maintained that thoſe of the wicked ſhall ceaſe to be after they ſhall have been tormented a long time. *Dupin*, vol. i, p. 60.

After this time we find that the doctrine of a direct *materialiſm* crept into the chriſtian church, and it is not eaſy to ſay from what ſource it came. Poſſibly, however, thoſe who uſed this language did not, at firſt, at leaſt, differ from other philoſophers; but conſidering what their ideas of *ſpirit* really were, thought (and it was certainly with reaſon) that the term *body* was more juſtly applicable to it.

The moſt determined materialiſt in chriſtian antiquity is Tertullian, who wrote his treatiſe *De Anima*, on purpoſe to explode the philoſophical opinion of the *deſcent of the ſoul from heaven*. He maintained that the ſoul is formed at the ſame time with the body, and that as the body produces a body, ſo the ſoul produces a ſoul. *Dupin*, vol. i., p. 79.

To what, ſays Tertullian, did Chriſt, when he died, deſcend? To the ſouls, I preſume, of the patriarchs; but why, if there be no ſouls under the earth? *If it be not a body, it is nothing*. Incorporality is free from all confinement, from pain or pleaſure. Alſo all the inſtruments of its pain or pleaſure muſt be body. *Opera*, p. 268. The ſoul of Adam, he ſays, p. 284, came from the breath of God. But what is the breath of God but *vapor, ſpiritus?*

Arnobius,

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Arnobius, in oppoſition to the philoſophers, maintained that it was human vanity that gave the ſoul a deſcent from heaven, that it is corporeal and mortal in its own nature; that the ſouls of the righteous obtain immortality by the divine ſpirit which Jeſus Chriſt unites to them; but that thoſe of the wicked are to be conſumed by fire, and will be annihilated after long torments. *Beauſobre*, vol. ii, p. 413.

This writer argues much at large, that the ſoul is wholly incapable of ſenſation or reflection without the body. After ſuppoſing the caſe of a child cut off from all communication with the world, and barely fed, in a hole, without light, he concludes that he would be deſtitute of all knowledge, except of the very few ideas that he would neceſſarily acquire by his ſenſes in that confined ſituation. And he concludes with ſaying, Where, then, is that immortal portion of divinity; where is that ſoul, which enters into the body, ſo learned and intelligent, and which with the help of inſtruction only recollects its former knowledge? *Opera*, p. 34.

Origen ſays it was not determined by the church whether a ſoul was produced by another ſoul, whether it be eternal, or created for a certain time; whether it animates the body, or is only confined in it. But himſelf, being a Platoniſt, held that ſouls had been *from eternity*, that they are ſent into bodies as into a priſon, for a puniſhment of their ſins. Dupin,

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vol. i, p. 110. Of courſe he believed the tranſmigration of ſouls. Beauſobre, vol. ii, p. 452. So alſo did the Cabbaliſts. The Jews, however, limited the tranſmigrations to three, which they ſeem to have taken from Plato, who admitted no ſouls into heaven but thoſe which had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by the practice of virtue in three incorporations. ib. p. 495. The Manicheans allowed five tranſmigrations; but the ſouls of the *elect*, they ſaid, went immediately into heaven. p. 499.

Among the later Fathers, we find three opinions relating to the origin of the ſoul. Firſt, that ſouls were created when the body was ready to receive them. ib. p. 353; another that they came from God, and are incloſed in the male ſeed; another that the firſt ſoul, viz. that of Adam, was made of nothing, and that all the reſt came from this by ordinary generation. It was to this opinion that Auſtin inclined. ib. p. 354.

He was, however, far from being determined in his opinion on this ſubject, and ſometimes expreſſes himſelf in ſuch a manner as if he thought the ſoul to be no *ſubſtance*, but only a *property*. He ſaid that the ſoul has no *corporeal dimenſions*, but that *reaſon* and the *ſoul* are one. Dupin, vol. iii, p. 131. He expreſsly denied, however, that the ſoul is any *part of God*, p. 161, and ſays that God's breathing upon Adam either was his ſoul, or that which produced it; but he does not determine

termine whether ſouls are *created daily*, or not.

Before his time Gregory Nyſſenus held that ſouls are formed at the ſame moment with the body; and he firſt, I believe, made uſe of an expreſſion which was long retained in the chriſtian ſchools, and was the ſource of much metaphyſical ſubtlety, viz. that *the ſoul is equally in all parts of the body*. Dupin, vol. ii, p. 277. It was afterwards added more diſtinctly, that *the whole ſoul* is in every part of the body.

The opinion of the immateriality of the ſoul does not ſeem to have tended to a ſettlement before the fifth century, when the queſtion ſeems at length to have been, in a manner, decided by Claudianus Mamertus, a prieſt of the church of Vienne, whoſe opinions, and manner of treating the ſubject, are much commended by Dupin.

In this century Æneas Gazœus had maintained that ſouls are ſenſible of nothing without the body. Dupin, vol. iv, p. 187. Gennadius had advanced that God only is incorporeal, ib. p. 185, and Fauſtus Regienſis had ſupported the ſame opinion more largely, alledging the authority of Jerom and Caſſianus, and urging that the ſoul is incloſed in the body, that it is in heaven or hell, and conſequently *in ſome place*, and that if it was not in place it would be *every where*, which is true of God only.

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It is to this writer that Mamertus replies. But notwithſtanding the exceſſive applauſe he has met with, it will be ſeen that his ideas on the ſubject would not be entirely approved by the more acute metaphyſicians of the preſent age. In his reply to Fauſtus, he ſays, That every thing that is incorporeal is not uncreated, that the volitions of the ſoul have their *effect* in place, but are not *made* in place; that it has neither length, breadth, nor height, that it is not moved upwards or downwards, or in a circle; that it has neither inward nor outward parts; that it thinks, perceives, and imagines, in *all its ſubſtance*; that we may ſpeak of the *quality* of the ſoul, but no man knows how to expreſs the *quantity* of it. It is neither *extended*, nor *in place*. Dupin, vol. iv, p. 151.

In ſome of his expreſſions we find the peculiar opinions of Deſcartes. For he ſays the ſoul is not different from the *thoughts*, that the ſoul is never without thought, for it is *all thought*; and that heaven and hell are not different *places*, but different *conditions*. ib. p. 152.

But I queſtion whether any modern metaphyſician will think him ſufficiently accurate, or indeed, conſiſtent, in ſaying that the ſoul is the *life of the body*, that this life is equally in all and in every part of the body, and that therefore the ſoul is in no place. ib. 153. It ſeems to have been this confounding of the *ſoul* and the *life*, which is only a *property*, and not a *ſubſtance*, that gave riſe to the

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palpable abſurdities of all the ſchoolmen, who maintained that there was *a whole ſoul in every part of the body*, and yet that one man had but one ſoul. And analogous to this is their other paradox concerning God, viz. that he is completely in every poſſible place.

Mamertus's book is dedicated to Sidonius Apollinaris, who, in return, prefers him to all the writers of his time, as the moſt able philoſopher, and the moſt learned man that was then among chriſtians. As the compliment he pays him is a very ſingular one, I ſhall, for the entertainment of my readers, inſert it in the note *.

PART III.

The State of Opinions from the Sixth Century to the Time of Deſcartes.

THAT we may have a clearer idea of the ſtate of opinions concerning the ſoul in what are generally called the *dark ages*, I ſhall note thoſe of the moſt conſiderable writers that have fallen into my hands.

Caſſiodorus, who flouriſhed in the beginning of the ſixth century, in his treatiſe *De Anima*, in which he profeſſes to bring into

* He ſays that he was an abſolute maſter of all the ſciences, that the purity of his language equalled or ſurpaſſed Terence's, Varro's, Pliny's, &c. that he knew how to uſe

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into one view what was moſt approved, and beſt eſtabliſhed on the ſubject, maintains that the ſoul has neither length, breadth, nor thickneſs, that the whole ſoul is in all its parts (faculties) and that it is of a *fiery nature*. He inclines to the opinion of the *derivation of ſouls from ſouls*, becauſe he could not otherwiſe account for the ſouls of infants being contaminated with original ſin. *Opera*, p. 429.

Gregory the Great, in the ſixth century, ſays (*Opera*, vol. ii. p. 209) that the queſtion concerning the *origin of the ſoul* was much agitated among the Fathers; ſome maintaining

uſe the terms of logic eloquently; that his ſhort and conciſe way of writing contained the moſt deep learning in a few ſentences, and he expreſſed the greateſt truths in a few words; that his ſtyle was not ſwelled with empty hyperboles, and did not degenerate into a contemptible flatneſs. In fine, he ſcruples not to compare him with the moſt eminent philoſophers, the moſt eloquent orators, and the moſt learned Fathers of the church. He judges, ſays he, like Pythagoras, he divides like Socrates, he explains like Plato, he puzzles like Ariſtotle, he delights like Æſchines, he ſtirs up the paſſions like Demoſthenes, he diverts with a pleaſing variety like Hortenſius, he obviates difficulties like Cethegus, he excites like Curio, he appeaſes like Fabius, he feigns like Craſſus, he diſſembles like Cæſar, he adviſes like Cato, he diſſuades like Appius, he perſuades like Cicero. And, if we compare him to the Fathers of the church, he inſtructs like St. Jerom, he overthrows error like Lactantius, he maintains the truth like St. Auſtin, he elevates himſelf like St. Hilary, he ſpeaks as fluently and as intelligibly as St. Chryſoſtom, he reproves like St. Baſil, he comforts like St. Gregory Nazianzen, he is copious like Oroſius, and as urgent as Ruffinus; he relates a ſtory as well as Euſebius, he excites like St. Eucherius, he ſtirs up like Paulinus, he ſupports like St. Ambroſe.

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that it deſcended from Adam, and others that a ſoul was given to each individual; and it was acknowledged that this important queſtion could not be ſolved in this life. If, ſays he, the ſoul be of the ſubſtance of Adam, as well as the body, why doth it not die with the body? But if it have another origin, how is it involved in the guilt of Adam's ſin? But as he concludes with ſaying, that the latter, viz. the doctrine of *original ſin*, is certain, and the other, viz. the *mortality of the ſoul*, is uncertain, he ſeems inclined to think the ſoul deſcended from the ſoul of Adam *ex traduce*, and therefore was poſſibly mortal.

It is very evident that this writer had a notion that the ſoul was corporeal, as will be ſeen by a very curious circumſtance in what follows. He conſidered the ſouls of ſaints and martyrs as continuing in or near their dead bodies and relicks. For he ſays, that, as the life of the ſoul was diſcovered by the motion of the body while it was living, ſo after death its life is manifeſted by the power of working miracles. But he did not conſider the ſoul as confined to the dead body; for he adds, that many perſons, whoſe minds were purified by faith and prayer, had actually ſeen ſouls going out of their bodies when they died; and he relates at large ſeveral hiſtories of ſuch ſouls becoming viſible. Among others, he ſays, that the ſoul of *Abbot Spes* was ſeen by all the brothers of his monaſtery, coming out of his mouth in the ſhape

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ſhape of a dove, and flying up to heaven. ibid.

As we approach nearer the age of the ſchoolmen, we find leſs of materialiſm, but a language proportionably more unintelligible, though not quite ſo remote from all conception, as that of our modern metaphyſicians.

Damaſcenus, in the eighth century, ſays (*Opera*, p. 282) that "the *whole ſoul is preſent to the* "*whole body*, and not *part to part*, nor is it "contained in the body, but contains it; as fire "contains the red-hot iron, and, living in it, "performs its functions." Though this writer, as we have ſeen, conſidered God as not exiſting in place, we ſee here that he confines the ſoul of a man to his body.

From this time the philoſophical opinion of the *deſcent of the ſoul* was univerſally abandoned by chriſtians. Agobard, who flouriſhed in the ninth century, conſiders it as a queſtion decided by divines, that the ſoul is not a *part of the divine ſubſtance*, or nature, and had no being before its union with the body, being created when the body is formed. *Dupin*, vol. vii. p. 182. Fredegiſus, in the ſame century, ſays, that ſouls are created in and with the body, though the philoſophers aſſerted the contrary, and Auſtin doubted it. ib. p. 145.

Another doubt, however, continued in this century. For Rabanus Maurus ſays, it was a dubious queſtion, whether God created the

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ſoul to be infuſed into the body, or whether it was produced from the ſouls of the father and mother. He maintained that the ſoul has *no particular figure*, but that it is principally ſeated in the head. ib. p. 164. Hincmarus, in the ſame century, ſays, that the ſoul does not *move locally*, though it changes its will, and manners. ib. p. 50.

Barnard, in the twelfth century, ſays, that the ſoul cannot be in corporeal place, for that things incorporeal cannot be meaſured but by *time*. Opera, p. 466.

Many of the Fathers, we have ſeen, were of opinion that the ſoul is propagated like the body, and that the ſoul of Adam was an emanation from God. But Peter Lombard condemns thoſe who ſuppoſed the ſoul to be a part of God, and ſays that it was created out of nothing. *Sententiæ, Diſt.* 17.

My reader muſt excuſe me if, in relating the opinion of the famous ſchoolman Thomas Aquinas, I ſhould not make myſelf perfectly underſtood. I ſhall endeavour, however, to make his meaning as intelligible as I well can. He ſays that the ſoul is not a body, but the *act of the body (actus corporis)* as heat, which is the principle of warmth; juſt as the ſoul which is the principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body. This looks as if he conſidered the ſoul as a mere *property of body*; but treating of the difference between the ſouls of men and brutes, he ſays, that the former is *aliquid ſubſiſtens*, but the latter was *not ſub-*

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ſubſiſtens, p. 160. He acknowledges, however, with all the Ariſtotelians, that the ſoul is *the form of the body*, p. 161. Since *that by means of which any thing acts, is the form of that to which the operation is attributed*, p. 163. The whole ſoul, he ſays, is in every part of the body, according to the whole of its *perfection* and *eſſence*, but not according to the whole of its *power*, p. 168. There is but one ſoul, he ſays, to one man, diſcharging the functions of the intellectual, vegetative, and ſenſitive part, p. 165. In order to explain the mutual action of the ſoul and body, he ſays, p. 160, that the *contactus virtutis* is oppoſite to the *contactus qualitatis*, and that body may be touched by what is incorporeal, ſo that the ſoul may move the body.

In *Pernumia*, whoſe treatiſe of *Natural Philoſophy* was printed in 1570, the ſoul is ſaid, fol. 85, to be the *firſt act*, *primus actus*, of the body, and that it is ſo united to the body, that, with reſpect to its *quantity*, it is *tota in toto, et pars in parte*; but with reſpect to its *eſſence*, and all its *faculties*, it is *tota in toto, et tota in qualibet parte*. In the ſame treatiſe, the *natural* and *vital heat* (which he ſays is compoſed of the ſubſtance of the *heart*, the moſt refined *(depuratis)* vapours of the *blood*, and *air* attracted by it) is ſaid, fol. 91, to be a middle ſubſtance between the body and the ſoul.

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PART IV.

The State of Opinions from the Time of Deſcartes to the preſent.

THUS ſtood the orthodox faith concerning the ſoul till the time of Deſcartes, who introduced quite a new mode of conſidering the ſubject, beginning upon new principles; which was by doubting of every thing, and then admitting nothing but what his own conſciouſneſs abſolutely obliged him to admit. And yet his writings on this ſubject have been the means of introducing more confuſion into it than was ever known before.

The Carteſians conſidered the Ariſtotelian doctrine of the ſoul being *the ſubſtantial form of the body*, as inconſiſtent with its immateriality, and conſequently deſtructive of the doctrine of its immortality. *Hiſtorical View*, p. 17. But, in conſequence of ſeparating from the idea of the ſoul every thing that he was not obliged to admit, Deſcartes defined the eſſence of the ſoul to conſiſt in *thinking*, the evident conſequence of which is, that the ſoul is, in fact, nothing but a *property*, and no *ſubſtance* at all; and, therefore, notwithſtanding his boaſting of improving the doctrine of immateriality, he has been conſidered by ſome only as a more acute materialiſt.

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It is plain, however, that this was not the caſe, and his meaning muſt have been, that there was a *ſubſtance* of the ſoul, and that the property of this ſubſtance was to think without intermiſſion, which he maintained. He is, therefore, conſidered by others, and eſpecially Mr. Bayle, as having firſt eſtabliſhed the true doctrine of an immaterial ſubſtance, intirely without extenſion, or relation to place. And yet I do not ſee that his idea of the ſoul could be wholly abſtracted from matter, when he ſuppoſed that the ſeat of it was the *pineal gland*. I therefore think that the proper immaterial ſyſtem is of ſtill later date, but who was the author of it may not be eaſily diſcovered. Indeed, nothing was neceſſary to make the doctrine of the ſchoolmen a complete ſyſtem of immaterialiſm, but the omiſſion of a few poſitions which were inconſiſtent with it. But in the ſame proportion in which we cut off from ſpirit every property that it was ſuppoſed to have in common with matter, we bring it to a ſtate in which it is naturally impoſſible to act upon matter, or to be acted upon by it.

Malebranche adopted the ſyſtem of Deſcartes, maintaining that the eſſence of matter conſiſts in extenſion, and that of the ſoul in thinking. He therefore ſaid that the ſoul thinks always, and moſt of all when it has no conſciouſneſs of its thoughts. He is alſo ſaid to have been the firſt who brought into vogue the doctrine of *animal ſpirits*.

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The ſyſtem of Deſcartes has been generally adopted, but with ſome improvements, by more modern metaphyſicians. I do not, however, find the ſtrict immaterial ſyſtem in any writer earlier than our Sir Kenelm Digby, who in his treatiſe *Of the Soul*, p. 85, conſiders it as "the great property of the ſoul, "that it is able to move, and to work, without being moved or touched; that it is in "no place, and yet not abſent from any "place; that it is alſo not in time, and not "ſubject to it, for though it does conſiſt with "time, and is while time is, it is not in "time."

To this doctrine Alexander Roſs, in his *Philoſophical Touchſtone*, p. 80, very naturally and ſenſibly replies, "If the ſoul be no where, "it is nothing, and if every where, it is "God, whoſe property indeed it is to be "every where, by his eſſence, power, and "providence."

The good ſenſe of Mr. Locke was evidently ſtaggered at the extravagant poſitions of the ſtrict immaterialiſts, though he had not courage, or conſiſtency, to reject the doctrine altogether. In oppoſition to them, he maintains largely (*Eſſay*, vol. i. p. 259) that ſpirits are *in place*, and *capable of motion*. He likewiſe maintained much at large the poſſibility of thinking being ſuperadded to matter *, and

* So conſiderable a writer as Mr. Locke, having maintained the *poſſible materiality* of the ſoul, I cannot

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and was inclined to be of opinion, that the ſouls of men are only in part immaterial.

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not ſatisfy myſelf without giving my reader, in this note, an idea of his manner of conſidering the ſubject, by bringing together his moſt ſtriking arguments:

" We have ideas of *matter* and *thinking*, but poſſibly " ſhall never be able to know whether any mere material " being thinks or no; it being impoſſible for us, by the " contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to " diſcover whether omnipotency has not given to ſome " ſyſtems of matter, fitly diſpoſed, a power to perceive and " think; or elſe joined and fixed to matter, ſo diſpoſed, " a thinking immaterial ſubſtance: it being, in reſpect of " our notions, not much more remote from our com- " prehenſion, to conceive that God can, if he pleaſes, " ſuperadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he " ſhould ſuperadd to it another ſubſtance with the faculty " of thinking; ſince we know not wherein thinking con- " ſiſts, nor to what ſort of ſubſtance the Almighty has " been pleaſed to give that power, which cannot be in any " created being, but merely by the good pleaſure and " bounty of the Creator." *Eſſay*, vol. ii. p. 167.

This poſition he defends and illuſtrates very largely, in his letter to the biſhop of Worceſter, ſome of the moſt remarkable paſſages of which I ſhall ſubjoin.

" You cannot *conceive* how an extended ſolid ſubſtance " ſhould think, therefore God cannot make it think. " Can you conceive how your own ſoul, or any ſubſtance, " thinks? You find, indeed, that you *do* think, but I " want to be told how the action of thinking is performed. " This, I confeſs, is beyond my conception." ibid, p. 146.

" You cannot conceive how a ſolid ſubſtance ſhould " ever be able to move itſelf. And as little, ſay I, are " you able to conceive how a created unſolid ſubſtance " ſhould move itſelf. But there may be ſomething in an " *immaterial* ſubſtance that you do not know. I grant it, " and in a *material* one too. For example, gravitation of " matter towards matter inevitably ſhows that there is " ſomething in matter that we do not underſtand, unleſs we " can conceive *ſelf-motion* in matter, or an inexcitable and

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" It is worth our conſideration, ſays he, ib. " p. 264, whether active power be not the " proper attribute of ſpirits, and paſſive " power of matter. Hence it may be con- " jectured, that created ſpirits are not total- " ly ſeparate from matter, becauſe they are " both active and paſſive. Pure ſpirit, viz. " God, is only active, pure matter is only " paſſive, thoſe beings that are both active " and paſſive we may judge to partake of " both."

" inconceivable *attraction* in matter, at immenſe and in- " comprehenſible diſtances." ib. p. 147.

" The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways " inconceivable to me, is not only a demonſtration that " God can, if he pleaſes, put into bodies powers and " ways of operation above what can be derived from our " ideas of body, or can be explained by what we know of " matter, but alſo an unqueſtionable and every where vi- " ſible inſtance that he has done ſo." p. 149.

" When you can make it conceivable how any created " finite dependant ſubſtance can move itſelf, or alter or " ſtop its own motion (which it muſt to be a free agent) " I ſuppoſe you will find it no harder for God to beſtow " this power on a ſolid, than an unſolid created ſubſtance." p. 166.

" He that conſiders how hardly ſenſation is, in our " thought, reconcileable to matter" (it muſt be remember- ed that Mr. Locke thought brutes to be wholly material) " or exiſtence to any thing that has no extenſion at all, " will confeſs that he is very far from knowing what his " ſoul is. It is a point which ſeems to me to be put out " of the reach of our knowledge. And he who will give " himſelf leave to conſider freely, and look into the dark " and intricate part of each hypotheſis, will ſcarcely find " his reaſon able to determine him fixedly for or againſt " the ſoul's materiality." p. 168.

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I cannot help thinking that he who could maintain these positions, viz. that spirits exist *in place*, and have proper *loco-motion*, that *matter may be made to think*, that the souls of men are probably *in part material*, and also that the *souls of brutes are not immortal*, was not far from a proper materialism; and that to have been consistent with himself, he certainly ought to have declared for it without regarding vulgar prejudices.

Indeed, the tendency of these principles to materialism was so evident, that almost all the subsequent defenders of the immmateriality and natural immortality of the soul have disclaimed them. Among others, Dr. Watts has most clearly and largely proved (*Philosophical Essays*, p. 133) &c. that the necessary consequence of admitting spirits to exist in space, and to be capable of a proper motion from one place to another, is that they must have proper extension, figure, and a corporeal substance.

"With regard to conscious beings, whether created or uncreated," he says (ib. p. 381) "I confess I have no clear idea how they "can have any proper locality, residence, situation, nearness, or juxta-position among "bodies, without changing the very essence "or nature of them into extended beings, "and making them quite other things than "they are. When we say that God, the infinite spirit, is *every where*, in a strict philosophical sense, we mean that he has an

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" immediate and unlimited conſciouſneſs of, " and agency upon, all things, and that his " knowledge and power reach alſo to all " poſſibles, as well as to all actual beings. " When we ſay the ſoul of man *is in his* " *body*, we mean he has a conſciouſneſs of " certain motions and impreſſions made on " that particular animal engine, and can " excite particular motions in it at plea- " ſure."

This being the only conſiſtent ſyſtem of immaterialiſm, it is that which is held by Mr. Baxter, and all the moſt approved modern writers upon the ſubject.

From the whole of this ſection, and the preceding, it will appear, that the modern idea of an *immaterial being* is by no means the ſame thing that was ſo denominated by the ancients; it being well known to the learned, as has been ſhewn, that what the ancients meant by an immaterial being, was only a *finer kind* of what we ſhould now call *matter*; ſomething like *air* or *breath*, which firſt ſupplied a name for the *ſoul*, or elſe like *fire* or *flame*, which was probably ſuggeſted by the conſideration of the *warmth* of the living body. Conſequently, the ancients did not exclude from mind the property of *extenſion*, and *local preſence*. It had, in their idea, ſome common properties with matter, was capable of being united to it, of acting and being acted upon by it, and of moving from place to place along with it.

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But it was juſtly conſidered by the moderns, that ſuch an immaterial ſubſtance as this was, in fact, no immaterial ſubſtance at all, but a material one; it being the opinion of all modern philoſophers (though it was unknown to the ancients) that all matter is ultimately the ſame thing, all kinds of bodies differing from one another only in the *ſize* or *arrangement* of their ultimate particles, or atoms. It was, therefore, ſeen, that if the powers of ſenſation or thought could belong to ſuch a material ſubſtance as the ancients had denominated an immaterial one (being only an attenuated kind of matter) it might be imparted to the very *groſſeſt* matter; ſince it is naturally capable of the ſame attenuation; and therefore, that the *ſoul* and *body*, being in reality the ſame kind of ſubſtance, muſt die together.

To avoid this concluſion, of which divines entertained a very unreaſonable dread, they refined upon the former notion of ſpirit, excluding from it every property which it held in common with matter; making it, in the ſtrict metaphyſical ſenſe of the term, an *immaterial thing*, without extenſion, that is, occupying no portion of ſpace, and therefore bearing no relation to it; and conſequently incapable of motion from one place to another. In fact, there was no other method of keeping clear of a proper *materialiſm*. For there can be no medium between abſolute materialiſm, and this proper and ſtrict immaterialiſm.

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rialiſm. Now what I maintain is, that this dread of materialiſm has driven theſe refiners among the moderns, to adopt a ſyſtem with reſpect to human nature, that is not only contradicted by fact and experience, as I think has been fully proved, but is likewiſe abſurd and impoſſible in itſelf. For by denying to ſpirit every property in common with matter, it neceſſarily makes them incapable of *mutual action* or *influence*; in conſequence of which it will be naturally impoſſible that the divine mind ſhould either have *created* matter, or be capable of *acting upon it*.

SECTION XVII.

A brief Hiſtory of Opinions concerning the STATE OF THE DEAD.

AFTER reciting the foregoing ſeries of opinions concerning the ſoul in general, it may not be amiſs to conſider by itſelf what has been thought concerning its condition between the death of the body and the reſurrection. And the revolution of opinions, with reſpect to this queſtion, has been not a little remarkable.

It was unqueſtionably the opinion of the apoſtles and early chriſtians, that whatever be the nature of the ſoul, its percipient and thinking powers ceaſe at death; and they had no

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no hope of the reſtoration of thoſe powers, but in the general reſurrection of the dead. But when it was concluded that men had ſouls diſtinct from the body, and capable of ſubſiſting after the body was dead, it was neceſſary to provide ſome *receptacle* for them, where they might wait till they were reunited to their reſpective bodies.

Before the council of Florence, which was held in the year 1439, under Pope Eugenius IV. the current doctrine both of the Greek and Latin churches was, that the ſouls of the ſaints were in *abditis receptaculis*, or, as ſome of them expreſſed it, in *exterioribus atriis*, where they expected the reſurrection of their bodies, and the glorification of their ſouls; and though the Fathers believed all of them to be happy, yet they did not think they would enjoy the *beatific viſion* before the reſurrection. *Hiſtorical View*, p. 1. How the ſouls of the wicked were diſpoſed of, little or nothing is ſaid by them.

The catholics, as well as heretics, ſays Beauſobre, vol. i. p. 290, believed that the ſouls of the Old Teſtament ſaints were kept in priſon *in the ſhades below*, and could not be delivered from thence but by the grace of Chriſt. Chriſt, they ſay, when he was in a ſtate of death, went and preached to them, and brought from thence as many as believed in him. Irenæus maintained this opinion. *Dupin*, vol. i. p. 60.

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That the genuine chriſtian doctrine, of the *ſleep of the whole man* till the reſurrection, did however continue in the chriſtian church, and eſpecially among thoſe who had little intercourſe with philoſophers, there is ſufficient evidence. Dupin ſays, that under the reign of Philip, an aſſembly of biſhops was held on the account of ſome Arabians, who maintained that the ſouls of men died, and were raiſed again with their bodies, and that Origen convinced them of their miſtake, vol. i. p. 99. He alſo ſays that Tatian was of the ſame opinion with thoſe Arabians. ibid, p. 55.

It will be more ſatisfactory to my readers, if, beſides this general account, I quote more particularly the ſentiments of ſome of the chriſtian writers upon this ſubject. I ſhall, therefore, relate what is ſaid by a few of thoſe of the middle ages, when the opinion began to change.

Gregory the Great, ſays (*Opera*, vol. i. p. 39) that the ſouls of ſome of the righteous, on account of their imperfections, are not immediately admitted to heaven, though others certainly are. But he ſays, the ſouls of all the wicked are tormented in hell; and he explains how, like the ſoul of the rich man in the goſpel, and of the devils, they may be tormented with corporeal fire, though they themſelves be incorporeal.

Julian of Toledo, alſo, in the ſeventh century, maintained that the ſouls of the wicked, im-

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immediately after death, are precipitated into hell, where they undergo endleſs torments. *Dupin*, vol. vi. p. 44.

Anſelm ſays (*Opera*, vol. iii. p. 146) that the ſouls of good men do not enjoy perfect happineſs till they be re-united to their bodies. And that even then they could not be perfectly happy, if this union impeded their *velocity*, in inſtantly conveying themſelves from one place to another, even the moſt diſtant; in which, he ſays, part of their perfection will conſiſt.

Bernard ſays (*Operâ*, p. 481) that, at the reſurrection, the ſoul recovers its *life* and *ſenſe*, that is, its *knowledge*, and *love*. But he ſays, p. 954, that the ſouls of the *martyrs*, when looſed from their bodies, are immerſed in a ſea of eternal light. This, however, was peculiar to the martyrs, and not the neceſſary privilege of all the departed ſouls of good men. Again he ſays, p. 290, that the ſouls of the juſt go to reſt at death, but not to the *full glory of their kingdom*. And, p. 1716, K. that though they drink of happineſs, they are not intoxicated.

He hardly ſeems to think that the wicked ſuffered any thing in the intermediate ſtate. For he ſays, ib. that white robes are given to the ſaints, in which to wait till the wicked are puniſhed, and themſelves are crowned with double happineſs.

In this ſtate continued the doctrine concerning the dead, through the greateſt part of

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the dark ages, between the chriſtian Fathers and the Reformation. It ſeems, however, that the opinion of the admiſſion of the ſouls of the righteous to a ſtate of perfect happineſs in heaven, had gradually gained ground, and had become the general opinion in the fourteenth century. For Pope John XXII. made himſelf very obnoxious by reviving, as it is ſaid by Dupin, the opinion of the ancient Fathers, that the ſouls of good men do not enjoy the beatific viſion till the day of judgment. He was very ſtrenuous in aſſerting and preaching this doctrine, contrary to the judgment of the divines at Paris, whom the king of France aſſembled for that purpoſe. But it is ſaid that, on his death bed, he retracted his opinion, and acknowledged that ſouls, ſeparated from the body, which are purged from their ſins, are in the kingdom of heaven, and in Paradiſe with Jeſus Chriſt, and in the company of the angels; that they ſee God face to face, and the Divine eſſence, as clearly as the ſtate and condition of a ſoul ſeparated from the body will permit. *Dupin*, vol. xii. p. 28.

His ſucceſſor, Benedict XII, made a ſolemn decree againſt the opinion of his predeceſſor, ib. p. 29. But probably the opinion of Innocent had many adherents, ſince it was thought neceſſary a conſiderable time afterwards to bring a decree of a council in aid of the contrary doctrine; and, it is remarkable that it was by the authority of a pope, who was obliged to uſe great art and addreſs

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to gain his point, that the preſent faith of all proteſtant churches on this article was properly eſtabliſhed.

In a council ſummoned by Eugenius IV, to meet at Ferrara, and adjourned to Florence, it was decreed that the ſouls of thoſe who, after baptiſm, have incurred no ſtain of ſin, as alſo the ſouls of thoſe, who having contracted the ſtain of ſin, whether in their bodies, or diveſted of their bodies, have been purged by the ſacrifice of the maſs, prayers and alms, are received into heaven immediately, and clearly behold the triune God as he is. *Hiſtorical View*, p. 2.

The doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul, which implies that of its ſeparate exiſtence after death, being denied by many of that age, eſpecially by the diſciples of Averroes, and other Arabian philoſophers (who maintained one *univerſal ſoul*, the derivation of all other ſouls from it, and their abſorption into it) it was thought neceſſary to reinforce the belief of it in another council. Accordingly, in the Lateran council, held by Leo X. in 1513, it was decreed that the ſoul is not only truly, and of itſelf, and eſſentially *the form of the human body*, as is expreſſed in the canon of Pope Clement V, publiſhed in the general council of Vienne, but likewiſe *immortal*, and according to the number of bodies into which it is infuſed, is ſingularly multiplicable, multiplied, and to be multiplied, (*multiplicabilis*, *multiplicata*, et *multiplicanda*). *Hiſtorical View*, p. 6. This certainly implies

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the generation of ſouls from ſouls, contrary to the deciſion of Damaſcenus mentioned above.

Pomponatius, a philoſopher of Mantua, not at all intimidated by this Lateran thunder, publiſhed a book in the year 1516 on the immortality of the ſoul; in which he expoſed the futility of that argumentation by which the followers of Ariſtotle had endeavoured to prove the immortality of the ſoul, on the principles of their maſter, by ſhewing that they either miſtook the ſenſe of Ariſtotle's principles, or drew wrong concluſions from them. He then examines the hypotheſis of Ariſtotle himſelf, and ſhews that the mortality of the ſoul may be as eaſily proved by it as the contrary. After all this he ſtates the moral arguments for the immortality, or rather againſt the mortality of the ſoul, under eight heads; and having ſhewn that they are weak and inconcluſive, he infers upon the whole, in his laſt chapter, that the immortality of the ſoul being a problematical queſtion, we can have no aſſurance of the thing but from Revelation; and that they who would build immortality upon any other foundation, only verify the character given to certain ſelf ſufficient reaſoners by the apoſtle, namely, that *profeſſing themſelves wiſe they became fools*. Hiſtorical View, p. 8.

Though this doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul, as a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, is manifeſtly favourable to popery, but few of the

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the Proteſtants appear to have had ſtrength of mind to call it in queſtion. Luther, however, did it, though the oppoſition almoſt died with him. In the defence of his propoſitions (in 1520) which had been condemned by a bull of Leo X. he ranks the opinions of the *natural immortality of the ſoul*, and that of the ſoul being *the ſubſtantial form of the body*, among the monſtrous opinions to be found in the *Roman dunghills of decretals*; and he afterwards made uſe of the doctrine of *the ſleep of the ſoul*, as a confutation of purgatory and ſaint worſhip, and he continued in that belief to the laſt moment of his life. *Hiſtorical View*, p. 15. William Tyndale alſo, the famous tranſlator of the Bible into Engliſh, in defending Luther's doctrine againſt Sir Thomas More's objections, conſiders the ſleep of the ſoul as the doctrine of the Proteſtants in his time, and founded on the ſcriptures. ib. p. 16.

Calvin, however, violently oppoſed this doctrine; and this ſeems to have given a different turn to the ſentiments of the reformed in general, and Tyndale himſelf recanted his opinion. Calvin ſeems to have been embarraſſed with the ſouls of the wicked. He ſays it is nothing to him what becomes of their ſouls, that he would only be reſponſible for the faithful. *Hiſtorical View*, p. 25. But it appears from Calvin's own writings, that *thouſands* of the reformers were of a different opinion from him; and though the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul be ex-

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hibited in all the preſent proteſtant confeſſions of faith, there is little or nothing of it in the earlieſt of them.

After the long prevalence of the doctrine of the *intermediate ſtate*, that of the *ſleep of the ſoul* has of late years been revived, and gains ground, not ſo much from conſiderations of philoſophy, as from a cloſer attention to the ſenſe of the ſcriptures. No perſon has done more in this way than the preſent excellent biſhop of Carliſle. Very important ſervice has alſo been done to the ſame cauſe by the author of the *Hiſtorical View of this controverſy*, from which much of this ſection is extracted. Upon the whole, the doctrine of an intermediate ſtate is now retained by few who have the character of thinking with freedom and liberality in other reſpects. And the more attention is given to the ſubject in a philoſophical light, the better founded, I doubt not, will the concluſions that have been drawn from the ſtudy of the ſcriptures appear to be.

It has not, however, been conſidered how much the doctrine of the *inſenſible ſtate of the ſoul* in death affects the doctrine of the *ſeparate exiſtence of the ſoul*, which it appears to me to do very materially. It certainly takes away all the *uſe* of the doctrine, and therefore ſhould leave us more at liberty from any prejudice in the diſcuſſion of the queſtion, ſince nothing is really gained by its being decided either way. Though we ſhould have a ſoul,

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a ſoul, yet while it is in a ſtate of *utter inſenſibility*, it is, in fact, as much *dead*, as the body itſelf while it continues in a ſtate of death. Our calling it a ſtate of *ſleep*, is only giving another and ſofter term to the ſame thing; for our *ideas* of the ſtate itſelf are preciſely the ſame, by whatever name we pleaſe to call it. I flatter myſelf, however, that in time chriſtians will get over this, as well as other prejudices; and, thinking with more reſpect of *matter*, as the creation of God, may think it capable of being endued with all the powers of which we are conſcious, without having recourſe to a principle, which, in the moſt favourable view of the ſubject, accords but ill with what matter has been conceived to be.

SECTION XVIII.

An Account of Opinions concerning the SENTIENT PRINCIPLE IN BRUTES.

THE ſouls of brutes, which have very much embarraſſed the modern ſyſtems, occaſioned no difficulty whatever in that of the ancients. They conſidered all ſouls as originally the ſame, in whatever bodies they might happen to be confined. To-day it might be that of a man, to-morrow that of a horſe, then that of a man again, and laſtly be

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be abſorbed into the univerſal ſoul, from which it proceeded.*

But chriſtianity made a great difference between men and brutes. To the former a happy immortality was promiſed, and in ſuch a manner as made it impoſſible to think that brutes could have any title to it. It was abſolutely neceſſary, therefore, to make a change in the former uniform and comprehenſive ſyſtem; and though ſome philoſophical chriſtians ſtill retained the doctrine of tranſmigration, it was generally given up, notwithſtanding the doctrines of *pre-exiſtence*, and of a *ſeparate conſciouſneſs after death*, which were originally parts of the ſame ſyſtem, continued.

To account for the great difference which chriſtianity made between the future ſtate of men and brutes, and yet retain the ſeparate ſtate of the ſoul, it was neceſſary to find ſome *ſpecific difference* between them. But a moſt unhappy one was pitched upon, one that is contradicted by every appearance. It has, however, been ſo neceſſary to the reſt of the now *disjointed ſyſtem*, that notwithſtanding this circumſtance, it has maintained its ground, in

* It was conſiſtent, however, with this hypotheſis, to ſuppoſe that while ſouls were confined to the bodies of brutes, their faculties ſhould differ, with reſpect to their exerciſe, from thoſe of men. Thus Ariſtotle beſtowed *ſenſation*, *memory*, and the *paſſions* on other animals, and *reaſon* on man excluſively. On this principle the ſchoolmen, and all the Peripateticks proceeded. *Bolingbroke's Works*, vol. iii. p. 530.

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ſome ſort, to this day. It is that, though the ſoul of a man is immortal, that of a brute is not; and yet it is evident that brutes have the rudiments of all our faculties, without exception; ſo that they differ from us in *degree* only, and not in *kind*. But the conſequence of ſuppoſing the ſoul of a man and that of a brute to be of the ſame nature, was abſolutely inadmiſſible; for they muſt then, it was thought, have been provided for in a future ſtate as well as our own.

It has been ſeen that the Platoniſts thought there was ſomething corporeal even in the human ſoul. It is no wonder then that the ſouls of brutes ſhould have been thought to be *wholly* ſo, and therefore mortal, which was the opinion, I believe, of all the chriſtian world till very lately. Even the great Lord Bacon entertained this opinion. *Anima ſenſibilis*, ſays he, *ſive brutorum, plane ſubſtantia corpore acenſenda eſt.* Gale, p. 326. The celebrated anatomiſt Willis alſo profeſſed the ſame. ib.

The opinion of Deſcartes was much more extraordinary, for he made the ſouls of brutes to be mere *automata*, and his diſciples in general denied that they had any perception. Malebranche ſays that they eat without pleaſure, and cry without pain, that they fear nothing, know nothing; and if they act in ſuch a manner as ſhews underſtanding, it is becauſe God, having made them to preſerve them, has formed their

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their bodies so as mechanically to avoid whatever might hurt them.

The learned Dr. Gale maintains at large that the sensitive soul is corporeal, *Philosophia Generalis*, p. 323, and the very justly celebrated Dr. Cudworth has revived, for the sake of helping this great difficulty, the long-exploded notion of the *soul of the world*, from which the souls of brutes issue, and to which he supposes they return, without retaining their separate consciousness after death. "They "may, if they please," says he, p. 45, "suppose the souls of brutes, being but so "many particular *irradiations*, or *effluxes*, "from that *life above*, whensoever and where-"soever there is any fitly prepared matter ca-"pable to receive them, and to be actuated "by them, to have a sense and perception of "themselves in it, so long as it continues such. "But so soon as ever those organized bodies "of theirs, by reason of their indisposition, "become incapable of being farther acted "upon by them, then to be resumed again, "and retracted back to their original head and "fountain. Since it cannot be doubted but "what creates any thing out of nothing, or "sends it forth from itself, by free and vo-"luntary emanation, may be able either to "retract the same back again to its original "source, or else to annihilate it at pleasure." p. 45.

This writer, however, suggests another method of solving this difficulty, much more liberal

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beral and rational; ſuppoſing the immortality of the ſoul not to follow neceſſarily from its immateriality, but from the appointment of God. But he injures the brutes very much when, to account for the difference in the divine diſpenſations to them and us, he ſuppoſes them to be deſtitute of *morality* and *liberty*, p. 45.

I am moſt ſurpriſed to find Mr. Locke among thoſe who maintain, that, though the ſouls of men are, in part, at leaſt, immaterial, thoſe of brutes, which reſemble men ſo much, are wholly material. It is evident, however, from the manner in which he expreſſes himſelf on the ſubject, not only that this was his own opinion, but that it was the general opinion of his time. He ſays (*Eſſay*, vol. i. p. 148) "Though to me ſenſation be comprehended "under thinking in general, yet I have ſpoke "of ſenſe in brutes as diſtinct from thinking; "—and to ſay that flies and mites have im-"mortal ſouls will probably be looked on as "going a great way to ſerve an hypotheſis. "Many, however, have been compelled by "the analogy between men and brutes to go "thus far. I do not ſee how they can ſtop "ſhort of it."

It would be endleſs to recite all the hypotheſes that have been framed to explain the difference between brutes and men, with reſpect to their intellects here, and their fate hereafter.

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hereafter. I shall, however, mention that of Mr. Locke, who says, "This, I think, I may "be positive in, that the power of *abstraction* "is not at all in them, and that the having "of *general ideas* is that which puts a perfect "distinction between men and brutes. For "it is evident we observe no footsteps in "them of making use of general signs for "universal ideas, from which we have rea- "son to imagine that they have not the fa- "culty of abstracting, or making general "ideas, since they have no use of words, or "any general signs." *Essay*, vol. i. p. 126.

In fact, however, as brutes have the same external senses that we have, they have, of course, all the same *inlets to ideas* that we have; and though, on account of their wanting a sufficient *quantity of brain*, perhaps, chiefly, the combination and association of their ideas cannot be so complex as ours, and therefore they cannot make so great a progress in intellectual improvements, they must necessarily have, *in kind*, every faculty that we are possessed of. Also since they evidently have *memory*, *passions*, *will*, and *judgment* too, as their actions demonstrate, they must, of course, have the faculty that we call *abstraction* as well as the rest; though, not having the use of *words*, they cannot communicate their ideas to us. They must, at least, have a natural capacity for what is called *abstraction*, it being nothing more than a particular case of the *association of ideas*,

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ideas, of which, in general, they are certainly poſſeſſed as well as ourſelves.

Beſides, if dogs had no general or abſtract ideas, but only ſuch as were appropriated to particular *individual objects*, they could never be taught to diſtinguiſh a *man*, as ſuch, a *hare*, as ſuch, or a *partridge*, as ſuch, &c. But their actions ſhew that they may be trained to catch hares, ſet partridges, or *birds* in general, and even attack *men*, as well as to diſtinguiſh their own maſter, and the ſervants of the family in which they live.

Whether brutes will ſurvive the grave we cannot tell. This depends upon other conſiderations than their being capable of reaſon and reflection. If the reſurrection be properly *miraculous*, and entirely out of all the eſtabliſhed laws of nature, it will appear probable that brutes have no ſhare in it; ſince we know of no declaration that God has made to that purpoſe, and they can have no expectation of any ſuch thing. But if the reſurrection be, in fact, *within the proper courſe of nature*, extenſively conſidered, and conſequently there be ſomething remaining of every organized body that death does not deſtroy, there will be reaſon to conclude that they will be benefited by it as well as ourſelves. And the great miſery to which ſome of them are expoſed in this life, may incline us to think, that a merciful and juſt God will make them ſome recompence for it hereafter. He is *their* maker

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maker and father as well as *ours*. But with reſpect to this queſtion, we have no ſufficient *data* from which to argue, and therefore muſt acquieſce in our utter ignorance; ſatisfied that the Maker and Judge of all will do what is right.

THE

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THE HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF THE SOUL, AND THE NATURE OF MATTER; WITH ITS INFLUENCE ON CHRISTIANITY,

Especially with respect to the Doctrine of the

PRE-EXISTENCE OF CHRIST;

BEING A SEQUEL TO THE

Disquisitions concerning Matter and Spirit.

We have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.

2 Pet. i. 16.

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THE

INTRODUCTION;

Containing the Outlines of the Philoſophical Doctrine concerning the Origin of the Souls of Men, &c.

TRUE Religion, which conſiſts in the obſervance of juſt precepts for the conduct of life, and of reaſonable expectations after death, is neceſſarily founded on a juſt knowledge of God, of ourſelves, and our ſituation. But it was naturally impoſſible that mankind, in the infancy of the world, ſhould attain to juſt notions on theſe ſubjects. It could not be, but that the philoſophy of the world around us, and the various ſubſtances that compoſe it, ſhould precede the knowledge of ourſelves, and eſpecially the knowledge of God, the maker of all things. And the very ſlow progreſs that mankind have made in the true philoſophy of the external world, our acquaintance with which is at preſent but very imperfect, and all the great diſcoveries recent, is ſufficient to convince any perſon, who knows what philoſophy is, and how ready men always are to ſpeculate upon every ſubject, and to attach themſelves

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to *general principles*, falſe as well as true, of what importance it was that the univerſal parent ſhould make ſome proviſion for his offſpring in theſe reſpects; by imparting to them that information, which, in their circumſtances, it was abſolutely impoſſible they ſhould have acquired. Without this ſeaſonable aſſiſtance, very abſurd notions would unavoidably have been formed, and fooliſh and pernicious practices would have been the conſequence of them.

It is not from *theory* only, but from unqueſtionable *facts*, that we are authoriſed to pronounce in this manner. All authentic hiſtory ſhows us, that when mankind, unfurniſhed with the rudiments of juſt previous knowledge, *did* ſpeculate concerning the ſtructure of the world, and the origin of it, concerning their own nature, and future deſtination, and eſpecially the nature and moral government of God, they did adopt the wildeſt and moſt extravagant ſyſtems imaginable; and that the religion they thus made for themſelves gave a ſanction to ſuch practices as exceedingly debaſed their natures, and ſunk them to the loweſt degree of depravity, vice, and wretchedneſs. That the religions of the heathen world, and eſpecially thoſe of the early ages of mankind, were of this pernicious kind, no perſon acquainted with hiſtory will deny.

It is, likewiſe, no leſs evident from hiſtory, that it has been owing to the influence of a few

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few *fundamental truths*, communicated by God to men, that the miſchievous tendency of the various pagan religions has, in fact, been counteracted; and it is from theſe alone we are to expect the future prevalence of ſound knowledge, virtue, and happineſs. I do not ſay, however, that *no* juſt principles of religion could ever have been formed by men unaſſiſted by revelation, but that this knowledge would have been acquired *very late*, not till error, ſuperſtition, and vice, had become too prevalent and inveterate; and ſome important religious truths, I may venture to ſay, would never have been acquired at all.

That there is *one God*, who made the world and all things in it, and who governs it by his providence, who loves virtue and will reward it, who hates vice and will puniſh it, are truths too ſublime to have been inveſtigated by human ſpeculation. On the contrary, a various and abſurd *polytheiſm*, leading to the moſt abominable and horrid rites, was the immediate conſequence of the wild, undirected ſpeculations of men concerning the origin of the world. The religion of the Patriarchs and Jews, which alone contained the great truths above mentioned, was a moſt ſeaſonable check upon the polytheiſm of the Eaſt, which was of the moſt flagitious and horrid kind. And it has been owing to chriſtianity, and to nothing elſe, that the ſame great and generous principles have now ſpread into this Weſtern part of the world, overturning the polytheiſm

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that prevailed in it before, and bidding fair, according to the prophecies of the gospel, to diffuse their beneficial influence among all the nations of the world.

The incapacity of mankind, in the early ages of the world, for speculating concerning their own nature, or that of the Divine Being, and therefore the real importance of revelation, is in nothing more conspicuous than in its appearing (now that we are somewhat better prepared to form a judgment concerning these subjects) that the doctrines of revelation only prove to be truly *rational*, and all the ingenious speculations of men, how specious soever, are found to be all chimerical and vain; being contradicted by the appearances of nature.

This is in nothing more evident than in the doctrine concerning *human nature*. The doctrines of philosophy on this subject, even those that have been in some measure subservient to the interests of virtue, will by no means stand the test of sound philosophy; whereas the simple doctrine of revelation stands uncontradicted by any natural appearance whatever; and by this means proves its origin from the *God of all truth*.

The doctrine of the scripture is, that God made man of the *dust of the ground*, and by simply animating this organized matter, made him that living, percipient, and intelligent being that he is. According to revelation, *death* is a state of rest and insensibility, and

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our only, though ſure hope of a future life, is founded on the doctrine of the *reſurrection of the whole man*, at ſome diſtant period; this aſſurance being ſufficiently confirmed to us, both by the evident tokens of a divine commiſſion attending the perſons who delivered the doctrine, and eſpecially by the actual reſurrection of Jeſus Chriſt, which is more authentically atteſted than any other fact in hiſtory.

On the contrary, the doctrine of philoſophy on this ſubject is that there are *two diſtinct principles* in man, a *body*, and a *ſoul*, the latter of which comes from heaven, and returns to it again, when the body dies; and conſequently that the body is ſo far from being the *whole man*, that it is very improperly called a part of him; being, in fact, an incumbrance to the percipient and thinking ſubſtance, which alone is *himſelf*; and we only begin to live to purpoſe, when we are diſengaged from theſe impediments to our highly active powers.

Contrary as this ſyſtem is to all appearances whatever, as I have ſhewn at large in the preceding treatiſe, it has been to an attentive ſtudy of the ſcriptures chiefly; and not ſo much to the conſideration of natural phenomena, that we are indebted for the downfall of it. We there find a total and remarkable ſilence concerning the *unembodied ſtate of man*. Death is there conſidered as a ſtate of oblivion and inſenſibility, and it is only at the general reſurrection of the human race, that the re-

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wards of virtue, and the punishments of vice, are expressly said to *commence*.

These circumstances are so striking in the system of revelation, that divines (and not philosophers) were first convinced, that, though man has a soul distinct from his body, its powers of perception and action depend upon the body, and that the whole man is in a state of insensibility from death to the resurrection. After this, we discover that natural phenomena entirely favour the same conclusion, and that, had we known nothing of man but what we see of him here, we must necessarily have formed the same judgment; and that death would be followed by the utter extinction of all our percipient and intellectual powers.

This having been the state of opinions for a considerable time, and the soul having served no other purpose but that of an *hypothesis* (being deemed incapable of subsisting, or at least of *acting* by itself) we are encouraged to lay aside all prejudice, and examine whether this hypothesis of a soul distinct from the body be favoured by fact and appearances. Finding it not to be favoured by any one fact or appearance in nature, I have ventured to reject it altogether; and here, and here only, I find a perfect consonancy between the doctrines of Revelation, and the dictates of natural reason.

Having proceeded thus far, I am tempted to extend my views, and consider the whole philosophical system, of which the doctrine of the

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the ſoul makes a part; endeavouring to trace it from its ſource, and to ſhew the miſchievous effects that have followed from incorporating a thing of ſo heterogeneous a nature into the ſyſtem of Revelation.

The importance of theſe inquiries muſt be evident to any perſon who attends to the progreſs of knowledge and good ſenſe in the world. For if the general body of chriſtians retain any doctrine as eſſential to revealed religion, which true philoſophy ſhall prove to be actually falſe, the conſequence will be, that the whole ſyſtem will be rejected by thoſe who conſider that tenet as an inſeparable part of it. So greatly doth it behove us that *chriſtian knowledge* ſhould keep pace with *philoſophical*.

A conjecture concerning the origin of the opinion of a *ſoul diſtinct from the body* of man was advanced in the preceding treatiſe. I ſhall now obſerve, that after the ſoul had, for reaſons there aſſigned, been conceived to be of the nature of *air*, or *fire*, to *go above the clouds*, and to *have come down from thence*, all which opinions have an eaſy connection, we find the following more extended philoſophical ſyſtem erected on this baſis. All accounts prove that it was firſt eſtabliſhed in the Oriental part of the world, and that it was thence diffuſed through Europe, but it was held with conſiderable variations every where.

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There have exiſted from eternity *two principles*, eſſentially different from, and oppoſite to each other, *God* and *matter*; the former an intelligent and perfectly good being, generally compared to *light*, the other the ſource of all evil, and generally compared to *darkneſs*. Either from eternity, or in time, there iſſued from the ſupreme intelligence various inferior intelligences. This production was by way of *efflux*, or *emanation from himſelf*, it being an indiſputable maxim, that *nothing can come from nothing*. Theſe intelligences occupied the region of light, bounded by that of darkneſs, which lay below it. The ſecond principle, or matter, was by ſome repreſented as wholly inert, but by others it was ſaid to be animated, or to have a peculiar ſoul.

Some of the inferior intelligences having ſinned, and forfeited their rank in the regions of light, were condemned to aſſume material bodies, ſeveral of which they ſometimes animated in ſucceſſion, till by this courſe of ſuffering and purgation, they were ſufficiently purified from their original ſtains; after which they were to re-aſcend to the regions of light, and be finally abſorbed into the ſupreme mind from which they iſſued.

For the purpoſe of forming theſe material bodies, and preparing a habitable world for their reception, there was a peculiar emanation from the ſupreme mind, or a *ſecond God*; ſince

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ſince the preſent habitable world, containing a mixture of good and evil, could not come from a being perfectly good. Others however ſuppoſed that this peculiar emanation was prior to all others, and co-eternal with the ſupreme mind.

The moſt conſiderable variation in this ſyſtem reſpects the *origin of matter*. For ſome did not ſuppoſe it to be eternal, but, like all other things, to have iſſued, directly or indirectly, from the one great original being and ſource of all exiſtence; and therefore that this alſo will, at length, be re-abſorbed, and nothing will exiſt but the Divine Being himſelf.

The next conſiderable variation is, that ſome repreſent the deſcent of ſouls into bodies, to have been at the ſame a *ſin* and a *puniſhment*; thoſe ſouls having firſt been ſmitten with a deſire to animate ſuch bodies, for the ſake of the corporeal pleaſures they might enjoy in them.

Such are the outlines of a ſyſtem, which, though founded on nothing but *imagination*, and conceit, without a ſingle *fact*, or appearance in nature to ſupport it, has dazzled and captivated the philoſophical part of the world from the earlieſt ages. And though the humble *ſyſtem of revelation* be diametrically oppoſite to it, in all its parts; repreſenting one God as *himſelf*, the maker of all things, the author of good and evil, and as having made man *of the duſt of the earth*, to which he

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he is to return, and from which he is to be raiſed at laſt; and though this ſyſtem of revelation has not failed, wherever it has been received, to overturn the *heatheniſh ſyſtem* in part, much of it, however, was unnaturally incorporated into chriſtianity in early times; and there are no ſmall remains of it in the chriſtianity of the preſent time, both popiſh and proteſtant, as will abundantly appear in the courſe of this work.

Notwithſtanding the very general ſpread of this philoſophical ſyſtem, it is remarkable that the minds of the Jews were long uncontaminated with it. The doctrine of revelation concerning a future life for man, depends upon *the reſurrection of the dead*, and has no other foundation whatever. No other ground of hope is ſo much as hinted at in any part of the Old or New Teſtament; and though it is poſſible that ſome of the learned Phariſees in our Saviour's time might have been infected with other notions, borrowed from the Greeks, or from the Eaſt, they appear not to have been then known to the *vulgar* among the Jewiſh nation, as is ſufficiently evident from the hiſtory of the death and reſurrection of Lazarus.

From this valuable hiſtory, we find that Martha, the ſiſter of Lazarus, had no hope reſpecting her brother, but from *the reſurrection of the laſt day*, John xi. 24, and our Lord gives her no conſolation but on the ſame ground. *I am the reſurrection and the life.*

Had

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Had the notion of a *ſeparate ſoul*, releaſed from the fetters of fleſh, and enjoying conſummate happineſs in another life, been known to them, and believed by them, it could not but have been uppermoſt in their minds; and ſome mention of it, or ſome alluſion to it, would certainly have been found in the hiſtory: whereas no ſuch thing appears.

This belief of a reſurrection, as the only foundation of a future life, evidently exiſting, and being univerſally received in the time of our Saviour, there can hardly be a doubt, but that it muſt have been the belief of the moſt early Jews and Patriarchs. And ſince this doctrine could never have been ſuggeſted by any appearance in nature, it muſt have been derived from ſome original revelation, probably prior to the flood.

It is remarkable that the doctrine of a reſurrection appears to have been a part of the religion of the ancient Perſians and Chaldeans, as may be ſeen in Le Clerc's edition of Stanley's *Hiſtory of the Chaldean Religion*, and Beauſobre's account of the religion of the Magi, in his excellent *Hiſtory of Manicheiſm*; but it ſeems to have become extinct in time, and to have given place to the more flattering account of the origin of the human ſoul, and its future deſtination, mentioned above. For after this it is remarkable, as all writers acknowledge, that no philoſopher admitted any future life but on the ſuppoſition

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poſition that the ſoul ſurvived the body; or admitted that the ſoul ſurvived the body, who did not, at the ſame time, ſuppoſe that it had exiſted before its union to the body, and who inferred that it would ſurvive the body from the conſideration of its having pre-exiſted? This, then, was the only ground of hope on the *heathen ſyſtem*, as oppoſed to that which revelation holds out to us, and which, though utterly inconſiſtent with it, has kept its place along with it in almoſt all our public creeds to this day.

SECTION I.

Of the INDIAN, *or the proper* ORIENTAL *Philoſophy.*

IT is in the Eaſt, and eſpecially in the empire of Indoſtan, where the ſame people, and the ſame government, continued for many ages, that we are to look for the genuine Oriental philoſophy with reſpect to the ſoul. We have not only the teſtimony of all ancient writers, that the ſyſtem I have mentioned prevailed there, and that from thence it was propagated Weſtward, but later travellers into thoſe countries give us the moſt ſatisfactory information concerning it. It is at this

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this very day the reigning religion of the Hindoos, and of a great part of the Eaſt; and the attachment of theſe people to it is exceeded by nothing but by that of the Jews to theirs.

Ramſay (*Travels of Cyrus*, p. 300) informs us from *Abraham Roger concerning the religion of the Bramins*, and *Kercher's Sina Illuſtrata*, that the Bramins believe that ſouls are an eternal emanation from the divine eſſence, or at leaſt that they were produced a long time before the creation of the world; that in this pure ſtate they ſinned, and from that time are ſent into the bodies of men and beaſts, each according to its deſert; ſo that the body which the ſoul inhabits reſembles a chaos or priſon. They teach that, after a certain number of tranſmigrations, all ſouls are re-united to their original, will enter into the company of the gods, and become divinities.

The Baudiſtes (ſays the author of *Examen du Fataliſme*, vol. i. p. 215) a ſect of Indian philoſophers, ſay that it is *ſenſual pleaſure* that weighs down the ſoul, corrupts it, and chains it to matter; ſo that the ſoul, in order to recover its natural dignity, muſt make itſelf independent of the wants of the body, and be ſenſible of the deceitfulneſs of the pleaſures it procures. The Baudiſtes, therefore, convinced of theſe principles, renounce pleaſure, the world, and their families, and give them-

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themſelves up to contemplation, and incredible auſterities.

Later travellers have given us much more extenſive and exact information concerning the religion of Indoſtan; and in them we have more particulars of the Oriental ſyſtem unfolded, ſo as to leave no doubt but that it was from this ſource that the Greeks derived their boaſted wiſdom, and the chriſtians the firſt taint that was given to their purer principles. Two Engliſh travellers have particularly diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their attention to this ſubject, Mr. Holwell, and Mr. Dow, who, though they differ in ſome particulars, agree ſufficiently in many things, for which I ſhall quote them.

Mr. Holwell gives his account of the religion of the Hindoos, from the *Chartah Bhade*, which, he ſays, contains a genuine uncontaminated account of their religion, in oppoſition to the *Aughtorrah Bhade*, which he ſays is a corruption of it. *Intereſting Hiſtorical Events*, vol. ii. p. 29. He ſums up the whole in the following manner:

"That there is one God, eternal, omnific, "omnipotent, and omniſcient; that God, "from an impulſe of love and goodneſs, firſt "created three angelic perſons, to whom he "gave precedence, though not in equal de-"gree; that he afterwards, from the ſame "impulſe, created an angelic hoſt, whom he "placed in ſubjection to *Birmah*, his firſt "created,

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" created, and to Biſtnoo, and Sieb, as co-
" adjutors to Birmah. God created them all
" free, and intended that they ſhould all be
" partakers of his glory and beatitude, on
" the eaſy conditions of their acknowledging
" him as their Creator, and paying obedience
" to him, and to the three primary created
" perſonages whom he had put over them."

" In proceſs of time, a large portion of
" the angelic hoſt, at the inſtigation of Moi-
" ſaſoor, and others of their chief leaders,
" rebelled, and denied the ſupremacy of their
" Creator, and refuſed obedience to his com-
" mands. In conſequence the rebels were
" excluded heaven, and the ſight of their
" Creator, and doomed to languiſh for ever
" in ſorrow and darkneſs. After a time, by
" the interceſſion of the three primary, and
" the reſt of the faithful angelic beings, God
" relented, and placed the delinquents in a
" ſufferable ſtate of puniſhment and probation,
" with powers to regain their loſt happy ſi-
" tuation. For that purpoſe a new creation
" of the viſible and inviſible worlds inſtan-
" taneouſly took place, deſtined for the de-
" linquents.

" The new creation conſiſted of fifteen re-
" gions, ſeven below, and ſeven above the
" terraqueous globe, and this globe is the laſt,
" and chief place of puniſhment, purgation
" and trial. Mortal bodies were prepared by
" God for the rebel angels, in which they
" were for a ſpace to be impriſoned, and ſub-

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" ject to natural and moral evils, more or leſs " painful, in proportion to their original " guilt; and through which they were doom- " ed to tranſmigrate, under eighty-nine dif- " ferent forms, the laſt into that of man, " when the powers of the animating rebel " ſpirits are ſuppoſed to be enlarged, equal to " the ſtate of their firſt creation. The rebel " leaders had power given them of God to " enter the eight regions of puniſhment and " probation, and the faithful angelic ſpirits " had permiſſion occaſionally to deſcend to " thoſe regions, to guard the delinquents " againſt the future attempts of their lead- " ers. Conſequently the ſouls, or ſpirits, " which animate every mortal form are *de-* " *linquent angels*, in a ſtate of puniſhment, " for a lapſe from innocence in a pre-exiſtent " ſtate." *Intereſting Events*, vol. ii. p. 60, &c.

In this ſummary the word *creation* is made uſe of by Mr. Holwell; but in the work from which the ſummary is made, it is ſaid that " the eternal One formed the angelic hoſt, in " part, *of his own eſſence.*" ib. p. 35. It is alſo ſaid. p. 44, that the rebel angels were driven from heaven into the *Onderah*, or *in-* *tenſe darkneſs*, the origin of which, not being mentioned, may be ſuppoſed to have been from all eternity; and it is no where ſaid in this account, that any thing was made from nothing.

" It

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" It is an eſtabliſhed doctrine," he ſays, p. 71, " of the *Aughtorrah Bhade*, that the three " primary created perſonages, as well as the " reſt of the heavenly angelic faithful ſpirits, " have, from time to time, according to the " permiſſion given them by God, deſcended " to the place of puniſhment, and have vo- " luntarily ſubjected themſelves to the feel- " ings of natural and moral evil for the ſake " of their delinquent brethren."

Theſe extracts from Mr. Holwell contain a pretty full detail of moſt of the tenets that I have mentioned in my ſketch of the Oriental ſyſtem. Some other particulars we learn from Mr. Dow.

According to him the *Beda's*, written in the Shanſcritt language, are ſaid to have been collected by Beaſs, who divided them into four diſtinct parts, four thouſand, eight hundred and ninety-four years before 1776 of the chriſtian æra. *Diſſertation prefixed to his Hiſtory of Hindoſtan*, p. 27. "The Hindoos," he ſays, "are divided into two ſects, the followers " of the doctrine of the *Bedang*, and thoſe who " adhere to the principles of the *Neadirſen*, " p. 38. The Bedang is an expoſition of the " doctrine of the Beda's by Beaſs Muni. It " was revived ſome ages after by Serrider " Swami. Almoſt all the Hindoos of the " Decan, and thoſe of the Malabar and Co- " romandel coaſts are of the ſect of the Be- " dang." p. 38.

According to the Bedang, " *affection* dwell- " ed with God from all eternity. It was of

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"three different kinds, the *creative*, *pre-*
"*ſerving*, and *deſtructive*. The firſt is repre-
"ſented by *Brimha*, the ſecond by *Biſhen*,
"and the third by *Shibat*. The affection of
"God then produced *power*, and power, at
"a proper conjuncture of time, and fate,
"embraced *goodneſs*, and produced *matter*.
"The three qualities then, acting upon mat-
"ter, produced the univerſe." p. 41. Accord-
ing to this ſyſtem, ſince nothing is ſaid to be
made out of nothing, matter muſt have been
produced by a kind of generation from beings
whoſe ſubſtance was originally derived from
God himſelf, which was agreeable to the
avowed opinion of the Cabbaliſts.

"God ſeeing the earth in full bloom called
"forth *intellect*, which he endued with va-
"rious organs and ſhapes, to form a diver-
"ſity of animals upon the earth. Intellect is
"a portion of the great *ſoul of the univerſe*,
"breathed into all creatures, to animate them
"for a certain time. After death it animates
"other bodies, or returns like a drop into
"that unbounded ocean from which it firſt
"roſe, which is the caſe with the ſouls of the
"good. But thoſe of the wicked are after
"death immediately clothed with a body of
"fire, earth, and akaſh" (a ſubtle ethereal
matter, from whence the Greeks probably
had their notion of the *materia prima*) "in
"which they are for a time puniſhed in hell.
"After this they animate other bodies, and
"and when they are arrived at a ſtate of pu-
"rity,

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" rity, they are abſorbed into God. This ab-
" ſorbed ſtate is a participation of the divine
" nature, where conſcioufneſs is loſt in bliſs.
" p. 44.——At length all things will be in-
" volved in fire, and the world reduced to
" aſhes. God will then exiſt alone, for mat-
" ter will be totally annihilated." p. 45.
This doctrine of a *final conflagration* was adopted by the Stoics.

" The more learned Bramins," he ſays, p.
" 50, maintain that hell is a mere bugbear to
" terrify the vulgar; for that God has no
" paſſion, but benevolence; and men are
" never puniſhed for their vices, but by the
" natural conſequences of their actions."
This we find to have been the opinion of all the Greek philoſophers, without exception.——Such are the doctrines of the Bedang.

The *Neadirſen* is not reckoned ſo ancient as the Bedang, but is ſaid to have been written by Goutam, near four thouſand years ago, and is received as ſacred in Bengal, and all the northern provinces of Indoſtan, but is rejected by the reſt. p. 56.

According to this ſyſtem, " the ſoul is a
" vital principle, a ſubtle element, which
" pervades all things, diſtinct from organi-
" zation, and vital motion. p. 58.

" Five things," he ſays, " muſt of neceſſi-
" ty be eternal, the firſt is the *great ſoul*,
" which is immaterial, and inviſible; the ſe-
" cond is the *vital ſoul*, which he ſuppoſes to

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" be material, poſſeſſed of the following pro-
" perties, number, quality, motion, con-
" traction, extenſion, diviſibility, perception,
" pleaſure, pain, deſire, averſion, accidents,
" and power. Upon the difference of the
" vital ſoul from the great ſoul the followers
" of the Bedang and Neadirſen principally
" differ. p. 58. From this vital ſoul ariſes all
" evil." ib.

It is remarkable that we find the ſame difference of opinion among the Greeks, the Stoics maintaining that inferior intelligences are detached from the *ſupreme mind itſelf*, and are to be abſorbed into it again; whereas other ſects make the human ſoul to be a portion of the *ſoul of the univerſe*, a principle diſtinct from the ſupreme mind, or to be compoſed in part of the one, and in part of the other.

" The third eternal principle is *time*, and
" *duration*, the fourth is *ſpace* and *extenſion*,
" the fifth is *akaſh*, a ſubtle and pure ele-
" ment, which fills up the vacuum of ſpace,
" and is compounded of quantities infinitely
" ſmall, indiviſible, and perpetual. God," he ſays, " can neither make nor unmake theſe
" atoms; but they are in other reſpects to-
" tally ſubſervient to his pleaſure.

" God, at certain ſeaſons, endues theſe
" atoms with plaſticity, by virtue of which
" they arrange themſelves into the four groſs
" elements of fire, air, water, and earth.
" And theſe atoms, being from the begin-
" ning formed by God into the ſeeds of all
" pro-

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"productions, the vital ſoul aſſociated with "them; ſo that animals and plants of va-"rious kinds were produced upon the face of "the earth. The ſuperiority of man, ac-"cording to this philoſophy, conſiſts in the "finer organization of his parts."

"The doctrines of tranſmigration and ab-"ſorption into the Deity he holds in common "with others." p. 60.

"He maintains that the world is ſubject "to ſucceſſive diſſolutions and renovations, "at certain ſtated periods. He divides theſe "revolutions into the leſſer and the greater. "At the leſſer the world will be conſumed "by fire, and the elements will be jumbled "together; and after a certain ſpace of time "they will again reſume their former order." p. 66. This, alſo, was the doctrine of ſome of the Greek ſects.——"Theſe repeated diſ-"ſolutions and renovations," Mr. Dow ſays, "have furniſhed a moſt ample field for the "invention of the Bramins. Many allegori-"cal ſyſtems of creation are, on this account, "contained in the Shaſters, and it was for "this reaſon that ſo many different accounts "of the coſmogony of the Hindoos have "been promulgated in Europe; ſome travel-"lers adopting one ſyſtem, and ſome ano-"ther." p. 66.

The doctrine of the reſtolution of all things is alſo found farther to the Eaſt. F. Longobardi, in his treatiſe concerning a learned ſect in China, obſerves that it is a doctrine of

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theirs, that "this univerſe will expire, and "all things in it. All things ſhall return to "their firſt principle, which ſhall produce "another world, after the ſame manner; "and this alſo ending, another will ſucceed, "and ſo another without end," *Leland's Neceſſity of Revelation*, vol. ii. p. 286.

The curious reader will be amuſed with ſeeing a manifeſt reſemblance between the mythological ſyſtem of Indoſtan and that of Greece in ſeveral other reſpects, beſides thoſe which I have had occaſion to point out.

It appears from the tenets of the early chriſtian heretics, which are univerſally acknowledged to have been derived from the Eaſt, that an opinion was entertained by ſome of them, that the intelligence employed to make the world became puffed up with pride, and renounced his allegiance to the ſupreme mind. The following is the account that Moſheim gives of the Oriental ſyſtem in general, as it was entertained by many about the time of the promulgation of chriſtianity, and which the reader may compare with the preceding accounts.

"According to the Oriental philoſophers, "the eternal nature, infinitely perfect, and "infinitely happy, having dwelt from everlaſting in profound ſolitude, produced at "length from itſelf two minds of different "ſexes, which reſembled the ſupreme parent "in the moſt perfect manner. From the prolific union of theſe two beings aroſe others, "which

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" which were alſo followed by ſucceeding " generations; ſo that, in proceſs of time, a " *celeſtial family* was formed in the *pleroma*. " This divine progeny being immutable in " its nature, and above the power of mor- " tality, was called by the philoſophers *æon*. " How many in number theſe œons were, " was a point much controverted among the " Oriental ſages."

" Beyond the manſions of light lies a rude " maſs of *matter*, agitated by innate, irregular " motions. One of the celeſtial natures de- " ſcending from the pleroma, either by a " fortuitous impulſe, or by the divine mind, " reduced into order this unſeemly maſs, " created men and inferior animals of dif- " ferent kinds, and corrected its malignity, " by mixing with it a certain portion of " divine light. This author of the world is " diſtinguiſhed from the ſupreme Deity by " the name of *demiurge*. His character is a " compound of ſhining qualities, and inſup- " portable arrogance. He claims dominion " over the new world he has formed, as his " ſovereign right, and, excluding the Deity " from all concern in it, demands from man- " kind, for himſelf and aſſociates, divine ho- " nours." *Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory*, v. i. p. 72.

This was the ſpecies of Oriental philoſophy adopted by the early Gnoſtics, who maintained that this imperious demiurge was the god of the Jews, and the author of the law of Moſes. And Moſheim ſays (*Diſſertations*, p. 19)

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19) that the Platonic philoſophy was of ſome uſe to chriſtianity in combating theſe Gnoſtics, and aſſerting that the Maker of the world, though not the ſupreme mind himſelf, was a benevolent being.

One practical, and horrid conſequence of the notion of *the evil nature of matter*, and of its ſerving for a clog or priſon to the ſoul, we ſee in the diſpoſition to mortify the body, which is ſo prevalent in the Eaſt; where the Fakeers torment themſelves in the moſt ſhocking manner. The ſame notions led to the *mortification of the fleſh* in thoſe chriſtians that adopted them, viz. faſting, corporal penance, abſtinence from marriage, ſolitude, ſilence, and various other auſterities.

SECTION II.

Of the Religion of the ancient PERSIANS *and* CHALDEANS.

OUR knowledge of the religion of the ancient Perſians and Chaldeans is very imperfect, for the ſame reaſon that our knowledge of that of the Egyptians is ſo; the people having been ſubjugated, their prieſts diſperſed, and no writings of their own having come down to us. But it appears ſufficiently from the collections of learned men, that the religion of this part of the world was contained

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tained within the same general outlines with the Oriental system above described.

According to Zoroaster, says Beausobre (in his *History of Manicheism*, vol. i. p. 164) "God, who is self-existent, before all ages, formed the world of pure and happy spirits, the same that the Valentinians called "*æons*, the *intelligences* of the Platonists, "and the *angels* of the Jews and christians. "Three thousand years after he sent his *will*, "under the form of a glorious light, and "which appeared in the figure of a man, accompanied by seventy of the most honourable of the angels. Then were formed the "sun, moon, stars, and men. Three thousand years after *evil* appeared, when God "formed this lower world, bounded by the "vortex of the moon, where the empire of "evil and of matter ceases. The magi, he "says, p. 168, thought matter animated, and "had a power of producing from itself an infinity of beings, partaking of its imperfections. This matter, according to the "Magi, lay in the lowest regions." p. 175.

It is said by some, that the original Magi believed that God only was from eternity, and that darkness had been created, p. 170. But Zoroaster appears to have held two eternal principles. p. 172.

All this sufficiently agrees with the account of the Oriental philosophy of Mr. Stanley, published with many corrections and additions by Le Clerc. From this treatise it appears

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pears too, that the doctrines of the *deſcent* and *tranſmigration of human ſouls* was part of this philoſophy. The ſoul, it is ſaid, p. 36, deſcending from the region of light into this body, if it behave well, returns to the light from which it came; but if it behave ill, it is ſent to a ſtill worſe ſituation, according to its deſert.

The Chaldeans thought that there was an intelligent principle in the ſtars and planets, the latter of which are called ζωα πλανωμενα in the oracles of Zoroaſter. *Le Clerc's Index Philologicus.* STELLA.

Some of the Perſians thought that there were two gods, of different natures, the one good, called *Horomazes*, and the other evil, called *Arimanius*, the one reſembling *light*, and the other *darkneſs*; and that in the medium between theſe was *Mithras*, who was therefore called the *Mediator*. ib. p. 105. This Mithras ſeems to correſpond to the *Birmah* of the Hindoos, and the νους of Plato; being a peculiar emanation from the Deity, and employed by him in the formation of the world, and therefore was ſuppoſed by philoſophizing chriſtians to be the ſame with *Chriſt*.

SECTION

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SECTION III.

Of the Introduction of the Oriental Philoſophy into GREECE.

WE may clearly diſtinguiſh ſeveral periods of philoſophy in Greece, the firſt before they began to ſpeculate much, and while they retained a general idea, derived from tradition, but mixed with many fables, of a God, a providence, and a future ſtate; the ſecond when they began to ſpeculate without much foreign aſſiſtance, or neglecting and deſpiſing it, when they rejected all belief of a God or future life; the third when they adopted the principles of the Oriental philoſophy, either in its more imperfect ſtate from Egypt, or when it was more ripened into a ſyſtem in the remoter parts of the Eaſt.

This was the ſtate of philoſophy in Greece in its moſt ſplendid time, after the age of Socrates, and in this ſtate it continued till near the age of Auguſtus, when every thing in the whole ſyſtem that could poſſibly influence the conduct of men ſunk into contempt, and was conſidered as a pleaſing dream. But after the ſpread of chriſtianity, ſome of the ſects which inculcated a ſtricter regard to morals, and favoured elevation of ſoul, as that of Plato, and the Stoics, were revived. In a much later period ſucceeded the revival of the Ariſtotelian

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totelian philoſophy, by the ſchoolmen, which continued till the time of Deſcartes.

Of the ſtate of mere *tradition* in Greece we know very little; but of the period of the *atheiſtical philoſophy* we have pretty diſtinct accounts, as it ſubſiſted long after the introduction of the Oriental, and was often the more prevalent of the two, though even this ſpecies of philoſophy borrowed ſomething from the Oriental ſyſtem.

It is expreſsly aſſerted by Ariſtotle and others, ſays Mr. Toland (*Letters to Serena*, p. 22) that "the moſt ancient Greek philoſophers did not dream of any principle, or "*actuating ſpirit* in the univerſe itſelf, no "more than in any of the parts thereof; but "explained all the phenomena of nature by "matter and local motion, levity and gravity, or the like; and rejected all that the "poets ſaid of God, dæmons, ſouls, ghoſts, "heaven, hell, viſions, prophecies, and miracles, &c. as fables invented at pleaſure, "and fictions to divert their readers."

That the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul was not of Grecian origin, may be concluded even without hiſtorical evidence (of which, however, there is abundance) from the circumſtances of the thing; it being always accompanied with other opinions, which were certainly of Oriental extraction. All the philoſophers who believed the immortality of the ſoul believed its *pre-exiſtence*, thinking it impoſſible that the ſoul ſhould ſubſiſt after the body,

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body, if it had not existed before it; and Lactantius has remarked, that all the ablest Greek Fathers embraced this opinion, and were followed in it by the ablest of the Latins also. *Beausobre*, vol. ii. p. 330.

The Oriental doctrine was, however, adopted by the Greeks with considerable variations, some of the philosophers holding that souls were sent into bodies for offences committed in a pre-existent state, but others by the sovereign will of God. ib. p. 331. The opinion of the *evil nature of matter* also appeared in Greece together with the first idea of a God, the doctrine of two principles being very apparent; and the philosophers who acknowledged two eternal principles believed the world not to have been made by God, but by angels, some by good ones, and some by bad. ib. p. 11. And this is no other than the Oriental doctrine.

The first intimation that the Greek philosophers had of the immortality of the soul, they seem to have imported from Egypt, and it was even then accompanied with the doctrine of transmigration. Diodorus says that Orpheus brought from Egypt the greatest part of the mysterious rites used in Greece, with the *orgies* that are celebrated at their explanation, and the fictions of hell; and he explains particularly those customs which were the foundation of the Grecian notions. *Toland's Letters*, p. 50. According to Cebes, Orpheus called the body a prison, because the soul is in it in a state of punish-

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puniſhment, till it has expiated the faults committed in heaven. *Ramſay*, p. 282.

Orpheus, however, was long before the æra of philoſophy in Greece, and his hiſtory is very uncertain. Of the proper philoſophers, both Cicero and Maximus Tyrius ſay, that Pherecydes was the firſt among the Greeks who openly maintained that the body only died, but that the ſoul was immortal *(ſempiternum)* and that he alſo taught that it exiſted before it came hither, ſo that he muſt have had his doctrine from the Eaſt.

It is rather extraordinary that Warburton, notwithſtanding the expreſs authority of Herodotus to the contrary, quoted before, and on no ancient authority but the paſſage of Cicero above referred to, ſhould maintain (*Divine Legation*, vol. ii. p. 221, &c.) that this doctrine was of no other than Grecian original; when almoſt all the ancients who ſpeak of Pherecydes, ſay that he had his doctrine from the Eaſt. Heſychius ſays that he had no maſter, but that he inſtructed himſelf, after having found ſome ſecret writings of the Phenicians. Suidas and Euſtathius ſay the ſame thing. Homer expreſsly ſays that the Phenician veſſels frequented the iſle of Scyros where he lived. Joſephus alſo ſays, that the firſt who treated of celeſtial and divine things among the Greeks, Pherecydes of Scyros, Pythagoras, and Thales, learned their opinions from the Egyptians and Chaldeans. Both Heſychius and Suidas ſay that Pherecydes

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des first introduced the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. See a Dissertation by Mr. Heinius in the *Memoirs of the Academy of Berlin*, vol. iii. p. 210, &c.

The next Greek philosopher who taught this doctrine, viz. Pythagoras, besides being the disciple of Pherecydes, it is universally acknowledged, had it from the East. He conversed with the Chaldean Magi, the Indian Gymnosophists, and particularly with the Egyptian priests; suffering himself to be circumcised, that he might be admitted to the secret doctrines of the latter. *Toland's Letters to Serena*, p. 31.

"Pythagoras," says *Beausobre* (vol. i. p. 33) "acknowledged two principles, God "and matter, the latter of which he believed "to be the cause of all evil. He also taught "the doctrine of divine emanations, calling "these first intelligences NUMBERS, being the "same with the *æons* of the Valentinians, "those spirits which are, as it were, the *eldest sons of God.* ib. p. 570. Plato called "them *ideas*, or λογοι. p. 571. The others "considered the œons as divine virtues, remaining in the divine essence. The *Sephiroth* of the Cabbalists are the same." ib.

The Pythagorean philosophy seems not to have spread much in Greece, but to have been confined pretty much to Italy, whither that philosopher retired. For, according to all accounts, the first person who taught the doctrine of a God in Greece, properly so called,

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was Anaxagoras; who, coming after Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and others, who had taught the univerſe to be infinite, and matter eternal, though the forms of it were changeable, added *another principle*, which he called *mind*, as that which moved and diſpoſed matter; from which, as being a new thing in Greece, he was ſurnamed νους.

But this philoſophy was not his own diſcovery. It is ſaid that he alſo was taught by the Magi, having been twenty years of age at the time of the expedition of Xerxes; and as Dionyſius Phalereus relates, he began to philoſophize at Athens at thoſe years; and as Theodoret and Ammianus inform us, had travelled likewiſe into Egypt. *Toland's Letters*, p. 32. The Greeks learned ſeveral things of the Magi in thoſe days, which afterwards inſpired others with the deſire of going into thoſe parts for perfecting their knowledge. ib. p. 32. Pliny alſo relates that Oſthanes, who accompanied Xerxes in his Grecian expedition, propagated his knowledge wherever he came. *Hic maxime Oſthanes ad rabiem, non aviditatem modo ſcientiæ ejus, Græcorum populos egit.* Hiſt. Nat. lib. 30. cap. i.

None of the heads of the Grecian ſects made ſo much account of a future life as Plato, and no philoſophical ſyſtem bears more evident marks of an Oriental origin than his. It is, in fact, the Oriental ſyſtem itſelf, with very little variation; no greater, probably, than might have been found in the Eaſt at the time that

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that he visited it. Pausanias particularly says, that he learned his doctrine from the Chaldeans and Indian Magi. *Toland's Letters*, p. 32.

Plato believed two co-eternal principles, God and matter, and that matter is the source of all evil. *Beausobre*, vol. i. p. 479. This he had from Pythagoras, and Pythagoras from the Magi. ib. He maintained the pre-existence of the soul, and asserted all human souls to be in a lapsed state, wanderers, strangers, and fugitives from heaven; declaring that it was a divine law, that souls sinning should fall down into these earthly bodies. *Cudworth*, p. 23. Agreeably to this, Cicero informs us, that he maintained that all *acquired science* was nothing but the recollection of former knowledge.

Without any softening, he frequently calls *souls*, *god*, and *part of God*, νουν αειθεον. Plutarch says that Pythagoras and Plato held the soul to be immortal; for that, launching out from the soul of the universe, it returns to its great parent and original. Eusebius expressly says that Plato held the soul to be ungenerated, and to be derived by way of emanation from the first cause, as being unwilling to allow that it was made out of nothing; which necessarily implies that, according to Plato's doctrine, God was the material cause of the soul, or that the soul was part of his substance. *Divine Legation*, vol. ii. p. 28.

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This account of the Deity, and the ſubdiviſion of his nature by *emanation*, could not have been derived from any other ſource than the Eaſt. But beſides the ſupreme intelligence, and the emanation of human and other ſouls from it, Plato ſuppoſed, agreeably to the Oriental doctrine, that there was another *peculiar emanation* from him, which he calls νους, and alſo δημιουργος; as having been employed in making the world, which world had alſo a ſoul peculiar to itſelf; and this, together with the two higher principles, make a kind of *trinity of minds*. The ſecond perſon in this trinity is alſo ſometimes called αυτοπαλωρ, from his producing other beings, and αυτογενης, from being the emanation of the ſupreme Being. *Cudworth*, p. 579.

There is, however, ſomething peculiar to the Platonic ſyſtem, which is that the world is as ancient as its cauſe, a mind not being capable of exiſting without action (*Beauſobre*, vol. ii. p. 12) ſo that the divine emanations were as eternal as himſelf. This doctrine was of capital uſe to the chriſtian Fathers, who maintained the *eternal proceſſion* of the Son from the Father, as well as his being of the *ſame ſubſtance* with him. Nor has it been of leſs uſe to thoſe Arians, who maintain the eternal creation of the Son out of nothing.

" Ariſtotle," ſays Warburton, " thought " of the ſoul like the reſt, as we learn from a " paſſage quoted by Cudworth, where, hav- " ing ſpoken of the *ſenſitive ſoul*, and declared

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" it to be mortal, he goes on in this manner. " It remains that mind, or intellect (pre-ex- " isting) enter from without, and be only " divine. But then he diſtinguiſhes again " concerning this mind or intellect, and makes " it twofold, *agent* and *patient*, the former " of which he concluded to be immortal, and " the latter corruptible." *Divine Legation*, vol. ii. p. 211.

As for the Getes, Celtes, and other northern nations, who held the doctrine of the future exiſtence of the ſoul, they alſo held the doctrine of tranſmigration, and are known to have had both from the Greeks, and the Eaſt. Xamolxis, the philoſopher of the Getes, and of Thrace, was a ſervant and diſciple of Pythagoras. *Toland's Letters*, p. 42.

SECTION IV.

Of the mixture of the Oriental and Greek Philoſophy with CHRISTIANITY.

THAT the leaven of this Oriental philoſophy was mixed with chriſtianity, at a very early period, even in the times of the apoſtles, all antiquity, and even their own writings, ſufficiently teſtify; and it is far from being wholly purged out even at this day. But whether the firſt introduction of it was directly from the Eaſt, or by the medium of the Greek philoſophy, is not quite clear. I

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rather think from Greece, though not long after more was introduced than the Greek philoſophy could well ſupply. It happened, however, that by the influence of the Greek philoſophers, who embraced chriſtianity, and diſtinguiſhed themſelves as writers, a great deal of that which came by this channel was firmly retained, and became incorporated into the ſyſtem, while much of that which was derived immediately from the Eaſt, being more glaringly inconſiſtent with the chriſtian principles, was rejected, and thoſe who introduced it were condemned as heretics.

On the firſt view of things, we are apt to wonder at the propenſity of the primitive chriſtians to adopt a ſyſtem ſo utterly repugnant to their own. But it is not more extraordinary than the propenſity of the Iſraelites to idolatry; and both were deceived by very ſpecious reaſons, that is, by reaſons which could not but appear ſpecious *in their circumſtances.*

The Oriental ſyſtem, beſides other flattering allurements, was wonderfully calculated to remove the two great objections that were in thoſe times made to chriſtianity, and at which the minds of men moſt revolted, viz. the doctrine of a *crucified man* for the founder of their religion, and of a *reſurrection from the dead.* The former, we learn from the apoſtle Paul, was a great ſtumbling block both to Jews and Gentiles; and at the latter all the wiſe

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wiſe men of Greece abſolutely laughed, as a thing utterly incredible.

How ready, then, muſt thoſe who were dazzled with the *wiſdom of this world*, more than with the *true*, but *hidden wiſdom of God*, have been to catch at the ſplendid doctrine of the *emanation of ſouls from the divine mind*, which was already received in the Gentile world, and to take that opportunity of advancing their maſter, the too *humble Jeſus*, to the high rank of the firſt and principal emanation of the Deity, the νους or λογος of the Platoniſts, and the δημιουργος under God, in ing the world.

More effectually to wipe away the *reproach of the croſs*, and make their ſyſtem more coherent, how natural was it to ſuppoſe that this great Being did not really, but only *in appearance* put on *fleſh*, and therefore did not really ſuffer and die, but only ſeemed to do ſo?

Alſo, when the philoſophers of that age ſneered at the doctrine of a *reſurrection*, with what pride would theſe weak chriſtians pretend to equal wiſdom and refinement with themſelves, by alledging that the true chriſtian reſurrection was not the reſurrection of a *vile body of fleſh and blood*, which could only be a burden to the ſoul, but either a myſtical reſurrection to a *new life*, or indicated the glorious time when the ſoul, being freed from all its impurities, would join its bright original, in a vehicle of light, a true ſpiritual body,

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and not that carnal one, which had been its puniſhment here?

Laſtly, the doctrine of the *impurity of matter*, has in all ages led to ſuch mortifications, and auſterities, as, requiring great reſolution and fortitude, have never failed to ſtrike mankind with reſpect and reverence; giving an idea of an extraordinary degree of abſtractedneſs from the world, and of greatneſs and elevation of ſoul.

It is very probable, alſo, that, as in later times, and alſo in our own days, perſons who pretended to extraordinary purity, more than they really had reſolution to keep up to, by expoſing themſelves to temptations too ſtrong for them, were ſeduced into lewdneſs, and other vicious practices; and then found pretences for continuing in them, as not affecting the *mind*, but the *body only*, which is no part of our *proper ſelves*, and of ſmall conſequence in itſelf. I am led to think ſo from what we may collect concerning the firſt chriſtian ſectaries in the writings of the apoſtles, who always ſpeak of great irregularities of conduct, as joined to a departure from the true faith of the goſpel. Perhaps their writings might check thoſe enormities, ſo that thoſe who retained the ſame general ſyſtem of principles would afterwards be more upon their guard againſt ſuch an abuſe of them. For it does not appear that the Valentinians, Manichæans, and others alſo, in later times, who went the fartheſt into the Oriental ſyſtem, were juſtly reproach-

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reproachable with reſpect to their lives and manners.

The firſt trace that we find of any thing like the Oriental ſyſtem in the New Teſtament is in St. Paul's Epiſtles to the Corinthians, ſuppoſed to be written about the year 56. For though the ſame apoſtle inculcates the doctrine of a reſurrection upon the Theſſalonians, in the year 52, what he ſays upon that ſubject to them does not imply that they *denied* the doctrine, but only that they had not been well informed concerning it, or had not rightly apprehended it. But what he ſays to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 15. ſhews that ſome among them had abſolutely diſbelieved the doctrine. Beſides, other hints that he drops in the courſe of the ſame epiſtle, ſhew that their minds had been infected with ſome ſpecious ſyſtem of *philoſophy*.

Speaking of his own preaching the goſpel, he ſays, ch. i. 17, *It was not with the wiſdom of words, leſt the croſs of Chriſt ſhould be made of none effect. For the preaching of the croſs is to them that periſh fooliſhneſs, but unto us who are ſaved it is the power of God. For it is written, I will deſtroy the wiſdom of the wiſe, and will bring to nothing the underſtanding of the prudent. Where is the wiſe, where is the ſcribe, where is the diſputer of this world? Hath not God made fooliſh the wiſdom of this world? For after that, in the wiſdom of God, the world by wiſdom knew not God, it pleaſed God by the fooliſhneſs of preaching to ſave them that believe.*

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For the Jews require a ſign, and the Greeks ſeek after wiſdom, but we preach Chriſt crucified, to the Jews a ſtumbling-block, and to the Greeks fooliſhneſs; but to them who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Chriſt the power of God, and the wiſdom of God. Becauſe the fooliſhneſs of God is wiſer than men, and the weakneſs of God is ſtronger than men.

It is probable alſo, from the inſtructions which the apoſtle gives concerning *virgins*, in the ſeventh chapter of this epiſtle, that too favourable an idea of *continence*, and *abſtinence from marriage* had crept in among them, from the ſame ſyſtem.

This epiſtle appears to have had a great effect. In his ſecond, however, he repeats his cautions with reſpect to the deceitfulneſs of worldly wiſdom, and he ſtill expreſſes his fears of their being ſeduced by it. Ch. xi. 2. *For I am jealous over you with godly jealouſy, for I have eſpouſed you to one huſband, that I may preſent you as a chaſte virgin to Chriſt: But I fear, leſt by any means, as the ſerpent beguiled Eve through his ſubtlety, ſo your minds ſhould be corrupted from the ſimplicity that is in Chriſt. But if he that cometh preacheth another Jeſus, whom we have not preached, or if ye receive another ſpirit, which ye have not received, or another goſpel, which ye have not accepted, ye might well bear with him.* Now a *Jeſus not really crucified*, might well enough be called *another Jeſus*, one that he had not preached to them, and the goſpel of that

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Jesus, and the spirit of it, would be quite *another gospel*, and *another spirit*.

The evil, however, appears by no means to have been stopped by these seasonable and forceable admonitions, at least not in other churches. For in all the epistles written by this apostle from Rome, during his imprisonment there, in the years 61 and 62, we find that this corruption of christianity had risen to a most alarming height; as we see that it excited the strongest expressions of concern and indignation from this truly wise and good apostle.

To the Colossians, he says, ch. ii. 4, *This I say lest any man should beguile you with enticing words*, v. 8. *Beware, lest any man spoil you through philosophy, and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ*, v. 18. *Let no man beguile you of your reward, in a voluntary humility, and worshipping of angels, intruding into those things which he has not seen, vainly puffed up in his fleshly mind, and not holding the head*, &c.—*which things have, indeed, a shew of wisdom, and will worship, and humility, and neglecting the body, not in any honour to the satisfying of the flesh*. He goes on to say, ch. iii. 3, *If ye then be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth at the right hand of God*, in which he might possibly allude to the turn they gave to the doctrine of a resurrection, willing to make some use of their mistake. "If it be true, as

"you

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" you pretend, that the *reſurrection is paſt al-*
" *ready*, and you are riſen again in the ſenſe
" that Chriſt really meant, act as becomes
" perſons ſo renewed in mind, and advanced
" to ſo pure and holy a ſtate."

But it is in the epiſtles to Timothy, and Titus, men who had the inſpection and care of ſeveral churches, that this apoſtle is moſt earneſt in his admonitions to oppoſe the progreſs of this miſchievous but ſpecious philoſophy. His firſt epiſtle to Timothy begins with this ſubject, as what was uppermoſt in his mind. Ch. i. 3. *I beſought thee to abide ſtill at Epheſus, when I went into Macedonia, that thou mighteſt charge ſome that they teach no other doctrine, neither give heed to fables, and endleſs genealogies, which miniſter queſtions, rather than godly edifying, which is in faith.* In the fourth chapter he again plainly alludes to the ſame ſyſtem of opinions, as what had been foretold ſhould be introduced into the church. Ch. iv. 1. *Now the ſpirit ſpeaketh expreſsly, that in the latter times ſome ſhall depart from the faith, giving heed to ſeducing ſpirits, and doctrines of dæmons—forbidding to marry, and commanding to abſtain from meat, which God hath created to be received with thankſgiving, of them who believe and know the truth. For every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refuſed, if it be received with thankſgiving. For it is ſanctified by the word of God and prayer.*

To

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To the ſame, no doubt, he refers in the ſixth chapter, where, ſpeaking of ſome who taught otherwiſe than he had done, he ſays, v. 3, *If any man teach otherwiſe, and conſent not to wholeſome words, even the words of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, and to the doctrine which is according to godlineſs, he is proud, knowing nothing, but doting about queſtions, and ſtrifes of words, whence cometh——perverſe diſputings of men of corrupt minds, and deſtitute of the truth*, &c. And he concludes the epiſtle with exhorting him, no doubt with the ſame view, in the following words, *O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy truſt, avoiding prophane and vain babblings, and oppoſitions of ſcience, falſely ſo called, which ſome profeſſing have erred concerning the faith.*

In his ſecond epiſtle to the ſame perſon, he very plainly alludes to the ſame ſyſtem, when he ſays, ch. ii, 16, *But ſhun prophane and vain babbling, for they will increaſe unto more ungodlineſs, and their word will eat as doth a canker. Of whom is Hymeneus, and Philetus, who concerning the truth have erred, ſaying that the reſurrection is paſt already, and overthrow the faith of ſome.* And as a motive with him to preach the word, and to be inſtant in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon, he adds, ch. iv. 3. *For the time will come when they will not endure ſound doctrine, but, after their own luſts, ſhall they heap to themſelves teachers, having itching ears, and they ſhall turn away their ears from the truth, and be turned unto fables.*

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In his epiſtle to Titus we find many expreſſions very much like thoſe in his epiſtle to Timothy, and therefore they probably allude to the ſame things; though he here intimates that they were *Jews* who were moſt induſtrious in propagating theſe new doctrines, accommodating them to their own law, as the Cabbaliſts afterwards are known to have done. Moſheim ſays, "That a conſiderable number "of the Jews had imbibed the errors of the "Oriental philoſophy appears evidently both "from the books of the New Teſtament, "and from the ancient hiſtory of the chriſtian church, and it is alſo certain that many "of the Gnoſtic ſects were founded by Jews." *Eccleſ. Hiſt.* vol. i. p. 38. Titus, i. 9, *Holding faſt the faithful word, as he hath been taught, that he may be able by ſound doctrine both to exhort and convince the gainſayers. For there are many unruly, and vain talkers, and deceivers, eſpecially they of the circumciſion, whoſe mouths muſt be ſtopped, who ſubvert whole houſes, teaching things, which they ought not, for filthy lucre's ſake.* Again, v. 14, *Not giving heed to Jewiſh fables, and commandments of men, that turn from the truth. Unto the pure all things are pure, but to them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing pure,* alluding perhaps to the prohibition of marriage, and of certain meats. iii. 9. *Avoid fooliſh queſtions and genealogies, and contentions, and ſtrivings about the law, for they are unprofitable and vain.*

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It is not improbable, alſo, that the apoſtle Peter alludes to the ſame ſyſtem, when he ſays, i. 16, *For we have not followed cunningly-deviſed fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, but were eye witneſſes of his majeſty.*

But the apoſtle John, who wrote later than the reſt, uſes language that cannot be applied to any thing but the ſyſtem I have mentioned; and it is moreover evident from the ſtrain of his writings, that he knew of no other conſiderable hereſy in the church in his time, which agrees with what ancient writers ſay, that no hereſies were known in the times of the apoſtles, but that of the *Docetæ*, who believed that Chriſt did not come in real fleſh, which is moſt evidently a branch of the ſyſtem I have deſcribed, and that of the *Nazarenes*, or *Ebionites*, of which I ſhall ſay more in its proper place.

To guard againſt this hereſy, which, in fact, ſubverted the whole goſpel, this venerable apoſtle is very particular in giving a moſt circumſtantial teſtimony to the proper humanity of Chriſt. 1 John i. 1. *That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have ſeen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the word of life. For the life was manifeſted, and we have ſeen it, and bear witneſs, and ſhew unto you, that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifeſted unto us.*

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That which we have ſeen, and heard, declare we unto you, &c.

It is, moreover, remarkable, that this apoſtle expreſsly calls this very doctrine *that of Antichriſt*, and he ſays there were many that publiſhed it. Ch. ii 18. *Little children it is the laſt time, and as ye have heard that Antichriſt ſhall come, even now are there many antichriſts, whereby we know that it is the laſt time*——v. 22. *Who is a lyar, but he that denieth that Jeſus* (the man Jeſus) *is the Chriſt*; the opinion of ſome of theſe ſectaries being, that *Chriſt* was another perſon than *Jeſus*, and that he came down from heaven, and entered into him. *He is antichriſt that denieth the Father and the Son. Whoſoever denieth the Son, the ſame hath not the Father.*

Again, iv. 3. *Every ſpirit that confeſſeth that Jeſus Chriſt is come in the fleſh, is of God.* From which we may clearly learn, that this was the only hereſy that gave any alarm to this good apoſtle. *And every ſpirit that confeſſeth not that Jeſus Chriſt is come in the fleſh, is not of God. And this is that ſpirit of Antichriſt, whereof ye have heard that it ſhould come, and even now already is it in the world.* It is alſo to the reality of the *body* of Chriſt, that he alludes, when he ſays, v. 6. *This is he that came by water and blood, even Jeſus Chriſt, not by water only, but by water and blood; for there are three that bear witneſs, the ſpirit, and the water, and the blood*; alluding, perhaps, to Jeſus being declared to be the Son of

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of God at his *baptiſm*, by his *miracles*, and by his *death and reſurrection*, of which the former was allowed by the Docetæ, but the latter they denied.

In his ſecond epiſtle, this apoſtle ſtill dwells upon the ſame ſubject, v. 7. *Many deceivers are entered into the world, who confeſs not that Jeſus Chriſt is come in the fleſh. This is a deceiver, and an Antichriſt.* V. 10. *If there come any unto you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your houſe, nor bid him God ſpeed.* It is to this alſo, probably, that he alludes when, in his third epiſtle, he expreſſes his joy that Gaius, to whom he writes, *walked in the truth.* V. 3. *I rejoiced greatly when the brethren came, and teſtified of the truth that is in thee, even as thou walkeſt in the truth. I have no greater joy than to hear that my children walk in truth.*

Who were the *Nicolaitans*, mentioned in the book of Revelation, is not known with any certainty; but as antiquity mentions no hereſies in the church in thoſe early times, but ſome branch of the Oriental ſect, and the Nazarenes, who are falſely conſidered as heretical, it is probable the Nicolaitans were ſome of the more flagitious of the former ſort, abuſing their tenets to licentious purpoſes; and perhaps this apoſtle naming them ſo expreſsly, and in terms of ſuch extreme diſapprobation, in an epiſtle from Chriſt himſelf, might be a means of extinguiſhing both the name and the thing.

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"The writers of the second and of the "following centuries," says Mosheim (*Eccles. Hist.* vol. i. p. 116) "Irenæus, Tertul-"lian, Clement, and others, affirm that the "Nicolaitans adopted the sentiments of the "Gnostics concerning two principles of all "things, the œons, and the origin of the "terrestrial globe."

"There is no sort of doubt," says the same writer (ib. p. 116) "but that Cerinthus, "another heretic, said to have been cotem-"porary with the apostle John, may be placed "with propriety among the Gnostics. He "taught that the Creator of this world, "whom he considered also as the sovereign "and lawgiver of the Jewish people, was a "Being endued with the greatest virtues, and "derived his birth from the supreme God, "that this Being fell by degrees from his na-"tive virtue, and his primitive dignity; that "the supreme God, in consequence of this, "determined to destroy his empire, and sent "upon earth for this purpose one of the ever "happy and glorious œons, whose name was "Christ; that this Christ chose for his habi-"tation the person of Jesus, a man of the "most illustrious sanctity and justice, the son "of Joseph and Mary; and, descending in "the form of a dove, entered into him while "he was receiving the baptism of John in "the waters of Jordan; that Jesus, after his "union with Christ, opposed himself with "vigour to the God of the Jews, and was,

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" by his inſtigation, ſeized and crucified by " the Hebrew chiefs; that when Jeſus was " taken captive, Chriſt aſcended up on high, " ſo that the man Jeſus alone was ſubjected " to the pains of an ignominious death."

It is to the ſame Oriental philoſophy that, for my part, I have little doubt that this apoſtle, who certainly referred to it in his *epiſtles*, alluded alſo in the *Introduction to his goſpel*, where (in direct oppoſition to the principles of this philoſophy, which ſuppoſed that the λογος, which made the world, was *a Being diſtinct from God*) he explains what the word λογος really means; as when it is ſaid, in the Old Teſtament, that the *world was made by it*, viz. the *wiſdom and power of God himſelf*, and nothing that was diſtinct from him. *In the beginning, ſays he, was the* λογος, as the philoſophers alſo ſaid; but the λογος *was with God*, that is, it was *God's own* λογος, or *his attribute*, ſo that the λογος was really God himſelf. This divine power and energy was always with God, always belonged to him, and was inherent in him. *All things were made by it, and without it was not any thing made that was made.* Thus we read in the Pſalms, *By the word of the Lord, were the heavens made.* &c.

Launching beyond the age of the apoſtles, we find ourſelves in a wide ſea of this *vain philoſophy*, partly of Grecian, and partly of immediate Oriental extraction; which, however, as has been ſeen, was ultimately the ſame thing. The moſt diſtinguiſhed of the

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chriſtian Fathers, as Juſtin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, &c. were deeply verſed in this philoſophy, and ſtudiouſly covered the *offence of the croſs*, by giving ſuch an idea of the author of their religion, and the tenets of it, as was calculated to ſtrike the philoſophical part of the world.

A principal ſource of the mixture of the Platonic philoſophy with chriſtianity was from the famous ſchool of Alexandria, as will appear from the following general account of it in the *Apology of Ben Mordecai*, letter i. p. 105. "The ſchool of Alexandria in "Egypt, which was inſtituted by Ptolemy "Philadelphus, renewed the old academy, "or Platonic philoſophy, and reformed it.— "This ſchool flouriſhed moſt under Ammo- "nius (the maſter of Origen and Plotinus) "who borrowed his choiceſt contemplations "from the ſacred ſcriptures, which he mixed "with his Platonic philoſophizings; and it "is diſputed by Euſebius and Porphyry whe- "ther he died a pagan, or a chriſtian.* He "had great advantages, being bred up in the "ſame ſchool with Philo Judæus. Beſides "this,

* Moſheim ſays (*Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory*, vol. i. p. 139) "That Ammonius maintained that the great principles "of all philoſophical and religious truth were to be found "equally in all ſects, that they differed from each other "only in their methods of expreſſing them, and in ſome "opinions of little or no importance; that all the Gentile "religions, and even the chriſtian, were to be illuſtrated "and explained by the principles of this univerſal philo- "ſophy, which derived its original and conſiſtence from "the

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" this, there was in the town of Alexandria, " a famous church, ſettled by Mark the Evan- " geliſt, and the ſchool was continued by " Pantænus, Clemens Alexandrinus, &c. " and after him ſucceſſively by Origen, He- " raclius, Dionyſius, Athenadore, Malchion, " and Didymus, who reached the year 350, " which doctors gave an admirable advance " to the church. The town was for this re- " puted the univerſal ſchool of the church, " and the Platonic philoſophy was in the " higheſt authority among the Fathers. For " it was the common vogue that it differed " little from Moſes; yea Cœlius Rhodius " thinks that Plato differs little from Chriſt's " placits."

" Origen, ſcholar to Ammonius, though a " profeſſed chriſtian, followed his maſter's " ſteps, mixing the Platonic philoſophy, and " the doctrines of the goſpel together; hop- " ing thereby to gain credit to the chriſtian " religion; and, with Clemens Alexandri- " nus and others, made uſe of the Platonic " and Pythagoric philoſophy, as a medium " to illuſtrate the grand myſteries of faith, " thereby to gain credit among thoſe Platonic " ſophiſts. And F. Simon ſays that the mix- " ture of the Platonic philoſophy with the

" the Eaſtern nations; that it was taught to the Egyptians " by Hermes, and brought from them to the Greeks, and " was preſerved in its original purity by Plato, who was " the beſt interpreter of Hermes, and of the other Ori- " ental ſages."

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" chriſtian religion did not tend to the de-
" ſtruction of the orthodox faith, but more
" eaſily to perſuade the Greeks to embrace
" chriſtianity. This, no doubt, was the in-
" tent, and it ſucceeded as all ſuch methods
" have done. Among other Platonic myſ-
" teries, that of the *Logos*, on which Am-
" monius and Plotinus, both heads of the
" Platonic ſchool, had commented, was tak-
" en, and applied to the divine logos, ex-
" plicated by St. John, which gave occaſion
" and foundation to many philoſophic diſ-
" putes, and conteſts in the ſchool and church
" of Alexandria."

That moſt of the celebrated Fathers were Platoniſts, and borrowed many of their explanations of ſcripture doctrines from that ſyſtem, is too well known to be inſiſted upon here. It was by this means that Auſtin, by his own confeſſion, as will be ſeen hereafter, came to underſtand, as he thought, the doctrine of the trinity.

He ſaid that if the Platoniſts were to live over again, they would, by changing a few words and phraſes only, become chriſtians. *Moſheim's Diſſertations*, p. 98. Many of the Platonic philoſophers, when they embraced chriſtianity, did not lay aſide their philoſophical gown, but thought to follow Chriſt and Ammonius too. ib. p. 117. The ſame judicious hiſtorian ſays that thoſe chriſtian doctors, who were infected with Platoniſm, did not diſcourſe of the ſtate of ſouls after death,

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of the nature of the ſoul, of the trinity, and many other things that bore a relation to them, as thoſe who drew their inſtructions from the ſacred ſcriptures, and were taught by Chriſt only. ib. p. 210.

" Syneſius," ſays Warburton (*Divine Legation*, vol. ii. p. 236) " went into the church " a Platoniſt, and a Platoniſt he continued " when he was there. This man could not " be brought to believe the apoſtolic doctrine " of a reſurrection, becauſe he believed with " Plato that the ſoul was before the body, " i. e. eternal, a *parte ante*. However, he was " not for ſhaking hands with chriſtianity, but " would ſuppoſe ſome grand and profound " myſtery to lie hid under the ſcripture ac- " count of a reſurrection."

But it is not my deſign to trace the Platoniſm of the Fathers in every article of faith. Enough of it has appeared in my hiſtorical account of opinions concerning the nature of God, and the human ſoul, on which I have enlarged pretty much, in order to trace the riſe and progreſs of the doctrines of materialiſm and immaterialiſm, and other things connected with them.

That the early heretics, or thoſe who attempted to bring into chriſtianity more of the Oriental ſyſtem than the bulk of chriſtians were diſpoſed to reliſh, had their inſtructions partly in the Eaſt, and partly alſo in the ſchool of Plato, is univerſally acknowledged. The doctrine of the Gnoſtics, ſays Beauſobre (vol.

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i. p. 394) was compounded of the philoſophy of Plato, the Oriental philoſophy, and the chriſtian religion. Tertullian's complaints, that ſo excellent a philoſophy as that of Plato ſhould give occaſion to all the hereſies, gives but too much reaſon, by diſcovering his own exceſſive admiration of it, to ſuſpect that he had himſelf made too free with it. "But in "thoſe days," ſays Beauſobre (ib. p. 40) "it "was allowed that, together with the funda-"mental doctrines of chriſtianity, any perſon "was at liberty to philoſophize about the reſt; "and the nearer they could bring their reli-"gion to the eſtabliſhed principles of philo-"ſophy, the more ſucceſs they had." But how dangerous a maxim was this! It was, in fact, ſetting up their own wiſdom againſt the wiſdom of God himſelf.

Manes and his predeceſſors were all known adepts in the philoſophy of the Eaſt. Baſilides, the proper founder of Manicheiſm, was a philoſophical divine, who travelled into Perſia, and mixed the philoſophical opinions of that country with his religion. ib. p. 40. Bardeſanes travelled even into India, to acquaint himſelf with the wiſdom of the Brachmans, ib. vol. ii. p. 129. The four books of Scythian, a teacher of Manicheiſm, and who had travelled into India, were thought to be thoſe which he had from the Brachmans, and which he brought into Egypt, p. 45. And the Valentinians, Beauſobre ſays, were Pythagoricians and Platoniſts, as, he adds, were almoſt

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almoſt all the Greek philoſophers, who embraced chriſtianity. vol. ii. p. 161.

Simon Magus is, by ſeveral ancient writers, called the *parent of all hereſies*, not that he was properly a chriſtian heretic, but becauſe the Gnoſtics, and other early heretics, borrowed much of their ſyſtem from him, and becauſe he introduced the Oriental philoſophy into Judea and the neighbourhood. See *Moſheim's Diſſertations*, p. 226.

In theſe circumſtances can it be any wonder that the pure religion of Chriſt got a tincture that would continue for ages, and even to the preſent time.

SECTION V.

Of the Influence of the Philoſophical Syſtem on the Chriſtian Doctrine concerning the PERSON OF CHRIST.

PERHAPS the greateſt diſſervice that the introduction of philoſophy ever did to chriſtianity was, that, in conſequence of the general doctrine of the *pre-exiſtence of all human ſouls*, the ſoul of Chriſt was, of courſe, ſuppoſed to have had a pre-exiſtent ſtate, and alſo to have had a ſuperior rank and office before he came into the world, ſuitable to the power and dignity with which he appeared to be inveſted on earth.

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Had the ſtate of philoſophical opinions in that age of the world been what it is now, and, conſequently, had the doctrine of pre-exiſtence been unknown, the riſe of ſuch a doctrine concerning the perſon of Chriſt would have been very extraordinary; and *the fact of its exiſtence* might have been alledged, as an argument for its truth. But the introduction of this tenet from the Oriental or Platonic philoſophy was but too eaſy; ſo that to a perſon who conſiders the ſtate of opinions at that time, there appears to have been nothing extraordinary in it. Nay, it would have been very extraordinary if, together with other opinions, known to have been derived from that ſource, philoſophizing chriſtians had *not* adopted this alſo; the temptation in this caſe being greater than in any other whatever; viz. to wipe away the reproach which was reflected upon chriſtianity from the *meanneſs of the perſon of our Saviour*, and the *indignity* with which he was treated.

We have ſeen that it was a fundamental doctrine in the Eaſt, and likewiſe in the Platonic ſyſtem, that, on account of the mixture of *evil* in the world, it could not be ſuppoſed to have been made by the ſupreme Being himſelf; but that it was formed from pre-exiſtent matter, by a celeſtial ſpirit, a principal emanation from the divine mind, the *Birmah* of the Hindoos, the *prima mens* of the Chaldeans, the νους and λογος of Plato. And what was more natural than to ſuppoſe that the *re-*

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ſtorer of the human race had been the *former* of it; eſpecially as thoſe who adopted that hypotheſis could ſo plauſibly apply to Chriſt, as we know they actually did, thoſe paſſages of the Old Teſtament, in which the world was ſaid to have been made by the *word*, λογος, *of God*, the ſame word or *power*, which actually dwelled in Chriſt, and acted by him *. By this eaſy channel, I make no doubt, did this great corruption flow into the chriſtian ſyſtem, with all the train of miſchievous conſequences that ſoon followed it.

It is, likewiſe, remarkable, that, as in the philoſophical ſyſtem of thoſe times, there was but *one* emanation of the Divine Being diſtinguiſhed in ſo particular a manner as to be the Creator of the world, ſo we find that chriſtians were firſt charged with introducing *two Gods*, and not *three*, the divinity of the *Holy Ghoſt*, as a ſeparate perſon, not having been an article in any chriſtian creed till after the council of Nice. Alſo the orthodox in thoſe times always gave that ſuperiority to the Father, as the ſource of all intelligence, that the philoſophers did to the *ſupreme mind* with reſpect to his emanations; ſo that the correſpondence between the two ſyſtems was wonderfully complete.

The Platoniſts, indeed, beſides *the ſecond God*, called νους, which they ſuppoſed to be a

* Alexander, to prove the eternity of the Logos, cites Pſ. xlv. i. *My heart is inditing a good matter*, λογον αγαθον. *Jortin's Remarks*, vol. iii. p. 47.

perfect

perfect image of the one ſupreme God, ſuppoſed a *third*, which was the *ſoul of the univerſe*, diffuſed through all its parts. *Beauſobre*, vol. i. p. 560. But though this makes a kind of a *trinity of Gods*, and therefore the doctrine is by ſome of the orthodox ſaid to be found in that philoſophy, it by no means tallies with the chriſtian trinity. But the doctrine of a *ſecond God*, an emanation from the firſt, is well known to have been a fundamental principle in the ancient philoſophy.

According to the oracles of Zoroaſter, the *monad*, from which all things were produced, delivered the government of things to the *ſecond mind*, an opinion which, as Le Clerc ſays, was adopted by Plato. *Stanley by Le Clerc*, p. 26.

That this was the true ſource of the doctrine concerning the pre-exiſtent nature and power of Chriſt, as well as of the averſion that was ſoon entertained to the thought of his having aſſumed a real body of fleſh and blood, is ſo obvious, that even the orthodox Beauſobre almoſt acknowledges it, though without deſign. "Thoſe," ſays he (vol. i. p. 379) "who were educated in the ſchool of "Plato, whoſe philoſophy was much eſteem-"ed in the Eaſt, believed that there was a "perfect intelligence, called νους, or λογος, an "emanation from the ſupreme intelligence. "They concluded that this ſublime intelli-"gence might reveal his will to men, and "teach men the way of ſalvation; but could "not

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" not believe that he would become united to " matter. Their view," he ſays (p. 380) " was to aboliſh the *ſcandal of the croſs*, and " to render the chriſtian religion more plau- " ſible."

The hiſtory of Auſtin's converſion to orthodoxy is another ſtriking argument in favour of this hypotheſis. " Auſtin," ſays Beauſobre, vol. i. p. 478, " believed Chriſt " to be a *mere man*, though much exalted " above others by divine gifts, till he learn- " ed of the books of Plato, tranſlated by " Victorinus, that the *Logos* exiſted before " all things, that he was from eternity with " God, that he created all things, that he is " the only Son of the Father, and finally " equal to the Father, being of the ſame ſub- " ſtance with himſelf."

The very *language*, which the early orthodox Fathers made uſe of to expreſs the derivation of the Son from the Father, viz. *emanation*, *efflux*, *probole*, &c. ſhews plainly enough whence that doctrine was derived. This language is even uſed by ſome of the modern orthodox, without conſidering how the doctrine of the immateriality of the Divine Being is affected by it. Cudworth ſays that " the ſecond and third perſons in the " trinity are eternal and neceſſary emanations " from the firſt," p. 559, and that " they all " have a mutual *inexiſtence* and *penetration of* " *one another*." ib. This divine alſo maintains the ſubordination of the Son to the Fa-

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ther, which agrees with the ancient doctrines on this ſubject. He ſays, p. 599, that "the "ſecond and third perſons in the trinity are "not ſo omnipotent as the firſt, becauſe not "able to produce it."

Several of the orthodox chriſtians, however, in early times, objected to the language above mentioned, viz. *emanation*, &c. as denoting either a *ſeparation*, or *extenſion* of the divine eſſence, which the Baſilidians and Valentinians avowed. *Beauſobre*, vol. i. p. 546. But thoſe chriſtian writers who thought God to be corporeal, made no difficulty of explaining the generation of the Son by the term προβολη, or *branch*, as not implying any ſeparation of ſubſtance, or a part detached from the reſt. ib. p. 548. Tertullian uſes this term. "The Son," ſays he, "comes from "the eſſence of the Father, as the ſtock of a "tree from the root, or a ray from the ſun. "Juſtin Martyr uſes the ſame term." ib. p. 549.

The Manicheans explained the generation of the Son from the Father, without ſuppoſing any loſs to the Father, by comparing it to the lighting of one lamp by another, p. 555. Juſtin Martyr, and Tatian uſe this compariſon. Tatian alſo uſes another compariſon with the ſame view; but it is leſs happy in other reſpects. When I ſpeak to you, ſays he, and you hear me, my reaſon (λογος) goes into you, without my being deprived of it. ib. p. 590.

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Others of them had recourſe to worſe ſhifts than even this. Some of the catholics being charged with introducing three gods, and with making the perſons of the trinity as diſtinct from one another, as Peter, James, and John, acknowledged it; ſaying that Peter, James, and John might be ſaid to be one, on account of their partaking of the ſame human nature. ib. p. 558.

The term προβολη, was rejected, however, by Origen, who was a Platoniſt, as implying that God was corporeal. p. 553.

According to the heathen ſyſtem, the emanation of the Son from the Father was not a neceſſary, but a *voluntary* thing, and took place either *in time*, according to the proper Oriental ſyſtem, or *from eternity*, according to Plato. And we alſo find the doctrine of the voluntary emanation of the Son by the Father among the early chriſtians, though this idea is not admitted at preſent. Juſtin Martyr ſays that "the Father begat the Son volun-" tarily." Origen taught the ſame doctrine, and Petavius acknowledges that it was the opinion of a great number of the ancient doctors. *Beauſobre*, vol. i. p. 522. "The principles " of the ancients concerning the trinity," ſays Mr. Dupin, "was that the word was " from all eternity in the Father, being his " wiſdom and power; that when he choſe to " make the world, *he put him*, as it were, " *without himſelf*." vol. i. p. 520.

The Fathers did not, in general, believe that the Son was produced from eternity, but only

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only immediately before the creation of the world, that he might be employed for that purpoſe. ib. This opinion is found even later than the council of Nice. p. 521. Lactantius ſays that "when God was reſolved to make "the world, which was to be compoſed of "things of a contrary nature, he began with "creating two ſorts of them, the one good, "*his only Son*, and the other evil, *the devil*, "which are to be in continual war." p. 574.

It is, likewiſe, a very ancient opinion among very catholic authors, that the firſt intelligent being that God made was *the devil*; he being the firſt of thoſe intelligences that God created an infinite number of ages before the creation of the viſible world, at which time, and not before, Chriſt was produced. ib. p. 524.

The hypotheſis I am purſuing clearly explains why the Marcionites, Valentinians, and Manicheans eſcaped cenſure at the council of Nice. For thoſe ſectaries, as Beauſobre ſays, vol. i. p. 542, were orthodox with reſpect to the trinity; ſince they could make uſe of the term *conſubſtantial* as well as the moſt orthodox; which the Arians, who believed that the Logos was created out of nothing, could not do. The Manicheans believed the conſubſtantiality of the perſons, but not their *equality*; believing the Son to be below the Father, and the Spirit below both. p. 561. This error, however, was not peculiar to them, but was very general. ib.

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It is only by an attention to these principles that we can understand the state of the controversy between the orthodox and the Arians. For though the Fathers in general believed that the Son had not proceeded from the Father, but a short time before the creation of the world, in which he was employed, they believed that he issued *from the substance of the Father*, and therefore was *light of light*, *very God of very God*, *begotten* not *made*, that is, *not created out of nothing*, which the Arians maintained. We see, then, that the Arians retained so much of the established system, as not to deny the *pre-existence* of Christ, or his office of *creating the world*. These notions were so deeply rivetted, that they were not easily eradicated; but it is evident that the Arians had less of the Oriental or Platonic philosophy than the orthodox.

Indeed the learned Cudworth acknowledges that the Athanasians, and the Nicene Fathers, Platonized, and not the Arians; though he says that they derived their ideas not from Plato, but from the scriptures. p. 529. But of that let the reader judge. The Platonizing Fathers, says Le Clerc (see his *Edition of Stanley*, p. 160) thought that before the actual generation of the Son, he was *virtually in the Father*, and therefore αὐλοθεον, whereas the Arians denied this, and said that he, like other creatures, was produced from nothing.

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SECTION VI.

General Arguments againſt the PRE-EXISTENCE OF CHRIST.

THE preceding hiſtory of opinions relating to the pre-exiſtence of Chriſt affords a very ſtriking argument againſt that doctrine. But I think it will not be amiſs in this place, in order to remove the ſtrong prejudices that have taken place with reſpect to this ſubject, to add ſome other arguments of a *general nature*, ſuch as ariſe from the known ſtate of things in the apoſtolic age, and what may be fairly inferred from the apoſtolic writings, without entering into the diſcuſſion of particular texts of ſcripture, for which I beg leave to refer my reader to my *Illuſtration of particular Texts*, and more eſpecially to *Mr. Lindſey's* excellent *Sequel to his Apology*, where that worthy man, and valuable writer, has thrown much new light upon many of thoſe paſſages which have been the greateſt ſtumbling blocks in the way of the antipre-exiſtent doctrine.

It is acknowledged by all writers, that, at the beginning of chriſtianity, there aroſe *two* oppoſite errors concerning the perſon of Chriſt. The firſt they ſay came from the Jewiſh converts, who maintained that Chriſt was only *a*

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man, distinguished by peculiar gifts. "This," says Athanasius, "was an error of the Jews, "in the time of the apostles; and he says "they drew the Gentiles into it." Of these there were two sorts, some called Nazarenes, who believed the miraculous conception, and the other Ebionites, who believed Christ to be born of Joseph and Mary. This is expressly said to have been *the most ancient heresy in the church*. Beausobre, vol. ii. p. 517.

"Presently after, however, there arose "another error, quite opposite to this, intro- "duced by the Pagan philosophers, who strip- "ped Christ of his human nature. This he- "resy was one of the first that spread among "the Gentiles, and the apostle John did all "he could to prevent its spread, but in vain." ib. p. 518.

Now, admitting these facts, viz. the existence of the *Nazarene* heresy, and that of the *Docetæ* in the apostolic age, and that the former was prior to the other, I think we may safely infer, from the notice taken of heresy in the New Testament, that the former was not considered as any heresy at all; because there is no mention made of it *as such*; whereas the other is inveighed against, and especially by the apostle John, in the strongest terms; and moreover, as has been shewn above, he evidently speaks of it in such a manner as implies, that he had no idea of any other heresy of consequence in his time.

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Againſt this hereſy he writes in the cleareſt and moſt expreſs manner, and with the moſt vehement zeal. Of the other ſuppoſed hereſy he is ſo far from taking any notice at all (notwithſtanding what has been imagined by ſome commentors upon him) that he writes exactly like a perſon who conſidered Chriſt as a man, who was ſo far from being of *the ſame ſubſtance with the Father*, and conſequently poſſeſſed of any power *of his own*, that he received all his powers immediately from God. And it is remarkable, that thoſe texts which moſt ſtrongly expreſs the abſolute dependence of Chriſt upon God, and which aſſert that all the wiſdom and power that appeared in him were the wiſdom and power of the Father, and not his own, occur chiefly in the goſpel of this very apoſtle.

Alſo, the reſt of the apoſtles, inſtead of taking any notice, direct or indirect, of this capital hereſy, as it has been repreſented, conſtantly uſe a language that could not but give the greateſt countenance to it; always ſpeaking of Chriſt as *a man*, even when they repreſent him in a light of the greateſt importance.

This utter ſilence of the writers of the New Teſtament concerning a *great hereſy*, the very firſt that ever exiſted in the chriſtian church, and as it is now repreſented, the moſt *dangerous* of all others; a hereſy taking place chiefly among the Jews, with whom the apoſtles had moſt to do, looks as if they conſidered the opinion

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opinion of the *proper humanity of Chriſt* in a very different light from that in which it was viewed by their philoſophizing ſucceſſors.

Athanaſius, who could not deny theſe facts, endeavours to account for them, by ſaying that "all the Jews were ſo firmly perſuaded "that their Meſſiah was to be nothing more "than a man like themſelves, that the apoſ- "tles were obliged to uſe great caution in di- "vulging the doctrine of the proper divinity "of Chriſt." See his *Epiſtola de Sententia Dionyſii contra Arianos.* Opera, vol. i. p. 553. But did the apoſtles ſpare other Jewiſh prejudices, which were, at leaſt, as inveterate as this, eſpecially their zeal for the law of Moſes, and their averſion to the admiſſion of the Gentiles into the chriſtian church without circumciſion, &c.? And ought not the *importance* of the doctrine to have conſtrained them to venture a little beyond the bounds of a *timid prudence,* in ſuch a caſe as this; eſpecially as the Jewiſh chriſtians in general, as far as appears, always continued in this error, till their final diſperſion, by the civil convulſions that took place in the Eaſt, ſubſequent to the deſtruction of Jeruſalem?

Beſides, whether was it more probable that the *illiterate Jews,* who received their doctrine from none but the apoſtles themſelves, and indeed converſed with no other, ſhould have fallen into ſo grievous an error with reſpect to the perſon of Chriſt, *their own Meſſiah,* or thoſe who are known to have drawn various

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opinions from other ſources beſides the genuine apoſtolical doctrine, and particularly from that very *philoſophy* which, manifeſtly contrary to any thing that the Jews could poſſibly have learned from their ſacred books, expreſsly taught the doctrine of the pre-exiſtence of all human ſouls, and their emanation from the divine mind; which was, in fact, the doctrine and language of the pretended orthodox Fathers?

Without examining the merits of the queſtion, *probability* will certainly incline us to take the part of the poor Jewiſh converts. Indeed, their poverty and illiterateneſs made them deſpiſed by the Gentile chriſtians, who were captivated with the *wiſdom of this world:* Juſtin Martyr, however, the earlieſt Gentile chriſtian writer, ſpeaks of them and their opinions with more reſpect than they were afterwards treated with. He was one of the firſt of the philoſophizing chriſtians, and therefore might know that their doctrines were thoſe of the bulk of chriſtians in his time; and perhaps, at that time, few thought differently from them, beſides a few ſpeculative perſons like himſelf. See Edit. *Thyrlby*, p. 235.

2. It is evident, that the moſt intelligent of the Jews expected nothing more than a *mere man* for their Meſſiah *; nor can it be ſaid that any

* "They," ſays Trypho (the Jew ſpeaker in Juſtin Martyr's Dialogue) "who think that Jeſus was *a man*, "and, being choſen of God, was anointed Chriſt, ap-"pear

any of the ancient prophecies give us the leaſt hint of any thing farther. Had the prophecies *not* been *explicit*, there ſeems to have been the greateſt reaſon why our Lord, or his apoſtles, ſhould have expreſsly obſerved that they were ſo; or if they had been univerſally *miſunderſtood*, or *perverted*, we might expect that this ſhould have been noticed by our Lord, as well as other abuſes or miſtakes which prevailed in his time. Or if a diſcovery of ſo great importance would have ſtaggered the faith, or checked the freedom of the diſciples of our Lord, when they were fully apprized of the tranſcendent greatneſs of the perſon whom they had conſidered as a man like themſelves, we might have expected that this great diſcovery would have been made to them when their minds were fully enlightened by the deſcent of the Holy Ghoſt, or at ſome other time, when they were fully inſtructed in all things relating to the religion they had to teach. And whenever the revelation of a thing ſo highly *intereſting*, and *unexpected*, as this muſt have been, had been made to them, their wonder and ſurprize muſt have been ſuch, as we ſhould have found ſome *traces* or *intimations* of in their writings.

" pear to me to advance a more probable opinion than " your's. For all of us expect that Chriſt will be born *a* " *man from man* (ανθρωπον εκ ανθρωπων) and that Elias will " come to anoint him. If he, therefore, be Chriſt, he " muſt, by all means, *be a man born of men.*" Edit. *Thyrlby*, p. 235.

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Nor can it be ſuppoſed that a thing of ſo wonderful a nature as this, could have been announced to the body of chriſtians, who certainly had not, at firſt, the moſt remote idea of ſuch a thing, without exciting an aſtoniſhment, that could not have been concealed, and ſuch *ſpeculations* and *debates* as we muſt have heard of. And yet the apoſtles, and the whole chriſtian world, are ſuppoſed to have paſſed from a ſtate of abſolute ignorance concerning the nature of their Lord and Maſter (regarding him in the familiar light of a friend and *brother*) to the full conviction of his being the *moſt glorious of all created natures*; him by whom *God* originally *made*, and conſtantly *ſupported all things*, without leaving any intimation by which it is impoſſible for us to learn, *in what manner* ſo wonderful a communication was made to them, or of the *effects* it had on their own minds, or thoſe of others.

At whatever *time* it be ſuppoſed that the apoſtles were firſt apprized of the *ſuperangelic nature* of their Maſter, it might be expected that ſo very material a change in their conceptions concerning him, would have been attended with a correſpondent change in their *language*, when they ſpoke of him; and yet through the whole book of Acts, he has hardly any other appellation than ſimply that of *a man*. Thu the apoſtle Peter calls him, Acts ii. 22. *A man approved of God*; and the apoſtle Paul, Acts xvii. 31. *The man whom God*

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God ordained. Nor when we may moſt certainly conclude that the apoſtles meant to ſpeak of him in his *higheſt capacity*, do they give him any other title; as when the apoſtle Paul ſays, 1 Tim, ii. 5. *There is one God and one Mediator between God and men*, the man *Chriſt Jeſus.*

3. Had this Mediator between God and man been of a *middle nature* between God and man, I think one might have expected ſome *poſitive declaration* of it, in this or ſome ſuch place; and that the apoſtle would not have expreſſed himſelf in a manner ſo unguarded, and which, without ſome explanation, muſt neceſſarily lead his readers into a very great miſtake. It is in vain, however, that we look through the whole New Teſtament for any thing like ſuch an expreſs declaration, or explanation, on the ſubject; and a doctrine of this extraordinary nature is only pretended to be deduced by way of *inference from caſual expreſſions.*

4. It is alſo with me a very ſtrong preſumption againſt the Arian hypotheſis, that no *uſe* is made by the writers of the New Teſtament, of ſo extraordinary a fact, as that of the union of a ſuperangelic ſpirit with the body of a man. No *argument* or *exhortation* is even grounded upon it; whereas it might have been expected, that ſo very wonderful a thing as this muſt have been *alluded to*, and *argued from*, in a great variety of reſpects; and eſpecially that the firſt converts to chriſtianity ſhould have been frequently, and very diſtinctly

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diſtinctly informed of the *high rank of their maſter*; eſpecially as the great popular objection to the chriſtian ſcheme was the *mean birth* and *obſcurity* of its author, and the *diſgraceful treatment* he met with in the world. The very few texts in which it is thought by ſome that arguments are drawn from the pre-exiſtent ſtate of Chriſt, appear to me to refer to nothing more than the dignity with which he was inveſted as *Meſſiah*, after he was *ſent of God*, and endued with power from on high, for the important purpoſes of his miſſion.

It weighs much with me, that if ſo extraordinary a thing as the deſcent of a ſuperangelic ſpirit, to animate a human body, had been true, it muſt have appeared, in the courſe of the hiſtory of Chriſt, that ſuch an extraordinary a meaſure was *neceſſary*; as by his acting a part which a *mere man* was either naturally incapable of, or in which there was an obvious impropriety for a mere man to act. But ſo far are we from perceiving any thing of this in the evangelical hiſtory, that nothing is exhibited to us in it, but the appearance of *a man approved of God* and *aſſiſted* by him. For, though no man could have done what he is ſaid to have done, *unleſs God had been with him*, yet *with that aſſiſtance*, every thing muſt have been eaſy to him.

If our Lord had, *in himſelf*, though derived originally from God, any extraordinary degree of wiſdom, or peculiar ability of any other kind, for carrying on the work of man's re-

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redemption, above the measure or capacity of that nature which God had given to men, he would hardly have declared so frequently and so expressly as he does, that *of his own self he could do nothing*, that *the words which he spake were not his own*, but *his Father's who sent him*, and *that his Father within him did the works*. This is certainly the proper language of a person who is possessed of no more natural advantage than any other man. If he had any superior powers, abstracted from what he derived from the immediate agency of God, *in what do they appear?*

So solicitous does the Divine Being always appear, that his rational offspring, mankind, should *understand*, and *approve* of his proceedings respecting them, that there is hardly any measure which he has adopted, that is of much moment to us, for which some *plain reason* is not assigned by one or other of the sacred writers. Indeed, this is a circumstance that cannot but contribute greatly to the efficacy of such measures. But though, I believe, every other circumstance relating to the scheme of redemption is clearly revealed to us, yet we neither find any reason assigned for so important a preliminary to it, as the *incarnation of the first of all created beings*, nor are we any where given to understand, that this was a necessary preliminary to it, though the reasons for it were such as we could not comprehend. A conduct so exceedingly dark and mysterious as this, has no example in the whole

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whole hiſtory of the diſpenſations of God to mankind.

5. Could the hiſtory of the *miraculous conception of Jeſus* have been written ſo fully as it is by both Matthew and Luke, and ſo very important a circumſtance relating to it as this have been overlooked by them, if it had been at all known to them? I will appeal to any Arian, whether he himſelf could poſſibly have given ſuch an account of that tranſaction as either of theſe evangeliſts has given. It muſt certainly be thought by them to be a capital omiſſion in the account.

6. It has often been obſerved, and I cannot but think very juſtly, that the uniform ſcripture doctrine of the preſent and future dignity of Chriſt, being conferred as *the reward of his ſervices and ſufferings on earth*, is peculiarly favourable to the idea of his being a man only; and I think the Arians are obliged to ſtrain very hard in order to make out any material difference between the pre-exiſtent and preſent ſtate of Chriſt; or to explain the nature of his *reward*, of which ſo ſtriking an account is always given, if there be no material difference between the two ſtates.

7. It is ſaid that, if it be difficult to explain the reward of Chriſt upon the Arian hypotheſis, it is equally difficult to account for his diſtinguiſhed reward and future honour and power upon the ſuppoſition of his being a *mere man*; theſe being *too great* in this caſe, if they were *too little* in the other. But it ſhould

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ſhould be conſidered, that there is a *natural propriety* in diſtinguiſhing a man appointed by God to act the moſt important part that man could act (and a part that *no other than a man* could with propriety appear in, reſpecting the whole human race) in a manner greatly ſuperior to what is conferred on any other man.

It ſhould alſo be conſidered, that there are many paſſages of ſcripture, which moſt expreſsly ſay that, great as is the honour and dignity to which Chriſt is advanced, his diſciples, and eſpecially his apoſtles, will be advanced to *ſimilar* if not *equal* honour. And it is remarkable that there is no one *power*, or *prerogative*, that is mentioned as conferred on Chriſt, but the ſame is likewiſe ſaid to be imparted to his followers.

As to what is called his *glory*, or honour and dignity in general, and the *love that God* has for him, that love and high regard from which thoſe honours proceed, our Lord himſelf ſays expreſsly, that his diſciples are on a level with himſelf. What elſe can be inferred from his prayer before his death, in which he ſays, John xvii. 21, *That they may be one, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they alſo may be one in us,—and the glory which thou gaveſt me, I have given them, that they may be one, even as we are one. I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one, and that the world may know that thou haſt ſent me, and haſt loved them as thou haſt loved me.*

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me. Other parts of this remarkable prayer are in the ſame ſtrain, and it appears to me that nothing but our having long conſidered Chriſt in a light infinitely higher than that of his diſciples, has prevented our underſtanding it as we ought to have done.

Chriſt is appointed to *raiſe the dead*, but this is not ſaid to be performed by any proper *power of his own*, any more than the miracles of that and other kinds which he wrought when he was on earth, and dead perſons were raiſed to life by the apoſtles as well as by himſelf.

Chriſt is alſo ſaid to *judge the world.* But even this honour is ſaid to be ſhared with him by his diſciples, and eſpecially the apoſtles. *Know ye not*, ſays St. Paul, 1 Cor. vi. 2, *that the ſaints ſhall judge the world. And if the world be judged by you, are ye unworthy to judge the ſmalleſt matters. Know ye not, that we ſhall judge angels, how much more things that pertain to this life.*

8. The *kingdom of Chriſt*, whatever it be, is expreſsly ſaid to *have an end.* 1 Cor. xv. 24, *Then cometh the end, when he ſhall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father.——And when all things ſhall be ſubdued unto him, then ſhall the Son alſo himſelf be ſubject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all.* This is what we ſhould hardly have expected if Chriſt had been the firſt of all created beings, by whom all things

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things were made, and who upholds and governs all things.

In this I am far from meaning to detract from the peculiar dignity and juſt prerogative of Chriſt. And upon this ſubject I ſhall beg leave to quote what I have in my *Diſcourſe concerning the Spirit of Chriſtianity* prefixed to my *Eſſay on Church Diſcipline*, p.

" Our aptneſs to paſs from one extreme to " another, and the inconvenience attending it, " are alſo felt with reſpect to our ſentiments " concerning the perſon and character of Chriſt. " Upon finding that inſtead of being *very God of* " *very God, the Creator of heaven and earth*, he " is only *a man like ourſelves*, we are apt at firſt " to undervalue him, and not to conſider him " in that diſtinguiſhed light in which, though a " man, he is every where repreſented in the " ſcriptures; as the great inſtrument in the " hands of God, of reverſing all the effects of " the fall; as the object of all the prophecies " from Moſes to his own time; as the great " bond of union to virtuous and good men (who, " as *chriſtians*, or having Chriſt for their maſter " and head, make *one body*, in a peculiar ſenſe) " as introduced into the world without a human " father; as having communications with God, " and ſpeaking and acting from God, in ſuch a " manner as no other man ever did; and there- " fore having *the form of God*, and being *the* " *Son of God* in a manner peculiar to himſelf; " as the means of ſpreading divine and ſaving " knowledge to all the world of mankind; as

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" under God, *the head over all things to his* " *church*; and as *the Lord of life*, having pow- " er and authority from God to raiſe the dead, " and judge the world at the laſt day.

" There ſeems to be a peculiar propriety that " theſe powers reſpecting *mankind*, ſhould be " given to a *man*; and it therefore *behoved* our " Redeemer to be *in all things like unto his bre-* " *thren*, and to be *made perfect through ſufferings*; " but, certainly the man who is inveſted with " theſe powers and prerogatives ſhould be the " object of our attention, reverence, and love, " in ſuch a manner as no other man can be, or " *ought* to be."

9. How it may affect others I cannot tell, but with me it is a very great objection to the pre-exiſtence of Chriſt, that it ſavours ſtrongly of the Oriental doctrine of the *pre-exiſtence of all human ſouls*, which was the foundation of the Gnoſtic hereſy, and the ſource of great corruption in genuine chriſtianity. For if the ſoul of one man might have pre-exiſted, ſeparate from the body, why might not the ſoul of another, or of all? Nay, analogy ſeems to require that the whole ſpecies be upon one footing, in a caſe which ſo very nearly concerns the *firſt and conſtituent principles of their nature*. Beſides, the opinion of the ſeparability of the thinking part of man from his bodily frame, even after he comes into the world, is ſo far from being agreeable to the phenomena of human nature, that it is almoſt expreſsly contradicted by them all.

10. The

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11. The author of the epiſtle to the Hebrews, one of whoſe principal objects was to reconcile the Jews to the thoughts of a ſuffering Meſſiah, ſeems to make uſe of arguments which neceſſarily ſuppoſe Chriſt to have been a man like ourſelves; as when he ſays, Heb. ii. 9, *We ſee Jeſus, who was made a little lower than the angels, for the ſuffering of death, crowned with glory and honour.* In this paſſage the writer ſeems to conſider Chriſt as a *man*, in direct oppoſition to created beings of a *ſuperior nature*, or *angels*, under which denomination Chriſt himſelf muſt have been ranked, according to the phraſeology of ſcripture, if he had exiſted prior to his becoming man; ſince no other term is made uſe of, to denote his nature and conſtitution, as diſtinct from that of men or angels.

With this view this writer applies to Chriſt, that authority and dominion which is aſcribed to man *as diſtinguiſhed from angels* by the Pſalmiſt, (Pſ. viii. v. 5,) *For unto the angels hath he not put into ſubjection the world to come, whereof we ſpeak. But one in a certain place, teſtified, ſaying, What is man that thou art mindful of him, or the ſon of man, that thou viſiteſt him. Thou madeſt him a little lower than the angels; thou crownedſt him with glory and honour, and didſt ſet him over the works of thine hands. Thou haſt put all things in ſubjection under his feet.* As, in this paſſage, he plainly conſiders the nature of man as properly characterized by his being *a little lower than the*

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angels, and he applies the very ſame expreſſion to Chriſt, without giving the leaſt hint of any diſtinction between them, I cannot help thinking, that in the writer's idea, the nature of both was preciſely the ſame.

It is alſo remarkable that this ſame writer ſpeaks of Chriſt as diſtinguiſhed from angels, when he ſays, i. 9, *That God had anointed him with the oil of gladneſs above his fellows*, by which therefore, *in this connection*, I do not ſee how we can help underſtanding his *fellow men*, or *fellow prophets*.

11. This writer, alſo, ſeems to lay particular ſtreſs on Chriſt's having *felt* as we feel, and having been *tempted* as we are tempted; and to aſſert that for this purpoſe, it was neceſſary that he ſhould be, *in all reſpects*, what we ourſelves are, ii. 11, &c. *For both he that ſanctifieth and they who are ſanctified are all of one; for which cauſe he is not aſhamed to call them brethren*—and *children*. V. 13, 14. *Foraſmuch then as the children are partakers of fleſh and blood, he alſo himſelf likewiſe took part of the ſame*. And again, v. 17. *Wherefore in all things, it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high prieſt*. V. 18. *For in that he himſelf hath ſuffered, being tempted, he is able to ſuccour them that are tempted*. Now I cannot help thinking from theſe paſſages, that the writer had an idea of Chriſt being much more *what we are*, and conſequently of his *feeling* more as we do, than he could have

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meant, upon the ſuppoſition of his being of an angelic, or ſuperangelic nature. For then, the views that he had of his *ſufferings*, and conſequently his *feelings under them*, muſt have been exceedingly diſſimilar to ours. And every argument that the apoſtle uſes, to ſhew the impropriety of Chriſt's being an *angel*, ſeems to weigh *much more* againſt his being of a nature *ſuperior to angels*.

12. If it be ſuppoſed that, upon becoming an inhabitant of this world, Chriſt loſt all conſciouſneſs of his former pre-exiſtent ſtate, I do not ſee of what uſe his ſuperior powers could poſſibly have been to him; or, which comes to the ſame thing, what occaſion there was for ſuch a being in the buſineſs. Beſides, the hypotheſis of an intelligent being, thinking and acting in one ſtate, and loſing all the remembrance of what he had been and done in another, has ſomething in it that looks ſo arbitrary and unnatural, that one would not have recourſe to it, but upon the moſt urgent neceſſity.

It ſhould ſeem, however, that if Chriſt did pre-exiſt, it was not unknown to him in this world, ſince one of the ſtrongeſt arguments for this hypotheſis is his praying that *his father would glorify him with the glory that he had before the world was*. John xvii. 5. But if Chriſt did retain a perfect conſciouſneſs of his former ſtate, and conſequently retained all the *powers* and all the *knowledge* of which he was poſſeſſed in that ſtate, I have no idea of

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ſuch an *increaſe of wiſdom* as the evangeliſt Luke aſcribes to him, when he ſays, ii. 52, *And Jeſus increaſed in wiſdom and ſtature, and in favour with God and man.* In the idea of this evangeliſt, Jeſus certainly made ſuch improvements in knowledge, as other well-diſpoſed youths make; ſo that I think he had manifeſtly no other idea of him.

13. Similar to the above-mentioned reaſoning of the author of the epiſtle to the Hebrews, is that of the apoſtle John, or rather of that of Chriſt himſelf. John v. 27. *And he hath given him authority to execute judgment, becauſe he is the ſon of man*; for I do not ſee the force of this inference, unleſs the meaning of it be, that Chriſt, being a man like ourſelves, having felt as we feel, and having been tempted and tried as we have, is the moſt *unexceptionable* of all judges. No man can complain of it, ſince it is being judged, as it were, *by our peers*, and by a perſon who knows how to make every proper *allowance* for us.

14. Some may poſſibly lay ſtreſs on its being ſaid by the writer of the epiſtle to the Hebrews, in the paſſage above mentioned, that *Chriſt himſelf took fleſh and blood*, as if it had depended upon his own choice, whether he would become man or not, which implies a pre-exiſtent ſtate. But the word μέτεχω is uſed for *partaking*, or *ſharing in*, abſolutely, without any reſpect to *choice*, and is uſed in that ſenſe in two other paſſages of this epiſtle, viz.

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v. 13, vii. 13, where the apoſtle ſpeaks of the *propriety of the divine deſignation*, not of the motive of Chriſt's election. Alſo in other places, he is repreſented as *paſſive* with reſpect to the ſame event. Thus in the ninth verſe of the ſame chapter, it is ſaid that *Jeſus was made a little lower than the angels*, and not that *he made himſelf lower*, or condeſcended.

It is ſaid, v. 16, That *Chriſt took not on him the nature of angels, but the ſeed of Abraham.* But επιλαμβανομαι, which is the word here uſed, properly ſignifies, and is, in every other place, in the New Teſtament, rendered to *lay hold upon.* In this place, therefore, the meaning probably is, that Chriſt did not (after he appeared in the character of the Meſſiah) lay hold upon, ſo as to *interpoſe in the favour of*, or *reſcue*, angels, but the ſeed of Abraham; and thence we ſee that the apoſtle infers that there was a neceſſity, or at leaſt an exceeding great propriety, that a Mediator for men ſhould be, in all reſpects, a man; for he immediately adds, *therefore in all things, it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful High Prieſt*, &c.

15. Indeed, there appears to me to be a moſt evident propriety that a perſon who acted ſo important a part with reſpect to mankind, as Chriſt did, who was ſent to be our inſtructor and example, and eſpecially who came to aſcertain the great doctrine of a *reſurrection from the dead*, ſhould be, with reſpect to his

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nature, the very ſame that we ourſelves are; that he might exhibit before us an example of proper *human virtue*, and eſpecially that he might die as we ourſelves die, and his reſurrection be the reſurrection of a *man like ourſelves*; and ſo the proper *firſt fruits from the dead*, and conſequently of the very *ſame kind* with thoſe of which the *general harveſt* will conſiſt; and thereby give us the greater reaſon to hope, that becauſe *Chriſt lives we ſhall live alſo*.

16. If we conſider the *practical tendency* of the doctrine concerning Chriſt, I think we ſhall find nothing at all in favour of the ſcheme of pre-exiſtence; but much in favour of the contrary doctrine, which repreſents him as a man like ourſelves. To this purpoſe I ſhall quote, with ſome little addition, what I have ſaid on this ſubject in the *Diſcourſe on the Corruption of Chriſtianity*, p. 24.

"Much of the peculiar power of the goſ-
"pel motives to virtue (ſeparate from our act-
"ing with a view to obtain the reward of im-
"mortality promiſed in it) ariſes from juſt ideas
"of the nature and offices of Chriſt, as diſtinct
"from thoſe of the Divine Being himſelf, with
"which they are too much confounded upon
"the ſuppoſition of the proper Deity, or ſuper-
"angelic nature, of Chriſt, notwithſtanding the
"different offices aſcribed to the divine perſons,
"or rather beings, in the Athanaſian ſcheme.

"The conſideration of *the love of Chriſt*, has
"ſomething in it peculiarly endearing, when it

"is

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" is not conſidered as the ſame thing with *the*
" *love of the Creator towards his creatures*, but
" as the love of one, who, notwithſtanding his
" miraculous birth, was as much a man as
" Adam was, or as we ourſelves are; when it
" is conſidered as the love of our *elder brother*,
" who *bore our infirmities*, who felt all the pains
" and agonies that man can feel; and, being the
" very ſame that we are, was in all reſpects
" *tempted as we are*; who *loved us*, and *freely*
" *gave himſelf to death for us*, to redeem us from
" ſin and miſery, that we might become par-
" takers of the ſame love of God, and be *joint*
" *heirs* with him of the ſame glory and happi-
" neſs, that we might all alike become *kings and*
" *prieſts unto God, even the Father, for ever and*
" *ever*; who after living many years on earth,
" in which he manifeſted the moſt intenſe af-
" fection for us, is now *gone to prepare a place*
" *for us in our heavenly Father's houſe*, that
" *where he is, there we may be alſo*; as one who
" is now exerciſing a power which, as the re-
" ward of his obedience unto death, he received
" from God, to be *head over all things to his*
" *church*; who ſtill feels for, and will be *pre-*
" *ſent with* his faithful diſciples and followers
" in all their trials, even to the end of the
" world.

" The eſteem and love that we bear to the
" character which we form of Chriſt, conſider-
" ed as a man like ourſelves, the attachment we
" have to him, and his cauſe, and the efficacy
" of this principle to promote a chriſtian temper

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" and conduct, and to encourage us to follow " this our glorious leader, the *captain of our* " *salvation*, and the *first fruits from the dead* " (even though, like him, we be called *to lay* " *down our lives for our friends*, and to bear " persecution and torture in the cause of con- " science, virtue, truth, and God) is exceeding- " ly great, and *peculiar to itself*. It is a kind of " love and esteem that cannot be felt by one " who is truly and practically an Athanasian or " Arian, and, in general, but imperfectly by " those who have long been Athanasians or Ari- " ans; and who, therefore, cannot easily get rid " of the ideas they have had of Christ as God, " or at least as a Being who has little in com- " mon with us; who therefore could not feel " as we do, act upon views similar to ours, or " entertain, and be the proper object of, a si- " milar and reciprocal affection.

" A man may have rejected the Athanasian " or Arian hypothesis a long time, before these " ideas shall even occur to him, or their power " be at all apprehended. At least we can only " expect to feel their influence at intervals, and " must not hope to experience that amazing " force, which, however, we may easily con- " ceive they must have had with the primitive " christians, and especially with the apostles, " and others who personally knew Christ, and " who therefore never had an idea of his being " any other than a man like themselves; though " as Peter expresses himself, *a man approved of* " *God*

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" *God by miracles and wonders and ſigns which* " *God did by him.*"

17. It is now agreed, both by Arians and Socinians, that the ſupreme God is the only object of *prayer*; it being acknowledged, that we have no authority in the ſcriptures for addreſſing ourſelves to Chriſt: but this reſtriction cannot be founded upon any other than the Socinian hypotheſis, and is by no means reconcileable with the principles of Arianiſm.

I ought not, in reaſon, to addreſs a petition to *a man* who may not be within hearing of me; and much leſs can there be a propriety in numbers of perſons, in very diſtant places, addreſſing themſelves to the ſame man at the ſame time, becauſe no man can attend to more than one perſon, or one thing, at once. But a Being equal to the formation of the world, and eſpecially of the whole ſyſtem of worlds, and even the univerſe, or the whole creation; he *by whom all things conſiſt*, that is, who ſtill *ſupports*, and governs all things, muſt be *capable* of giving his attention to every thing that paſſes. Nay every thing muſt neceſſarily be at all times ſubject to his inſpection; and therefore there could be no impropriety, *in the nature of things*, in addreſſing prayers to him.

Beſides, it is very obvious to reflect, that if there was any reaſon, or propriety, that ſome derived being, and not the Supreme, ſhould be the immediate *maker of the world*, and that the Deity ſhould not himſelf interpoſe in the government of it, it can only be this derived

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rived being, and not the Supreme, *with whom we have to do.* It can only be to him who *made us* what we are, and who himself immediately *supports* us in being, that we ought to look. A child naturally addreſſes itſelf to its nurſe, who attends conſtantly upon it, and not to its mother; and a tenant applies to the ſteward, who immediately inſpects and manages the eſtate, and not to the owner of it.

In fact, no reaſon can be imagined why the Supreme Being ſhould delegate to any inferior the making and governing of the world, which would not be equally a reaſon for his appointing him to hear our prayers. Nothing but the moſt expreſs declarations, founded on reaſons which I ſhould think impoſſible to ſuggeſt, can authorize us, to admit the former, and not the latter, the connection is ſo natural. I therefore look upon the undoubted *fact* of all prayer being, upon the plan of revelation, confined to God, excluſive of all inferior beings, and of Chriſt, to be a moſt ſatisfactory argument, that God himſelf is alone the immediate maker of the world, and that it is he himſelf who conſtantly ſupports and governs it, without the mediation of any ſuch glorious though derived being, as the Arians imagine Chriſt to have been before his incarnation.

18. It is ſaid, and certainly with great reaſon, that it is in vain to preach chriſtianity to Jews or Mahometans, while it is loaded with ſuch a tenet as the doctrine of the *Trinity*, which, it is well known, they both regard as equally

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equally abſurd and impious; the great and diſtinguiſhing principle of the Jewiſh religion being the *unity of God*, and the great objection that the Mahometans made to the corrupt chriſtianity of the ſixth century being the general departure of chriſtians from the ſame fundamental principle, as may be ſeen in the Koran itſelf. But the principles of Arianiſm are hardly more reconcileable to the notions of Jews or Mahometans than thoſe of Athanaſianiſm; and the following language of the Jew in Limborch's *Collatio* is applicable to the idea of Chriſt being the maker of the world, and the perſon who ſpake to Moſes in the burning buſh, as well as to his being ſtrictly equal to the Father. "The prophet," he ſays, "who pretends to be the true God of Iſrael, "who arrogates divine omnipotence, and "gave his own words as the words of God, "cannot be admitted; and ſuppoſing what "is impoſſible, that the true Meſſiah ſhould "publiſh this doctrine, he ought to be ſtoned "as a falſe prophet." See *Jortin*'s *Remarks*, vol. iii. p. 342.

The conduct which Dr. Jortin, who was himſelf an Arian, recommends with reſpect to the Jews I think to be inſidious, unworthy of chriſtian ſimplicity, and what muſt be altogether ineffectual. He ſays that, "in addreſſing "Jews and Mahometans, whoſe great objec-"tion to chriſtianity is the doctrine of the tri-"nity, no one ſhould attempt to remove this "prejudice, till he has brought them to be-

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" lieve the divine miſſion of Jeſus Chriſt, and " his character as prophet, Meſſias, a teacher " of truth, and worker of miracles; and that " then many things may be obſerved concern- " ing the *logos*, the angel of God's preſence, " and the angel of the covenant, from the Old " Teſtament, and from Philo, and from ſome " ancient Jewiſh writers." ib. vol. iii. p. 439.

But in fact *external* evidence is nothing more than *conditional* evidence with reſpect to chriſtianity, going upon the ſuppoſition that the things to be proved by miracles are not *incredible in themſelves*. The evidence that might be ſufficient to ſatisfy a Jew, that Chriſt was ſimply a *teacher ſent from God*, and ſuch a Meſſiah as *their prophecies announced*, would by no means prove to his conviction, that he was the *maker of the world*, and ſuch a Meſſiah as he was fully perſuaded their ancient prophets did *not* foretell, and ſuch a one as it was utterly repugnant to the whole ſyſtem of his religion to admit.

19. Some Arians of the preſent age, ſtaggered, it may be ſuppoſed, with the glaring abſurdity of making a man who died upon the croſs to be the maker of the world, and one who, even in his loweſt ſtate of humiliation, was actually *ſupporting all things with the word of his power*, and of ſuppoſing him to be the perſon who, with the name and character of *Jehovah*, had intercourſe with the patriarchs, ſpake to Abraham, to Moſes, and to all the nation of Iſraelites from mount Sinai, &c. &c. &c. ſeem

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&c. ſeem willing to abandon this part of the ſyſtem; but without conſidering, that, with it, they neceſſarily abandon all the advantages for the ſake of which the whole ſyſtem was originally adopted. They likewiſe diſclaim the aid of the very ſtrongeſt texts on which the doctrine of pre-exiſtence is founded; as the introduction to the goſpel of John, which ſpeaks of the logos as the Being *by whom all things were made*, and *without whom nothing was made that was made*, Coll. i. 5, which ſpeaks of Chriſt as *the firſt born of every creature, by whom all things were created, that are in heaven and that are in earth, viſible and inviſible*, &c. as being *before all things*, and *by whom all things conſiſt*, and Heb. i. 3, where Chriſt is ſaid to be the perſon *by whom God made the world*, or rather *the ages*, and who *upholds all things by the word of his power*.

Upon the whole, nothing can be more evident than that this *low Arian hypotheſis* has no plauſible foundation whatever, except being free from the palpable abſurdities of the *high* Arian ſcheme. Certainly, the perſon who can explain thoſe texts, which ſpeak of Chriſt as the *maker and ſupporter of all things*, without ſuppoſing that he pre-exiſted, can have no difficulty in explaining any other texts, which repreſent him as *ſimply pre-exiſting*. For the moſt difficult of all the texts are thoſe in which his *creating* and *ſupporting power* are expreſsly referred to. The capital circumſtances that recommended the doctrine of Chriſt's pre-exiſtence

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ence, when it was ſtarted, were the ideas of the *maker* of the world being the great *reſtorer* of it, and the giver of the *law* being the author of the *goſpel*; ſo that the ſame perſon was the medium of all the diſpenſations of God to mankind. But when theſe flattering advantages are abandoned, nothing is left but *ſimple pre-exiſtence*, without any knowledge, or the leaſt colourable conjecture, that Chriſt had ever borne any *relation to this world* more than to any other.

It is no leſs evident that by abandoning the ſpecious advantages of the proper Arian hypotheſis, the low Arians are as far as ever from being able to avail themſelves of the advantages peculiar to the Socinian ſcheme; as the propriety of a man being employed in a buſineſs ſo nearly reſpecting *men*, his exhibiting an example of proper *human virtue*, having a reward capable of being conferred on all his followers; of the ſame kind of being, viz. a man, both introducing *death*, and the *reſurrection of the dead*; of the *firſt fruits* from the dead being of the ſame kind with the general *harveſt*; and that the great judge of all men ſhould be himſelf a man.

In fact, therefore, this low Arian hypotheſis is intirely deſtitute both of the ſtrongeſt texts in favour of pre-exiſtence, and alſo of every advantage peculiar either to the high Arian hypotheſis, or the Socinian; ſo that no ſcheme can be more inſignificant, or reſt on narrower or weaker foundations.

Had

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Had ſuch general conſiderations as theſe been attended to, the doctrine of the pre-exiſtence of Chriſt could never have advanced ſo triumphantly as it has done. And ſuch arguments as theſe ought certainly to weigh more than the ſuppoſed *incidental reference* to a doctrine in particular texts of ſcripture, the interpretation of which is always various and uncertain. Beſides, if we confine ourſelves to the literal interpretation of particular texts of ſcripture, there is no ſyſtem that we may not embrace.

The doctrine of *tranſubſtantiation* is doubly intrenched in ſuch fortifications as theſe, and ſo are the groſs errors which have now got the name of *Calviniſm*, ſuch as *original* ſin, *atonement*, &c. and alſo the doctrine of the *perfect equality of the Son to the Father*. And yet Arians do not find themſelves affected by ſuch texts; and in my opinion it requires much leſs judgment to ſee that the texts on which they lay ſo much ſtreſs are equally inſufficient to bear it.

Upon the whole, I cannot help thinking it to be a capital advantage of the doctrine of *Materialiſm*, that it leaves no ſhadow of ſupport for the doctrine of *pre-exiſtence*, or the *Arian hypotheſis*, which are totally repugnant to the genuine principles of the chriſtian religion, ſo as hardly to be brought within the general outline of it; and that the greateſt miſchief that chriſtianity has derived from the unnatural mixture of heathen philoſophy with the principles of it, has been this injudicious exaltation of our Saviour; which, in fact, has been

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been nothing elſe than ſetting up the vain conceits of men in oppoſition to the wiſdom of God.

SECTION VII.

Of the opinions that have been held concerning MATTER *and their Influence with reſpect to Chriſtianity.*

WE have already ſeen a great deal of the miſchievous conſequence that has followed from the ſpecious doctrine of *matter being the ſource of all evil*, and of the union of an immaterial principle with it. In this ſection I propoſe to enter into a more particular detail of thoſe conſequences with reſpect to the chriſtian doctrine of a *reſurrection*, the *ſtate of marriage*, and other things connected with it, and with this I propoſe to cloſe the ſubject. It may not be amiſs, however, previous to this, to ſtate diſtinctly the various opinions that have been held concerning matter. For, notwithſtanding almoſt all the philoſophical opinions have been nearly the ſame, there have been ſome differences among them..

Some of the philoſophers thought that matter was originally without motion, quality, or form; but capable of receiving them, though with ſome neceſſary imperfections; while others gave it qualities, figure, and even a a *ſoul*. Beauſobre (vol. ii. p. 245) and Pythagoras

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goras thought matter animated, as well as evil, and was therein followed by Plato and Plutarch, p. 248.

The opinion of an *immaterial principle* as neceſſary to motion, &c. is a prevailing ſentiment at preſent, but was by no means ſo in ancient times. Otherwiſe the ſouls of brutes could never have been thought material, and mortal. Ariſtotle, and all the ancients, admitted a *motive force* in matter, without which they could not complete the idea of a body. This is acknowledged by Malebranche, and eſpecially by Leibnitz, and the ſchoolmen. Goudin ſays, *Ratio principii activi convenit ſubſtantiis corporeis, et inde pendent affectiones corporum quæ cernuntur in modo.* Hiſtoire naturelle de l'ame, p. 212.

Plato thought that all evil came from matter, and that its imperfection was eternal and incorrigible. It was a maxim with him, that an eternal being can produce nothing but an eternal being, and that corporeal and frail beings are the production of inferior intelligences. He therefore makes the angels of the planets to be the formers of the human body. *Beauſobre*, vol. ii. p. 416.

Many of the Jews entertained no better an opinion of matter than the Oriental or Greek philoſophers: Maimonides ſays (*More Nevochim*, preface and p. 345) that all impediments and obſtacles which hinder men in their progreſs towards perfection, and all ſin, came only from the part of matter. He alſo ſays

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that matter is to be underſtood by the *adulterous woman*, in the book of Proverbs, ſeducing a young man to criminal converſation with her.

Manes thought the demons altogether material, and Beauſobre ſays (vol. ii. p. 259) that many of the ancient Fathers thought the ſame. According to ſome of the orthodox Fathers the devil is the angel to whom God intruſted the government of matter. ib. p. 99.

The complaint of the *evil tendency of matter* is a hackneyed topic of declamation among all the ancients, heathens and chriſtians. Origen, among others, conſidered the body as the *priſon of the ſoul*, ib. p. 475, and every thing that tended to humble and bring under the body was thought to be the triumph of the ſoul, and a ſtep towards its purification and reſtoration.

The whole of this ſpecious doctrine was evidently drawn from other ſources than the ſyſtem of Moſes. He ſpeaks of God himſelf as the maker of the terreſtrial world, and of all things in it; and, perhaps with an intended oppoſition to the principles of the other ſyſtem, if it exiſted in his time, he particularly ſays, Gen, i. 31. *And God ſaw every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good.* In oppoſition to the doctrine of *evil* having a different origin from the *good* that we ſee in the world, the later prophets conſtantly ſpeak of God as equally the author of both; and *puniſhment*, contrary to the doctrine of the philoſophers, is always moſt expreſsly aſcribed to him. But this doctrine of Moſes and the

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prophets, even when reinforced by that of Chriſt and the apoſtles, was not able to ſtem the torrent of the Oriental philoſophy, which went upon a different principle.

That the doctrine of matter being the ſource of all evil accords very ill with the chriſtian doctrine of a *reſurrection of the dead*, cannot but be very evident to every perſon who reflects a moment on the ſubject. In fact, they are diametrically oppoſite to one another. On the chriſtian principles our only hope is founded upon a reſurrection, whereas on the philoſophical principles, *a re-union to the body* is a thing moſt of all to be dreaded.

The oppoſition of theſe principles was ſo manifeſt, that all the firſt chriſtians, who adopted the foreign philoſophy abſolutely denied, or explained away, the doctrine of a reſurrection; and though the authority of the apoſtles checked this extravagance, they were not able to prevent the miſchief entirely; and even at this very day the advantage of the chriſtian reſurrection is, in general, rated very low; and in the eye of reaſon it muſt appear an incumbrance upon the philoſophical ſcheme.

The repugnance between theſe philoſophical principles and the doctrine of a reſurrection appeared in the Jews as well as in the chriſtians. For the Eſſenes, as Moſheim ſays (*Eccleſ. Hiſt.* vol. i. p. 95) maintained that future rewards and puniſhments extend to the ſoul only, and not to the body, which they

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conſidered as a maſs of malignant matter, and as the priſon of the immortal ſpirit.

The opinion that matter is the ſource of all evil, and the contempt that, in conſequence of it, was entertained for the body, was capable of two oppoſite applications, one in favour of ſenſuality, as a thing that did not affect the mind, and the other of the mortification of the body; and we find that, in fact, this double uſe was made of thoſe principles, according as the perſons who adopted them were inclined.

The Gnoſtics, ſays Moſheim (*Diſſertations*, p. 243) were always talking of the contemplation of things inviſible, and of the Deity, and thought all things lawful to them that agreeably affected the body. He alſo ſays (*Eccleſ. Hiſt.* vol. i. p. 14) that thoſe of the Oriental ſects, who were of a voluptuous turn, might conſider the actions of the body as having no relation to the ſtate of a ſoul in communion with God. Some of them even maintained that the ſouls were ſent into the body that they might indulge in all ſenſual pleaſure, and that they could not arrive at perfection till they had performed their taſk. They acknowledged that Chriſt taught purity, but not to all; that it was proper for the *carnal*, but not the *ſpiritual* and *perfect*. *Moſheim's Diſſertations*, p. 247, 248. It is not improbable that the heretics, againſt whom the apoſtles, and our Saviour, in the book of Revelation, inveigh ſo much, were Gnoſtics of

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this kind; and that afterwards the ſame philoſophical principles took an oppoſite turn, and led to mortifications and auſterities *.

In various other reſpects, alſo, the doctrine of matter being the ſource of evil, and a clog upon the immaterial ſoul, has had moſt pernicious conſequences; having introduced max-

* Another vice, of moſt pernicious conſequence, the chriſtians of the ſecond and third centuries ſeem to have derived from the maxims of the philoſophers, but becauſe it does not relate to the ſubject of this work, except ſo far as it ſhews, in general, the hurtful connection of chriſtianity and philoſophy, I ſhall inſert in a note. It is the lawfulneſs *of lying to promote a good cauſe*.

Timæus Locrus, the maſter of Pythagoras, ſays that as we uſe poiſons to cure mens' bodies, if wholeſome remedies will not do, ſo we reſtrain mens' minds by falſehoods, if they will not be led with truth. *Moſheim's Diſſert.* p. 195. Plato gave into the ſame vice. ib. p. 156, and in his book, *De Republica*, he ſays, the chiefs of a city may deceive the reſt for their good, but that others ought to abſtain from lying, p. 199.

On this account, when chriſtianity prevailed, the Platonic philoſophers endeavoured, by feigned accounts of Pythagoras, and other early philoſophers, to eclipſe chriſtianity, ſetting up their characters and actions, as if they had been ſuperior to Chriſt. Hence the writings, aſcribed to Hermes and Zoroaſter, and hence, ſome think, thoſe of Sanchoniatho, to diſcredit thoſe of Moſes. ib. p. 199.

But the greateſt misfortune was, that thoſe chriſtians, who embraced the Platonic principles in other reſpects, received this alſo, and thought it innocent and commendable to lie for the ſake of truth; and hence came ſo many *forged goſpels*, and other writings of a ſimilar nature, which did not appear till after the æra of the incorporation of philoſophy with chriſtianity. ib. p. 200. Origen, in particular, avowed this principle, p. 203, and alſo Chryſoſtom, p. 205.

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ims and cuſtoms contrary to all common ſenſe, the very reverſe of the doctrines of the goſpel, and that have actually done much miſchief in ſociety. Such, more eſpecially, is the influence it has had with reſpect to the prevailing notions concerning *marriage*, *continence*, *faſting*, &c.; ſome particulars relating to which, being curious, I ſhall recite.

That the opinion of the great value and importance of bodily auſterities came from the heathen philoſophy, is evident from the known ſentiments and practices of the philoſophers on the ſubject.

The cuſtom of *faſting*, ſays Moſheim (*Diſſert.* p. 177) is chiefly to be aſcribed to the Platoniſts. Pythagoras forbad his diſciples the uſe of fleſh, and Porphyry imitated him in a book written for that purpoſe. The Platonic ſchool, he ſays, ib. p. 177, thought it was better to abſtain from fleſh, eſpecially if perſons gave themſelves to meditation, and the contemplation of divine things.

"Some of the philoſophers," ſays Jortin (*Remarks on Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory*, vol. iii. p. 23) "exerciſed ſtrange ſeverities upon themſelves, and upon their diſciples, from the days of Pythagoras to the time of Lucian, who introduces the philoſopher Nigrinus as condemning ſuch practices, and obſerving that they had occaſioned the deaths of ſeveral perſons. The Greek philoſophers," he ſays, ib. p. 26, "had a particular dreſs, and affected to appear rough, mean, and dirty;

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" dirty; for which they were ſometimes in-
" ſulted in the ſtreets by boys, and by the
" populace; and the Cynics very prudently
" were armed with a ſtaff to defend them-
" ſelves from dogs and from the rabble. The
" chriſtian monks," he adds, " imitated the
" old philoſophers in their rags and appear-
" ance, and many of them ſeemed, in the
" opinion of thoſe who loved them, to have
" inherited the rags, the pride, and contentious
" ſpirit of the former."

According to Ammonius, the *wiſe* were to raiſe above all terreſtrial things, by the towering efforts of holy contemplation, thoſe ſouls whoſe origin was celeſtial and divine. They were ordered to extenuate by hunger, thirſt, and other mortifications, the *ſluggiſh body*, which confines the activity, and reſtrains the liberty of the immortal ſpirit; that thus, in this life, they might enjoy communion with the Supreme Being, and aſcend after death, active and unencumbered, to the univerſal parent, to live in his preſence for ever. *Moſheim's Eccleſ. Hiſt.* vol. i. p. 141.

A very peculiar notion that the philoſophers entertained concerning dæmons was the cauſe of much of their doctrine of the mortification of the body. They taught, ſays Moſheim (*Diſſert.* p. 213) that the dæmons, being furniſhed with ſubtle bodies, were very greedy of carnal pleaſures, and poſſeſſed men for the ſake of enjoying them; and therefore that he who would drive away dæmons, muſt

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faſt, and mortify himſelf, and that thoſe who were married would do well to abſtain from their wives as much as poſſible. On this account many lived with their wives as with ſiſters, and called them by that name.

The Docetæ in general condemned marriage altogether, but others ſpake of it as an imperfection only. This, Beauſobre ſays, vol. i. p. 360, was a conſequence of the opinion of matter being the ſource of all evil. Marcion alſo diſapproved of marriage, and his diſciples were alſo great faſters. ib. p. 126. Manes ſaid that concupiſcence in general, or the love of the ſexes, came from matter, was derived from the bad principle, and was therefore vicious in itſelf. vol. i. p. 463.

It was the opinion of Bardeſanes, that Adam at firſt had no body, but what was ſubtle, and agreeable to his nature, and that he had a carnal body given him after his fall. ib. p. 235. According to Manes, marriage was the ſin of Adam and Eve, p. 459. That the woman was the tree of knowledge, was the opinion of many of the Rabbins, p. 461. And Clemens Alexandrinus ſays, that the ſin of Adam was his anticipating his commerce with Eve, p. 463. Marriage, however, was not abſolutely forbidden by the Manicheans; but only to the *elect*, while it was permitted to thoſe they called *auditors*, p. 474.

In the very early times of chriſtianity, the biſhops and doctors, notwithſtanding the warnings of the apoſtles on this very head, magnified

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nified *celibacy* to the ſkies, and vilified marriage as much. ib. p. 484. Juſtin Martyr believed that Chriſt was born of a virgin, to ſhow that God could provide for the continuance of the human race without the union of the two ſexes. Auſtin was much inclined to the ſame opinion. He believed that Adam would never have known Eve if he had continued immortal. Gregory Nyſſenus held that, in a ſtate of innocence, there would have been no *generation*, but that men would have been multiplied by ſome other means. *Dupin*, vol. ii. p. 177. And many of the Fathers were divided in their opinion, whether marriage was neceſſary to the propagation of the human race. *Beauſobre*, vol. ii. p. 465.

Juſtin Martyr ſays that chriſtianity has diſſolved marriage, which luſt had rendered criminal, p. 485. Origen ſays that a man cannot approach his wife without defiling himſelf, and that this impurity does not permit a man to preſent himſelf before God, or pray to him. Methodius ſays that ſince Chriſt has introduced virginity, the reign of the devil is deſtroyed; whereas before this enemy of the human race held it in captivity; ſo that none of the ancients could pleaſe God. They were under the empire and dominion of their ſins. *Beauſobre*, vol. ii. p. 284.

That all this extravagance was derived from the philoſophical notion of matter being the ſource of evil, is farther evident from the oppoſition that was always made to theſe notions by

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by the *Ebionites*, who believed nothing of the philoſophical doctrine. Beauſobre ſays, vol. i. p. 358, that they did not approve of profeſſions of continence, and were always in oppoſition to the others. p. 377. He farther ſays of them, in this place, that they were chiefly Jews, educated in the belief of the unity of God, which they thought to be violated by the doctrine of the divinity of Chriſt. p. 378.

Among other conſequences of this ſyſtem of the diſtinction between matter and ſpirit, and the doctrine of an intermediate ſtate, depending upon it, we may reckon the Popiſh doctrines of *purgatory*, and the *worſhip of the dead*, concerning which I ſhall not, in this place, make any particular obſervations; contenting myſelf with only enumerating, from Beauſobre, the various honours paid to the dead.

All the honours that the Pagans paid to the falſe Gods were paid to the martyrs in their relicks. They were carried in proceſſion. Flowers were preſented to them, which thereby contracted a miraculous virtue. Lamps were lighted before them. They were placed upon thrones in churches, in a high ſituation. People kiſſed them, the vaſes that contained them, the gates, ſteps, and even the pavement of the churches dedicated to them. Feſtivals and feaſts were appointed in honour of them. Wakes, or nocturnal devotions, in imitation of thoſe for the dead among the Pagans,

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Pagans, were inſtituted to them. Vows and offerings were made to them. Children were called by their names, and prayers were addreſſed to them. vol ii. p. 669.

It is remarkable, as is obſerved by Jortin, in his *Remarks on Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory*, vol. iii. p. 17, that the honours paid to the dead, and to the relicks of the martyrs, were ſet forward and ſupported, though not entirely, yet principally, by the Conſubſtantialiſts. Fauſtus the Manichean, reproaches the catholic chriſtians with their endleſs ſuperſtitions of this kind, and tells them they were no better than humble imitators of the Pagan idolaters.

When, to all theſe groſs corruptions of chriſtianity, we add the doctrine of the *trinity*, with all its conſequences, all flowing from the philoſophical ſyſtem introduced into our holy religion, I ſhould think that a plain chriſtian would rejoice in being able to throw off the whole immenſe load (which muſt otherwiſe ſink the belief of it) by the eaſy ſuppoſition of *matter being capable of the property of ſenſation or thought*; an opinion which is ſo far from being contradicted by any appearance in nature, that it is perfectly agreeable to them all, and peculiarly favoured by the whole ſyſtem of Revelation.

FINIS.

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ILLUSTRATIONS

OF SOME PARTICULARS IN THE PRECEDING

DISQUISITIONS.

THAT I might not obtrude upon the public a crude and hasty performance on subjects of so much importance as those which I have ventured to discuss in these *Disquisitions*, I put copies of the work, after it was completely printed off, into the hands of several of my friends, both well and ill affected to my general system, that I might have the benefit of their remarks, and take advantage of them, in an additional sheet of Illustrations, if that should appear to be necessary.

Accordingly I have received, and considered, with as much attention as I can, various remarks that have been communicated to me, and have thought it might be of use to add some explanations in consequence of them. I hope they will be the means of obviating some cavils, and serve to make my meaning better understood, whether they make the doctrine itself more or less acceptable to my readers in general.

I. *Of Bodies acting where they are not.*

It is objected to the doctrine of these papers, which supposes that the repulsion, ascribed to bo-

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dies, takes place at ſome diſtance from their real ſurfaces; that bodies muſt then *act where they are not*, which is deemed to be an abſurdity. I acknowledge that there is a conſiderable difficulty in this caſe; but it does not in the leaſt affect the hypotheſis that I have adopted concerning matter, any more than that which is commonly received. According to Sir Iſaac Newton's Obſervations, rays of light begin to be reflected from all bodies at a certain diſtance from their ſurfaces; and yet he conſiders thoſe rays as reflected by thoſe bodies, that is, by powers inhering in and properly belonging to thoſe bodies. So alſo the gravitation of the earth and of the other planets to the ſun, he conſiders as produced by a power of attraction properly belonging to the ſun, which is at an immenſe diſtance from them.

If Sir Iſaac Newton would ſay that the impulſe, by which light is reflected from any body, and by which planets are driven towards the ſun, is really occaſioned by other *inviſible matter* in actual contact with thoſe bodies which are put in motion, I alſo am equally at liberty to relieve my hypotheſis by the ſame means. But the exiſtence of this inviſible ſubſtance, to the agency of which that great philoſopher aſcribes ſo very much, and which he calls *ether*, has not yet been proved, and is therefore generally ſuppoſed not to exiſt. And, indeed, if it did exiſt, I do not ſee how it could produce the effects that are aſcribed to it. For the particles of this very ether could not impel any ſubſtance, if they were not themſelves impelled in the ſame direction; and muſt we provide a ſtill more ſubtle ether for the purpoſe of impelling the particles of the groſſer ether? If ſo, we muſt do the ſame for this other ether, and ſo on, *ad infinitum*, which is abſurd.

Alſo,

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Alſo, if the parts of ſolid bodies, as, for inſtance, of gold (which by its expanſion when hot, and contraction when cold, appear not actually to touch one another) be kept aſunder by a ſubtle matter, viz. the ſame ether above-mentioned, the parts of this ether muſt be kept aſunder by a ſtill more ſubtle ether as before, and ſo on, till the whole ſpace, occupied by the dimenſions of the piece of gold, be abſolutely ſolid, and have no pores or vacuum whatever, which would be contrary to appearances, and make it impoſſible to contract by cold or by any other means. I do not ſay that there is no difficulty in this caſe, but it is not a difficulty that affects my ſyſtem more than the common one; and therefore it is no particular buſineſs of mine to diſcuſs it.

If it be ſuppoſed that no kind of matter is concerned in producing the above-mentioned effects at a diſtance from the ſurfaces of bodies, but that the Deity himſelf cauſes theſe motions, exerting his influence according to certain laws, am not I at at liberty to avail myſelf of the ſame aſſiſtance? And ſurely I muſt have leſs objection to this reſource than thoſe who believe that God is not the only proper agent in the univerſe. As a neceſſarian, I, in fact, aſcribe every thing to God, and, whether mediately or immediately, makes very little difference. But I believe that it is poſſible, though we cannot clearly anſwer every objection to it, that God may endue ſubſtances with powers, which, when communicated, produce effects in a manner different from his own immediate agency.

II. *Whether Matter be anything, on this Hypotheſis.*

It is ſaid that, according to my definition of matter, it muſt be abſolutely *nothing*; becauſe, be-

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ſides extenſion, it conſiſts of nothing but the powers of attraction and repulſion, and becauſe I have ſometimes ſaid that it conſiſts of phyſical points only, poſſeſſed of thoſe powers. In this I may have expreſſed myſelf rather incautiouſly; but the *idea* that I meant to convey was evidently this, that, whatever other powers matter may be poſſeſſed of, it has not the property that has been called *impenetrability*, or *ſolidity*.

From the manner of expreſſing our ideas we cannot ſpeak of powers or properties, but as powers and properties of ſome *thing* or *ſubſtance*, though we know nothing at all of that thing or ſubſtance beſides the powers that we aſcribe to it; and, therefore, when the powers are ſuppoſed to be withdrawn, all idea of ſubſtance neceſſarily vaniſhes with them. I have, therefore, the ſame right to ſay that matter is a ſubſtance poſſeſſed of the properties of attraction and repulſion only, as another has to ſay, that it is a ſubſtance poſſeſſed of the property of impenetrability together with them, unleſs it can be proved that the property of attraction or repulſion neceſſarily implies, and cannot exiſt without, that of impenetrability. Whether it be poſſeſſed of *any* of theſe properties muſt be determined by experiment only. If, upon my idea of matter, every thing vaniſhes upon taking away the powers of attraction and repulſion, in like manner every idea vaniſhes from the mind; if, upon the common hypotheſis, ſolidity or impenetrability be taken away. I own that I can ſee no difference in this caſe; *impenetrability* being as much a property as *penetrability*, and its actual exiſtence equally to be aſcertained by experiment, which, in my opinion, is deciſive in favour of penetrability.

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They who suppose spirit to have proper *extension*, and the Divine Being to have a proper *ubiquity*, must believe the mutual penetrability of real substance; and by whatever names they may choose to call the substances, is of no consequence. If they say that, on my hypothesis, there is no such thing as matter, and that every thing is spirit, I have no objection, provided they make as great a difference in *spirits*, as they have hitherto made in *substances*. The world has been too long amused with mere names.

III. *Of the Laws of Motion.*

It is said, that if there is not what has been termed a *vis inertiæ* in matter, the foundation of the Newtonian Philosophy is overturned: for that the *three laws of motion*, laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, in the beginning of his *Principia*, have no meaning on any other supposition.

I answer, that these laws of motion are founded on certain *facts*, which result just as easily from my hypothesis concerning matter, as from the common one. It is an undoubted fact that every body perseveres in a state of rest or motion, till it be compelled to change that state by some external force, which is the first of the three laws, and the foundation of the other two. But this will follow just as well upon the supposition of that mutual action between two bodies taking place at any given distance from their surfaces. Newton himself shews, that rays of light are reflected by a power belonging to other bodies, without actually impinging upon them, and, consequently, by a power which takes place at a certain distance from their surfaces, without supposing that any of his laws of motion were violated.

IV.

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IV. *Of the Divine Eſſence.*

It is ſuſpected that, notwithſtanding I decline the term, it will be thought that I virtually make the Deity to be a material being. I anſwer that, ſince, according to my ideas, the divine eſſence, and other eſſences have quite different properties or powers, they ought, in ſtrictneſs, to be denoted by quite different names; and, therefore, I can have no other objection to the term *immaterial*, as applied to the Divine Being, but as it is apt to imply that the divine eſſence is incapable of any property whatever in common with other eſſences, ſuch as even relation to ſpace.

I will farther obſerve, that, notwithſtanding I *may* have expreſſed myſelf in an unguarded manner on this ſubject (though I am not at preſent aware of it) it will be found, by the candid and attentive, that I have not, in reality, any idea of the divine eſſence that is at all different from that of thoſe philoſophers and divines, who maintain the *proper omnipreſence*, or *ubiquity* of the Divine Being, which neceſſarily implies a real extenſion; and that he has a power of acting upon matter.

I will take this opportunity of ſaying, farther, that, upon no ſyſtem whatever, is the great Author of Nature more diſtinct from his productions, or his preſence with them, and agency upon them, more neceſſary. In fact, the ſyſtem now held forth to the public, taken in its full extent, makes the Divine Being to be of as much importance in the *ſyſtem*, as the apoſtle makes him, when he ſays, *In him we live, and move, and have our being*. The contemplation of it impreſſes the mind with ſentiments of the deepeſt reverence and humility, and it inculcates a degree of devotedneſs to God, both active and paſſive, that no other philoſophical ſyſtem can inſpire.

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Consequently, the obligation to all those virtues that are more immediately derived from that great vital spring and principle of all virtue, *devotion*, those which give a superiority to the world, a fearless integrity, and a noble independence of mind in the practice of our duty, is more strongly felt, and therefore may be supposed to take a deeper root in the mind, than upon any other system whatever. In short, it is that philosophy which alone suits the doctrine of the *scriptures*, though the writers of them were not philosophers, but had an instruction infinitely superior to that of any philosophical school. Every other system of philosophy is discordant with the scriptures, and, as far as it lays any hold upon the mind, tends to counteract their influence.

In the last place, I think it may not be unuseful to observe, that a distinction ought to be made with respect to the *relative importance* and *mutual subordination* of the different positions contended for in this treatise. The principal object is, to prove the uniform composition of man, or that what we call *mind*, or the principle of perception and thought, is not a substance distinct from the body, but the result of corporeal organization; and what I have advanced preliminary to this, concerning the *nature of matter*, though subservient to this argument, is by no means essential to it: for whatever matter be, I think I have sufficiently proved that mind is nothing more than a modification of it.

Again, that man is wholly material is eminently subservient to the doctrine of the *proper*, or *mere humanity* of Christ. For, if no man has a soul distinct from his body, Christ, who, in all other respects, appeared as a man, could not have had a soul which had existed before the body; and the

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whole doctrine of the *pre-existence of souls* (of which the opinion of the pre-existence of Christ was a branch) will be effectually overturned. But I apprehend that, should I have failed in the proof of the materiality of man, arguments enough remain, independent of this, to prove the non pre-existence of Christ, and of this doctrine having been introduced into christianity from the system of Oriental philosophy.

Lastly, the doctrine of *necessity*, maintained in the Appendix, is the immediate result of the doctrine of the materiality of man; for mechanism is the undoubted consequence of materialism. But whether man be wholly material or not, I apprehend that proof enough is advanced that every human volition is subject to certain fixed laws, and that the pretended *self-determining power* is altogether imaginary and impossible.

In short, it is my firm persuasion, that the three doctrines of *materialism*, of that which is commonly called *Socinianism*, and of philosophical *necessity*, are equally parts of *one system*, being equally founded on just observations of nature, and fair deductions from the scriptures; and that whoever shall duly consider their *connexion*, and *dependence on one another*, will find no sufficient consistency in any general scheme of principles, that does not comprehend them all. At the same time each of these doctrines stands on its own independent foundation, and is capable of such separate demonstration, as subjects of a moral nature require, or admit.

I have advanced what has occurred to me in support of all the three parts of this system, confident that, in due time, the truth will bear down before it every opposing prejudice, how inveterate soever, and gain a firm establishment in the minds of all men.

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